

Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies (JSSHS)



An International Peer-reviewed journal

Number of issues per year: 6

ISSN: 2356-8801 (Print)

ISSN: 2356-8852 (Online)


Volume 3, Issue 1, February 2017

[Home](#)[Journals](#)[Contact Us](#)**TEXTROAD JOURNALS**

Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies

J. Soc. Sci. Hum. Stud. 2018., Vol.3 No. 1: pp. 1-26, Year 2017

Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies (JSSHS)
Bimonthly Publication



Number of issues per year: 6
ISSN: 2356-8801 (Print)
ISSN: 2356-8852 (Online)

Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies (JSSHS) is a peer reviewed, open access international scientific journal dedicated for publication of high quality original research articles as well as review articles in the all areas of Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies.

Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies (JSSHS) is devoted to the rapid publication of original and significant research in...

Acrobatics	Anthropology	Archeology
Arts	Business studies	Criminology
Communication studies	Corporate governance	Cross cultural studies
Demography	Development studies	Economics
Education	Environmental Studies	Ethics
Geography	Government	History
Industrial relations	Information science	International relations
Journalism	Law	Library science
Linguistics	Literature	Management
Market Research	Marriage and family life	Media studies
Methodology	Neuroscience	Paralegal
Performing arts (Comedy, Dance, Magic, Music, Opera, Film, Juggling, Marching Arts, Brass Bands, Theatre, Visual Arts, Drawing, Painting)	Philosophy	Political science
Population Studies	Psychology	Public administration
Religious studies	Social welfare	Sociology
Trade	Visual arts	Women studies

Scope

Editorial Board

Editor -in-Chief

William Ebomoyi

Ph.D., Professor, Department of Health Studies, College of Health Sciences, Chicago State University, **USA**.

E-mail: editor@textroad.com

Associate Editors

Prof. Dr. Sarwoko Mangkoedihardjo

Professor, Professional Engineer of Indonesian Society of Sanitary and Environmental Engineers, **Indonesia**

Saeid Chekani Azar

PhD of Veterinary Physiology; Faculty of Veterinary, Department of Physiology, Ataturk University, Erzurum 25010, **Turkey**.

Dr. Ravi Kant

Assistant Professor, M.A. (Economics) M.Ed., NET & Ph.D. in Education, Bihar, **India**.

Dr. Sandra Pacios Pujado

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, **USA**.

Vishal Patil, PhD

Materials Research Laboratory, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, **USA**.

Dr. YUBAO CUI

Associate Professor, Department of Laboratory Medicine, Yancheng Health Vocational & Technical College, Jiangsu Province, P. R. **China**

Chulho Kim

Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Advertising & PR, College of Social Science, Cheongju University, **South Korea**

Raja S Payyavula

Research Associate, Bio Science Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, **USA**.

Dr. Zhihong Song

The Ames Laboratory of US DOE, 2238 MBB Iowa State University, IA 54411 **USA**.

Prof. Dr. Valdenir José Belinelo

Department of Health Sciences and Postgraduate Program in Tropical Agriculture, Federal University of Espírito Santo (UFES, São Mateus, ES, **Brazil**

Dr. Chandrasekar Raman

Research Associate, Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biophysics, Biotechnology Core Facility, 238, Burt Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan 66506, KS, **USA**.

Mr. Jiban Shrestha

Scientist (Plant Breeding and Genetics), Nepal Agricultural Research Council, National Maize Research Program, Rampur, Chitwan, **Nepal**

Dr. Nadeem Javaid

Ph.D. (University of Paris-Est, France), Assistant Professor, Center for Advanced Studies in Telecommunications (CAST), COMSATS Institute of IT, Islamabad, **Pakistan**

Dr. Syamkumar Siv Pillai

Program Manager-National Clean Plant Network – Fruit Trees, Washington State University, **USA**

Dr. Hala Ahmed Hafez Kandil

Professor Researcher, National Research Centre, Plant Nutrition Dept. El-Bhouth St. Dokki, Giza, **Egypt**.

Prof. Dr. Aziza Sharaby

Pests and Plant Protection Department, National Research Center, Cairo, **Egypt**

Prof. Dr. Sanaa T. El-Sayed

Ex Head of Biochemistry Department, Professor of Biochemistry, Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology Division, National Research Centre, **Egypt**

Dr. Pratap V. Naikwade

M.Sc., Ph.D. Head, Department. of Botany, ASP College, Devrukh. Maharashtra, **India**.

Dr. Tarig Osman Khider

Associate Professor, University of Bahri-Sudan, College of Applied and Industrial Sciences, Department of Pulp and Paper Technology, **Sudan**

Dr. Hayman Z. Metwally

Associate Professor of Space Science Cairo University Egypt and Vice Dean of Quality Assurance and Development Hayel University **KSA**.

Dr. Nawfal Jebbor

Department of Physics, Moulay Ismail University, Meknes, **Morocco**.

Dr. Eng. Ahmed Kadhim Hussein

Assistant Professor, Department of Mechanical Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Babylon, Republic of **Iraq**.

Prof. Dr. Abd El Fady Beshara Morcos

Ass. Prof. of Relativistic Astrophysics and Cosmology, National Research Institute of Astronomy and Geophysics, **Egypt**.

Zohre Bahrami

Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, **Iran**. Researcher and Methodology Adviser.

Dr. Ayhan Kapusuzoglu

Department of Banking and Finance, Yildirim Beyazit University, **Turkey**.

Dr. Charalambos Tsekeris

Department of Psychology, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, **Greece**.

Dr. Mahdi Zowghi

Industrial and System Engineering, Management and Soft Computing, London Business and Engineering School, **United Kingdom**.

Dr. Tomislav Jurendic

Bioquanta Ltd. for Research and Development, Koprivnica, **Croatia**

Dr. Hanna Bolibok-Bragoszewska

Warsaw University of Life Sciences, **Poland**.

Dr. Alaa Abdelwahed Abdelbary

Prof. of Computational and Applied Mathematics, Arab Academy for Science and Technology & Maritime Transport, **Egypt**.

Dr. N R Birasal

Associate Professor, Zoology Department, KLE Society's G H College, HAVERI – 581 110, Karnataka state, **India**.

Dr. Nawab Ali Khan

Professor of Human Resource Management, College of Business Administration, Salman Bin Abdulaziz University, Post Box:165, Al Kharj - 11942 **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

Editors

Jasem Manouchehri

Instructor in Sport Management, College of Physical Education and Sport Sciences, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, **Iran**

Prof. Dr. Tarek Ahmed Shokeir

Professor and Consultant, Department of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Fertility Care Unit, Mansoura University Teaching Hospitals, Mansoura Faculty of Medicine, **Egypt**

Leila Falahati

Department of Resource Management and Consumer Studies, Faculty of Human Ecology, University Putra **Malaysia**.

Dr. Ali Elnaeim Musa

University of Bahri, Sudan College of Applied and Industrial Sciences, **Sudan**

Prof. Dr. Magda M.A. Sabbour

Professor, Department of Pests and Plant Protection- National Research Centre, Cairo, **Egypt**.

Dr. Basharia Abd Rub Alrasoul Abd Allah Yousef

Deputy Dean at Faculty of Engineering, University of Bahri, Khartoum, **Sudan**

Dr. Jinu John

Associate Professor (Biotechnology), Jinu Bhavan, Chepra (P. O), Kottarakara, Kollam (Dist.), Kerala – 691520; **India**.

Dr. Sunil Kumar

Assistant Professor, Department of Mathematics, National Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur, 831014, Jharkhand, **India**

Zairi Ismael Rizman

Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) (Terengganu) **Malaysia**

Muhammad Attique Khan Shahid,

Associate Professor of Physics, Department of Physics, GC University, Faisalabad. **Pakistan**. PNRA certified Health Physicist, RPO, RSO Atomic and Nuclear Physics Lab

Dr.Vuda Sreenivasarao

Department of Computer and Information Technology, Defence University College, Deberzeit, **Ethiopia**

Dr. Mohdammed Israil

Post Doctoral Fellow, University Sains Malaysia, Pulau Penang, **Malaysia**.

Dr. S. Ravichandran

Assistant Professor, Department of Physics, Sathyabama University, **India**

Dr. Sukumar Senthil Kumar

School of Mathematical Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, **Malaysia**.

Seifedine Kadry

American University of the Middle East, **Kuwait**.

Dr. Ho Soon Min

Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Applied Sciences, INTI International University, Persiaran Perdana BBN, Putra Nilai, Negeri Sembilan, **Malaysia**.

Dr. Ezzat Molouk Kenawy

Economic Department, Faculty of Commerce, Kafr El-Sheikh University, **Egypt**.

Dr. Farooq Ahmad Gujar

Centre for Advanced Studies in Pure and Applied Mathematics, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, 60800, **Pakistan**. & Head of Institution / Principal / Associate Professor of Mathematics.

Dr. Seshadri Sekhar. Tirumala

Principal, Chirala Engineering College, **India**.

Dr. Tarek Y. El-Hariri

Associated Professor, Egyptian Petroleum Research Institute, Exploration Department, **Egypt**.

Dr Mamode Khan Naushad

Department of Economics and Statistics, Faculty of social studies and humanities, University of Mauritius, **Mauritius**.

Dhahri Amel

Research professor, Research Unit: Materials, Energy and Renewable Energies (MEER)-Science Faculty of Gafsa, Tunisia.

Dr. Muhammad Waqas Anwar

COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, University Road, 22060, Abbottabad, **Pakistan**.

Prof. Dr. Abdul-Kareem J.Al-Bermany

Advance Polymer Laboratory, Physics Department/College of Science/Babylon University, **Iraq**.

Dr. Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah

Chairman Higher Studies and Research, Faculty of Management Sciences, International Islamic University Islamabad, **Pakistan**.

Saima Anis Mustafa

Assistant Professor in COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, University Road, Abbottabad, **Pakistan**

Dr.K.V.L.N.ACHARYULU

Faculty of Science, Department of Mathematics, Bapatla Engineering college, Bapatla, **India**.

Maryam Ahmadian

Post Doctoral Fellow, Department of Social and Development Sciences, Faculty of Human Ecology, Universiti Putra, UPM Serdang, Selangor, **Malaysia**.

Abdel Baset Hasoneh,

PhD, Associate professor of Marketing, Head of marketing Department Al Isra University - Amman, **Jordan**

Muhamad Fazil bin Ahmad

Asst. Prof. Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin, Terengganu, **Malaysia**.

Shaukat Amer

CPA, Assistant Professor, Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Attock, **Pakistan**.

Naveed Ahmed

Assistant Professor, Department of business administration, Indus International Institute, 2-Km, Jampur Road, Dera Ghazi Khan, **Pakistan**

Rab Nawaz Lodhi

PhD (ABD), Management Sciences (Bahria University Islamabad), Lecturer: Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Sahiwal, **Pakistan**.
International Licensed Trainer - NVivo Qualitative Research: QSR International Limited Australia

Dr. Majid Sharifi Rad

Department of Range and Watershed Management, Faculty of Natural Resources, University of **Zabol**

Dr. Muhammad Naeem

LECTURER, Department of Information Technology, Hazara University, **Mansehra**.

Dr. Sohrab Mirsaeidi

Centre of Electrical Energy Systems (CEES), Faculty of Electrical Engineering (FKE), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), 81310 Skudai, Johor, **Malaysia**

Farhan Altaee

Ministry of Science and Technology, **Iraq-Baghdad**

Dr. Hafiz Abdul Wahab

Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Department of Mathematics, Hazara University Mansehra **Pakistan**

Table of Contents, January 2017

Sabina Nargis Lepe

Britain's Recognition of Bangladesh as a State In 1972

J. Soc. Sci. Hum. Stud. 2017 3(1): 1-12. [\[Abstract\]](#) [\[Full Text PDF\]](#)

Agnes Atia Apusigah

Forging African Unity in a Globalizing World: A Challenge for Postcolonial Nation-Building

J. Soc. Sci. Hum. Stud. 2017 3(1): 13-26. [\[Abstract\]](#) [\[Full Text PDF\]](#)

Britain's Recognition of Bangladesh as a State In 1972

Sabina Nargis Lepe

Associate Professor, Department of Islamic History and Culture,
University of Chittagong, Chittagong- 4331, Bangladesh.

ABSTRACT

Using the declassified documents FCO (Foreign Commonwealth Office reports), PREM (Prime Minister Office reports), CAB (Cabinet papers), from the National Archives, Surry, UK, this paper attempts to investigate why Britain recognised Bangladesh as a state in 1972. Among other things, the article examines the legal framework of recognition and the historical context of the crisis in brief. It focuses in detail on the diplomatic interactions surrounding recognition and argues that Britain moved toward recognition on the basis of trade and to compete with the Soviet bloc. It also argues that, while there is a legal framework for the recognition, the application of the framework is political.

KEYWORDS: *Britain, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Recognition, 1971.*

INTRODUCTION

International approval plays an important role in the existence of a sovereign state.^[1] Seeking formal recognition from other states is, therefore, essential. On 16 December 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence, she needed recognition to support her freedom. Although prior to 16 December 1971, Bangladesh had been recognised by her neighbouring countries, India and Bhutan, acknowledgement from the wider world was needed to make her status stronger. For obvious reasons, besides the recognition of other countries, Britain's recognition was important. Britain held an important position in world affairs as both a Commonwealth state and a liberal international power. Britain also enabled easy access to the rest of Europe. Britain initially adopted a neutral stance in reaction to struggle between East and West Pakistan. British Government documents show that Britain maintained a cautious policy towards the recognition of Bangladesh, on the one hand seeking to avoid antagonizing Pakistan and on the other to build good relations with the new country. Some scholars have examined this issue.^[2] Janice Musson highlighted the British recognition of Bangladesh both from the legal aspect and Britain's self-interest but the paper did not consider the internal political pressures within Britain which also affected British policy. Angella Debnath pointed out British responses to the crisis with authority and examined it from wider geopolitical context but the process of recognition by Britain has discussed only in brief. Therefore, there is scope to scrutinize British policy concerning the recognition of Bangladesh.

Conception of recognition

The issue of recognition has often been debated in the field of international law. The fact that there are several forms of recognition (*de jure*, *de facto*, and *premature*) makes it more complicated. However, theoretically in international law recognition is 'an act of policy as distinguished from the fulfilment of a legal duty'.^[3] Stefan Talmon defined it as 'an indication of willingness or unwillingness on the part of the recognising Government to establish or maintain official, but not necessarily intimate relations with the Government in question'.^[4] As the number of new states has increased, so the recognition question comes to the forefront of the agenda of the international community. While there were fifty states at the start of the twentieth century, today there exist almost two hundred states.^[5] With regard to whether or not there is a duty to recognise a new state, some opines that it is obligatory and some argues that it is optional and political act.^[6]

In general, recognition by a third state helps the new state to gain legal status and creates good relations with the recognising parties. This approach, however, does not always work. For example, In the 1960s, Biafra seceded from Nigeria and was recognised by four African states, namely: Zambia, Tanzania, the Ivory Coast and Gabon.^[7] But Biafra had to reintegrate into Nigeria. Again, despite having a very hostile relationship with Cuba, America did not withdraw its recognition to Cuba; instead it cut diplomatic ties with Cuba.^[8] Some new states attempts at gaining independence and recognition take only for a few months while some have to wait for longer. Slovenia, Croatia gained recognition rapidly by other country. In contrast, Somaliland has successfully separated from Somalia and governed itself since 1991 but has not gained recognition from the international community.^[9] As mentioned, it is the

Corresponding Author: Sabina Nargis Lepe: Associate Professor, Department of Islamic History and Culture, University of Chittagong, Chittagong- 4331, Bangladesh. **E-mail:** snlepe@gmail.com, **Mobile:** +88-01731493657

decision of the recognising parties as to when a new state will be recognised. It is undeniable that, along with the legal side, political matters also influence decisions to recognise emerging states. For this reason, it is argued that, law and politics appear to be more closely interwoven on the question of recognition.^[10]

British policy of recognition

From 1933 to 1980 in recognising a new state, Britain followed the lines of international law laid down in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention (1933). The Convention sets out four criteria for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with the other states.^[11] For *de jure* recognition, Britain generally put emphasis on a new regime's effective control over the state's territory along with its firm establishment. In 1951, the Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, announced the British policy on recognition in parliament:

HMG (His Majesty's Government) consider that recognition should be accorded when the conditions specified by international law are, in fact, fulfilled and that recognition should not be given when these conditions are not fulfilled. The recognition of Government *de jure* or *de facto* should not depend on whether the character of the regime is such as to command HMG's approval.^[12]

Following this policy, Britain recognised the Communist Government of China in 1951, the Kadar regime of Hungary in 1956, the Colonels' junta of Greece in 1967 and Pinochet's coup in Chile in 1973.^[13] In almost every case Britain relied on the effective control of the territory. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office files on the South Asian crisis of 1971 contain an untitled and unsealed note which set out the HMG's criteria for recognition. According to this note:

The British Government's criterion for recognizing a new state is that it should have achieved its independent position with a reasonable prospect of permanency. A revolutionary Government is not entitled to recognition as the Government of the state until it may fairly be held to enjoy, with a reasonable prospect of permanency, the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of much of the greater part of the national territory.^[14]

Britain changed her policy on recognition in 1980. The main reason behind this change was the criticism that Britain was facing over her recognition of the Pol Pot Government of Cambodia and the Rawlings Government in Ghana which considered formal recognition as equivalent to moral endorsement.^[15] In our discussed period Britain followed the Montevideo Convention. From the above discussion on the legal framework of recognition, it is understood that recognition is a legal matter, but in practice applying that framework is a political decision. It is not automatic.

Historical context of the crisis of 1971

Before considering why Britain ultimately decided to recognise Bangladesh and the process leading to that recognition, it is necessary to provide some historical context on the crisis of 1971. After the partition of British India in 1947, the then eastern part of Bengal became East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) by joining with the Pakistan state. However, this joining was a bitter experience to the Bengalis. The socio-economic, cultural and political disparities between the two parts of Pakistan provided an impetus for national movements.

The language movement of 1952 was the first successful protest movement of Bengalis which culminated in a national movement. Finally, the Bengalis showed their grievances in the general election of Pakistan in 1970, where the Awami League of East Pakistan (a Bengali nationalist political party, established in 1949) won all but two of the 162 seats and almost 72% of the vote in the National Assembly.^[16] Rather than handing over power to the democratically elected party, the West Pakistani Government declared the postponement of National Assembly meeting. Furthermore, Dacca was attacked in an operation on 25 March 1971 (codename 'Operation Searchlight'). In Dacca alone, 15,000 people were killed in the 24 hour operation.^[17] Immediately after the massacre, East Pakistan declared its independence, thus sparking off the Bangladesh Liberation War.

Formation of the Provisional Govt. of Bangladesh and seeking recognition

Large numbers of East Pakistanis started to leave their land to the neighbouring country of India, following the crackdown of 25 March 1971. Some senior Awami League leaders also fled to India and later they formed a Provisional Government over there. In that Governmental body Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was declared as the President of Bangladesh, in his absence Sayed Nazrul Islam selected as Vice President and Acting President and Tajuddin Ahmed was Prime Minister. The formal swearing-in

ceremony of the Provisional Government was held on 17 April 1971, in Kustia, an area that was still within the control of the freedom fighters of Bangladesh. The Government became known as the Mujibnagar Government. Although all the activities of this Government were administered under this name (Mujibnagar) but the capital in exile was in Calcutta.^[18] Following its formation, the main targets of the new Government were to gain independence for Bangladesh and to obtain recognition from other countries. *The Economist* commented 'the main purpose of setting up the Provisional Government is to get foreign recognition for Bangladesh'.^[19]

Two weeks after the formation of the Bangladesh Provisional Government, a letter signed by Nazrul Islam and Mustaq Ahmed on 24 April 1971, was sent to the Queen Elizabeth II seeking recognition. It stated:

In view of the friendly relations that traditionally exist between the fraternal people of Bangladesh and that of the UK, I request of your Majesty's Government to accord immediate recognition to the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh will be pleased to establish normal diplomatic relations and exchange envoys with a view to further strengthen the ties of friendship between our own countries. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.^[20]

Initial stance of Britain

However, in accordance with British protocol, no reply was sent. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (Alec Douglas Home) sent a telegram to other diplomat offices stating that they should not acknowledge nor respond to the letter.^[21] An instruction also came from the Protocol and Conference Department to the South Asian Department (SAD) saying, 'the procedure for dealing with such letters is for them to be returned to the country of origin and for an acknowledgement or reply to the writer at the discretion of the post concerned'.^[22] It was quite clear, therefore, that Britain would not respond to the letter. Even before receiving the formal letter, some British officials of SAD displayed similar attitudes in a discussion with the Counsellor of the Netherlands Embassy in London. They stated, 'HMG recognized the existing Government of Pakistan and could not be associated with any moves which appeared to accord any degree of recognition to a separate Bangladesh'.^[23]

Similar opinions came from Cabinet members, who urged that the Government of Pakistan was generally in effective control of the territory and there could be no question of considering recognition of Bangladesh at this stage.^[24] In another Cabinet meeting, noting that India and the USSR had not recognised Bangladesh, Cabinet members took the decision 'there could be no question of our taking action of recognition, since none of the attributes of Statehood were evident'.^[25] Following this line, the Foreign Secretary declared in parliament that, 'the administration declined to accord recognition on the ground that there is no state of Bangladesh which fulfils Britain's normal criteria for recognition'.^[26]

Activities of the British Labour party in favour of recognition

While British government took a neutral stance, the British political parties, especially the Labour party supported Bengalis. The Party's successful efforts led to the arrangement of a special debate on 14 May, 1971 over the issue and that Motion was backed by 300 MPs. Another Motion 'genocide in East Bengal and the recognition of Bangladesh' was submitted by Labour MP John Stonehouse on 15 June, 1971 and it was signed by 210 MPs.^[27] Though this Motion was never debated. On the very day of Bangladesh's independence (16 December, 1971) Stonehouse asked the British Government to recognise Bangladesh, to build a bridge with the new state.^[28] Another member put forward the importance of early recognition to safeguard a continuation of trade in raw jute for Tayside (Scotland) which was so important for employment in that area.^[29] Some other members asked the British Government to consider British commercial interests, particularly the interests of the trade in jute and the leather industry (much of the British leather industry at that time depended on skins coming from Bangladesh). According to them, delay on recognition might divert trade to other countries.^[30] The Foreign Secretary assured parliamentary members that successful arrangements concerning the trade of jute had been made and many thousands of bales were available, which would help in the short term.^[31]

Labour members argued that Britain had a major part to play in rehabilitation as well as in commercial interests such as jute and tea and, therefore, HMG should recognise Bangladesh.^[32] Thus the Labour party put the British government under constant pressure by initiating motions, placing oral and written questions to the House on the crisis and relief, seeking statements from the concerned ministers; and other activities. That had an indirect impact on British policy. These internal political pressures, alone, however were not sufficient to sway British decision.

Various factors that shaped British policy about recognition

Throughout the crisis, Britain did not become embroiled with the issue; however, in 16 December, 1971 when Bangladesh became independent, the question of recognition came to the fore. The British Government closely observed the situation and considered the legal issues. The information that was being provided to London from the sub-continent enabled Britain to decide whether the conditions of international criteria were being actualized. Diplomats also gave their opinion about the situation, which influenced the Government. These legal issues were considered alongside Britain's own interests in the subcontinent.

By December, British policy makers were predicting West Pakistan's defeat and arrival of a new state. Heath commented, 'in the future we have to deal with three countries'.^[33] British officials also predicted the same thing that new state and Government might well be established that could meet the necessary criteria for recognition.^[34] The issue became more pressing when the new Government of Bangladesh revised the status of foreign consulates as foreign mission, until the new state would be recognised by their respective countries.^[35] These issues put the recognition question into fore.

Mujib's visit to London

Mujib's (the Awami League leader and President of Bangladesh Provisional Government) sudden visit to London after his long period spent in prison also brought the recognition question into the limelight. In fact, Heath was the first statesman who met with Mujib after his nine month prison sentence.^[36] In his meeting with Heath, Mujib called for recognition by Britain and urged Britain to encourage other friendly nations to recognise Bangladesh.^[37] Two days after this meeting, Heath sent messages to different Governments such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan), Richard Nixon (America), Georges Pompidou (France), William McMahon (Australia) and Pierre Trudeau (Canada) about his meeting with Mujib, describing it in a very positive way.^[38] In the Cabinet meeting Heath stated that he was impressed by Mujib and authorised the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Douglas Home, to arrange for recognition when he felt that the appropriate time had come.^[39]

Pressure of different groups

Different groups also applied pressure on the British Government. Many of Britain's 100,000 immigrant Bengalis were trying to persuade the Government for recognition. Such a vast number of immigrant Bengali's pleas could not be completely ignored. Furthermore, by the latter half of 1967 the immigration issue had become an important one in British politics. It was held in fourth position of importance by the voters in the election campaign of 1970.^[40] Other groups, British businessmen voiced some anxiety which the Government could not ignore, because they had a substantial investment in East Pakistan. British officials tried to allay fears and they gave assurance to the businessman that all the factors would be considered by the HMG.^[41] The British Tea Association members, who were involved with tea business, visited 12 of the estates in Sylhet (Bangladesh) early in the new year of 1972 and hoped that these damages caused by the war could be repaired.^[42] All these issues compelled Britain to take the recognition question seriously.

Commercial factors

The trading of jute and tea alongside other commercial matters were a major factor which prompted the Government to take a decision on recognition. Britain had established a good business network with both countries (India and Pakistan). In the 1960s, India was the fifth most important recipient of British direct investment.^[43] Although the amount of trade with India did diminish, post the 1960s Britain's economic investment and trade remained comparatively larger in India than they did in Pakistan. Britain also had a careful watch between the two countries (India and Pakistan) where British economic interests had suffered much. From J L Pumphrey (British High Commissioner to Islamabad) reported that 'in Pakistan British business has not suffered as much as might have been expected, partly because the commercial centre is in Karachi, out of the political main stream'.^[44] From India, Sir Terence Garvey (British High Commissioner to Delhi) reported that 'British exports in the first ten months of 1971 were up some 86 percent on the same period for the previous year'.^[45] Commercial factors were clearly in policy maker's mind around the time of recognition.

Commercial matters had priority at first meeting with Mujib held in 8 January 1972, where Sutherland discussed on various commercial issues.^[46] At the same time, some British officials put forward strong arguments for early recognition considering the trade and commerce. From Dacca, the British High Commissioner noted that the Bangladesh Government wanted to re-establish trade and commercial links with the UK and wanted to be a member of the Commonwealth.^[47] This further

displayed the importance of British recognition. Sir Terence Garvey, in his telegram, reminded the British Government of the Soviet bloc's influence over there and put his point that if recognition were unduly delayed, it could make things difficult.^[48]

Economic arguments in favour of recognition were also made by the British High Commissioner of Dacca. He reminded the British Government of the tea gardens of the East Pakistan and gave suggestions of how the manufacturing companies could look forward in the future to a modestly expanding market. In his telegram, he put importance on the prospects of invisible earnings from shipping, jute baling and merchandising and tea broking. Giving information on the Bangladesh Government's wish to use London's banking facilities for external transactions; he warned the British Government that delay in recognition could divert a high proportion of these invisible earnings to India. He also added that 'Bangladesh is the larger of the two countries in terms of population and that, in normal circumstances, earned just as much foreign exchange on visible exports'.^[49] Officials of FCO also pointed out the difficulties of moving too slowly on the question of recognition. They suggested:

If we are too slow and particularly if we are pre-empted by the Eastern bloc countries, we shall do a great disservice to ourselves and to Mujib. Non-recognition also creates considerable problems for British business in East Pakistan and for the resumption of aid. We should ideally move towards recognition in days rather than weeks.^[50]

Of all these sending information it showed that Britain had strong commercial interests were in the region.

Communism fear

Besides commercial matters, there was another issue which worried the British Government. The British Government got information that other countries especially some Communist countries were considering recognising Bangladesh. In a telegram of 8 December 1971, from Delhi which mentioned Bhutan's recognition of Bangladesh Terence Garvey wrote, 'there are persistent rumours here that East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and possibly other East European countries, but not the USSR, will recognize Bangladesh within a matter of weeks'.^[51]

In another telegram, which noted Poland's recognition, Terence Garvey put the total figure of recognizing countries at six, namely Poland, India, Bhutan, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and Mongolia.^[52] Another telegram described the growing interest of some Communist countries to build a bilateral relationship with the new state. From Warsaw, Henderson, the British High Commissioner, reported that following official recognition as an independent and sovereign state, the Polish Government wished to enter into diplomatic relations with the people's republic of Bangladesh and to exchange diplomatic missions.

Recognition by various Communist countries had made Britain alert to the situation and policy makers felt the need to take this matter seriously. In a meeting it was said, 'It would be contrary to our interests if the Soviet Union and the East European countries recognized whilst the Western countries did not'.^[53] The role of anti-communism in shaping British policy became apparent when Heath wrote to other Western European Governments. Mentioning their common Communist enemy, Heath tried to sway them in favour of early recognition. He wrote:

If Mujib receives early recognition and support from the West, it will help him to consolidate his position and improve his chance of keeping the country out of the hands of the extremists, if we delay too long the Communist countries will get a start on us in the East and the position of their friends there will be strengthened.^[54]

Thus the fact that there were a growing number of Communist countries giving their recognition was a cause for concern to the British Government.

Slow and cautious steps of Britain

But in December 1971, Britain was not in favour of recognition as Britain's normal criteria (as laid down in Montevideo convention) had not been fulfilled. Despite the continual requests of the Bangladesh Provisional Government representatives, Britain remained silent. Even recognition by India and Bhutan did not change the British administration's decision. P F Walker of SAD suggested 'our public line therefore remains that the necessary criteria for either *de facto* or *de jure* recognition have not been satisfied on present evidence'.^[55]

Similarly, the Cabinet also discussed whether the continued presence of Indian troops in Bangladesh to maintain order might complicate the question of Britain's eventual recognition of the new state.^[56] In response to questions asked by the German Ambassador about the likely timing of Britain's

recognition of Bangladesh, Denis Greenhill (Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs) argued that the presence of large numbers of Indian troops in East Bengal complicated the situation.^[57] The situation caused policy makers to hesitate and questions rose included whether Britain should either seek to encourage the new state's early establishment or favour a period of Indian administration.^[58] Moreover, some suggestions came from officials to rebuild relations with Pakistan. As different suggestions were coming from the officials, so the Heath Government was not prepared to be pushed into making a quick decision.

Following their slow and cautious steps on recognition, Britain wanted to rebuild good relations with Pakistan. Heath praised Bhutto's wise decision for releasing Mujib.^[59] The British Government did not want to break its relationship with Pakistan and also wanted to give Bhutto time to talk with Mujib, as Bhutto was claiming there was a possibility of a loose federation with East Pakistan. Bhutto strongly expressed his view that 'East Pakistan is an inseparable and an indissoluble part of Pakistan. Moslem Bengal will always be part of Pakistan'.^[60]

Unsuccessful effort of Heath to convince Bhutto

Heath believed that what Bhutto wanted was not possible. Although Bhutto was urging for a united Pakistan, he understood that things would never be same again. Heath commented, 'Bhutto's release of Mujib indicates that, while he cannot yet acknowledge it, he himself recognizes that the unity of Pakistan cannot be maintained'.^[61]

Heath tried to convince Bhutto of this reality. He wrote in a telegram to Bhutto that 'division is now a fact and it is difficult for us to move forward together until we have both come to terms with the realities as they now exist'.^[62] Furthermore, he pointed out that this would be the first instance of Britain accepting and endorsing the dismemberment of a Commonwealth country achieved through aggression.^[63] In the same letter, Bhutto suggested that British interests could be maintained in East Pakistan without the formal recognition of Bangladesh, citing the example of East Germany with whom Britain maintained commercial and financial relations without recognising that country. He also warned the British Government not to set a dangerous precedent for the future.^[64]

Reports also came from the British High Commission in Islamabad that Pakistan would regard recognition of Bangladesh as a hostile act.^[65] Due to this, the British Government considered delaying recognition. Douglas Home suggested that British interest would be best served by a short delay. A further suggestion came from the British High Commission, Islamabad, to give Bhutto at least 72 hours advance notice on the recognition matter.^[66] Furthermore, Bhutto mentioned his hope of a meeting with Mujib. He received assurance from Heath that this meeting could be held in the London were Mujib to agree.^[67]

British wish of concerted action

To avoid antagonising Pakistan and to reduce the risk of Pakistan leaving the Commonwealth, Britain wanted a collective effort of recognition by European countries or a number of Commonwealth countries.^[68] In a Cabinet meeting, Douglas Home reported that five or six substantial powers were ready to join with Britain. He hoped that if Britain proceeded in this way, the reaction in West Pakistan would not be unduly sharp.^[69] A similar suggestion came from Sutherland, who suggested that the British position would be much stronger if the French, German and a number of Commonwealth Governments agreed in principle to recognise Bangladesh at the same time.^[70] Douglas Home, still delayed for recognition 'to get a clear idea of the likely reaction of the West Pakistan Government'.^[71]

Bhutto's continued delaying tactics in pursuit of negotiation with Mujib and the recognition of other countries in the end prompted Britain to take action. British officials suggested that Britain should be guided by the British criteria for recognition rather than by waiting for Bhutto's negotiation. British High Commissioner, from Islamabad, urged Britain to pay less regard to Islamabad's susceptibilities and to be directed in considering the timing of recognition, by British normal criteria. In his telegram, he criticized Bhutto saying that, 'if Bhutto cannot give a lead in public recognition of the facts of life, he should at least not hold it against those that do'.^[72] In response to Bhutto's messages of 14 and 19 January 1972, Heath admitted that,

The British Government have never advocated nor wished to see the division of Pakistan. However, following the bloody events of March 1971, it was not easy to see how the status quo ante could ever be restored. As the wider section of the international community is now in favour of recognition, it would be pointless for Britain to stand aside for much longer.^[73]

In the meantime, Bhutto, in a message of 28 January 1972, invited Douglas Home to visit Pakistan and he hoped that decision on the recognition would not be taken by HMG until they had exchanged views. He also expressed his hope to the British High Commissioner in Islamabad, for a delaying of action by the HMG till his return from a visit to China.^[74] The FCO pointed out the disadvantages to the administration of accepting such request and strongly suggested not to turn down Bhutto's request.^[75]

Alongside this, officials suggested to inform the Pakistani Government that if the Foreign Minister cannot manage a visit on 4 February 1972, he would be able to call on his way back from East Asia around 19 February 1972; but that recognition would have to go ahead.

In fact, the decision on recognition had already been taken. In the message of 29 January 1972, Heath wrote bluntly to Bhutto that, '...we are on the point of instructing our High Commission to inform you that we would recognize the new state of Bangladesh and do so on 4 February 1972'.^[76] Heath also requested Bhutto to let him know of any new factors which might affect the timing. Heath boldly concluded that 'I must be clear that we could not delay recognition by more than a few days'.^[77] It is noteworthy that Heath mentioned to Bhutto about the effect of the timing, not about the effect of the decision itself. It showed that the decision already had been taken no matter what Bhutto wanted.

Commonwealth issue

The British desire to preserve Commonwealth unity was a factor in the timing of recognition. There was a rumour throughout the crisis that Pakistan would leave the Commonwealth and this has had an influence on the decisions made by Britain. Jamaica and Cyprus wrote letters of anxiety to the Commonwealth Secretariat.^[78] Britain encouraged Pakistan to remain in the Commonwealth in many ways. At first policy makers decided to recognise Bangladesh in the third week of January, however, later they changed their timing, after considering Pakistan's decision on the Commonwealth issue. Douglas Home suggested, 'if there is a clear indication that recognition by HMG would result in West Pakistan leaving the Commonwealth or serious damage to our interests, I accept that we must wait longer'.^[79]

As the two countries (Pakistan and India) were Commonwealth members, the question of mediation by the Commonwealth arose. Srimavo Bundernaik (President of Ceylon) was the first head of Government who put the matter of Commonwealth mediation formally in a letter written to the Commonwealth Secretariat. Arnold Smith (the then Commonwealth Secretary) in his memoirs, claimed that he was actively working on this.^[80] However, officials' comments suggest that they did not have much confidence in Smith. In response to the American official's question on Commonwealth mediation, Lord Cromer (British Ambassador in Washington) replied that 'Arnold Smith's efforts did not seem likely to be very effective'.^[81] Smith planned for a Commonwealth team which would send messages to both Governments and visit Islamabad, Dacca and Delhi, was not warmly received by Douglas Home.^[82] Sutherland later commented that 'Smith had indulged in wishful thinking'.^[83]

Smith tried to keep Pakistan in the Commonwealth and he went to Pakistan in order to persuade Bhutto to remain in this organization. However, Bhutto declared the withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth just two hours before his meeting with Smith.^[84] However, Britain did not want Pakistan to leave the Commonwealth and messages show that they were cautious about it. Pakistan eventually withdrew its Government from the Commonwealth on 30 January 1972.

Was British policy influenced by U.S?

British policy in early 1972 was also shaped by its relationship with the US. Britain kept in contact with America as the possibility of recognising Bangladesh emerged in early 1972. Britain believed that the new state was likely to remain. In the Bermuda meeting (20 December 1971), the British authorities expressed this view to the American delegates.^[85] But the Nixon administration was reluctant to accept an independent Bangladesh. Sutherland, in his letter written to K. M. Wilford (FCO Assistant Undersecretary of State), made a comment that America needed to realize the truth and must accept Bangladesh.^[86] On the recognition question, the Nixon administration considered the temperament of the Government of West Pakistan. Nixon said, 'We must never recognise Bangladesh until West Pakistan gives us the go ahead'.^[87] Kissinger, in his conversation with the Chinese Ambassador in New York leaders stated that they were not going to negotiate and recognise Bangladesh.^[88]

Britain maintained close contact with America on this issue as America had a good relationship with Pakistan. Heath requested an attempt to convince Bhutto to accept the inevitability of recognition of Bangladesh, as Heath believed that 'Nixon's views weigh heavily with Bhutto'. In a telegram of 15 January 1972, Heath outlined some positive reasons for early recognition to Bangladesh and hoped that

America would join in this. He continued, '...I believe that, jointly we use all the influence at our disposal to maintain our position and interests in the subcontinent'.^[89]

Although Britain was maintaining close contact with America and shared their view on the Bangladesh issue, British decision making on the timing of recognition was not influenced by the US administration. Rather, the Nixon administration was sure that Britain would recognise Bangladesh prior to the US. Even in an official meeting, the US official William P. Rogers (United States Secretary of State) expressed this view to British officials.^[90] Kissinger tactfully wanted to stall the British recognition. He remarked to Lord Cromer (British Ambassador to the US) that Heath had undertaken at Bermuda not to recognise Bangladesh before Nixon's visit to China. Heath confirmed to officials that he had given no such undertaking.^[91] In the Cabinet, Heath firmly declared 'although it was right that the views of the United States Government should be sought, we were under no obligation to them in the matter'.^[92]

Britain accorded recognition a full two months before the US. Though Nixon shared Heath's view to reinforce Mujib's hand against extremists, they were investigating their position on recognition. Nixon wrote:

We want to defer any decision until we have a clearer picture of how it will relate to the broader situation in South Asia. Principally, we consider how our recognition will affect a number of basic factors in the subcontinent, including the relationship between the new regime in Dacca and India.^[93]

The Nixon administration at that time was very interested to open their link with China, and Pakistan was playing a mediatory role, therefore, America took sides with Pakistan. As China had a hostile relationship with India, so it was also supporting Pakistan and therefore did not want to recognise Bangladesh. American and Chinese policy was in favour of Pakistan and so on in the matter of recognition.^[94] America's decision on recognition took final shape only after Nixon's visit to China. After returning to his own country, Nixon told Kissinger that 'I am just going to drag my feet on it'.^[95] By contrast, Britain gave its recognition in early 1972.

Reports of British diplomats in favour of recognition

British recognition was of particular importance to Bangladesh since it gave a lead to many other countries. In fact, most of the Scandinavian countries recognised Bangladesh on the same day of Britain (4 February 1972).^[96] In December 1971, Bangladesh had gained recognition only by two countries. Within two months, Bangladesh had gained recognition from 32 countries.^[97] Britain was one of them. From January 1972, positive remarks concerning recognition were coming from British diplomats.

The British Deputy High Commissioner of Dacca, Rae Britten, reported that, the takeover after the initial confusion was remarkably orderly.^[98] As the British Government was concerned about the Indian troops, he added:

It has of course to be admitted that the Indian army is the power behind the scenes. It has however in Dacca at least, withdrawn to barracks and is careful not to interfere in civil affairs. ...but I don't think one could justifiably say that the Indians are running the country.^[99]

Rae Britten clearly urged in favour of recognition and hoped that this recognition by Britain would greatly strengthen the hands of those individuals in the Government who were pro-west.^[100] From Pakistan Phumphrey argued, 'I submit that inhibitions which have so far restrained the HMG are considerably reduced and arguments for moving fairly smartly towards British recognition are correspondingly strengthened'.^[101] From Delhi, Garvey, expressed his view more sharply:

If, as I believe, the point of no return has been passed in the separate evolution of Bangladesh, time has surely come up to stop beating around the bush. If you see concrete reasons for continuing to sit tight I should be grateful for enlightenment.^[102]

Douglas Home, in a telegram dated 11 January 1972, gave his view that 'it now seems possible that recognition of Bangladesh may be closer than we thought'.^[103]

This shows that from January 1972, the decision on recognition had basically been made; however, there was still the issue of timing. In fact, the Heath administration was facing the problem 'not so much whether to recognise but when to do so'.^[104] Douglas Home, informed the House that the

question of recognition was under close consideration and the British administration had been in touch with a number of Commonwealth and other Governments.^[105]

So, in January, when the situation became calm and the British Government had received positive information from their diplomatic postings and having had discussions with other allied partners, Britain took the decision of recognition. Giving the news of the British Government's recognition of Bangladesh, Heath wrote to Mujib:

..... I look forward to working with you for the strengthening of the good relations which already exist between our two peoples. I am sure that your Government will do everything it can to promote peace and good relations with the other countries of the subcontinent; I can assure you of our strong support in this.^[106]

On 4 February 1972, in parliament, Foreign Secretary declared the HMG's decision and hoped that recognizing the new state of Bangladesh would, for Britain, be the beginning of a new epoch of friendship and co-operation with all the countries of the subcontinent.^[107] The Foreign Secretary also explained the time taken for recognition. He said, 'Britain was trying to time its recognition of Bangladesh at a point when there would be no rupture in bilateral relations and the maximum harmony created for the three countries of the sub-continent to come together'.^[108] The FCO officials were also put under pressure to declare Britain's position in public. The officials wanted to make a declaration of this decision prior to Douglas Home's visit to Pakistan in order that they could avoid the pressure of Pakistan or persuasion by India.^[109]

Conclusion

The British Government considered the recognition matter in the light of the reports from the area, concerted action with other Commonwealth or European countries, while, of course, keeping emphasis on their own interests. Britain explained these causes to the Pakistan Government which came through the Foreign Commonwealth Office. It pointed out two main causes which led to Britain opting for recognition: to protect British trade interests and to minimise Communist influence over the new Bangladesh Government. They also wanted to be in a position to exercise influence over Mujib in the direction of negotiation and accommodation with West Pakistan.^[110] It is true that, besides the legal niceties, both political and economical considerations played a critical role in determining the position taken by the UK with regard to Bangladesh.

British recognition was based on the implementation of international criteria. On recognition question though Britain was operating within international law, the application of those criteria was influenced by a range of factors, particularly the fear of Communism, and the desire to protect commercial interests. Decisions were not taken in a vacuum, but were shaped by non-governmental opinion and the international context. Although it was important that these provisions were being upheld, it was always in the minds of the British Government that consideration would have to be given to how the recognition of Bangladesh would affect Britain's political and economic matters.

Recognition of the new country by some Communist countries and their desire to build bilateral relation with Bangladesh prompted Britain in the timing of the announcement of recognition. British Officials came to the conclusion that an economically profitable Bangladesh and friend of India would be much more beneficial for Britain. Britain tried to keep Pakistan in the Commonwealth. Similarly, Britain knew very well that, though Pakistan had left Commonwealth, it would not terminate its relations with Britain. The British recognition was welcomed in this new state. While America was condemned for its action, Britain became popular in Bangladesh. This study reveals that although recognition is a legal matter that uses a legal framework, applying such a framework is a not automatic and can be implemented through political and economical, rather than legal decisions.

NOTES:

1. Catellino, *International law and self-determination*, 168.
2. Musson, *Britain and the recognition of Bangladesh in 1972*, 125-144; Debnath, *British perceptions of the East Pakistan crisis 1971*, 421-450.
3. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International law*, 7.
4. Talmon, *Recognition of government in the international law*, 23.
5. Crawford, *The creation of states in international law*, 4.

6. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in international law*, 75; Brownlie, *Principles of public international law*, 88.
7. Orakhelashvili, "Statehood, recognition and the UN system, 6; Harris, *Cases and materials on international law*, 131.
8. Warbrick, *The new British policy of recognition of government*, 569-592.
9. Coggins, "Secession Recognition and the international politics of statehood", 3.
10. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in international law*, v.
11. Dixon, et al., *Cases and materials on international law*, fifth edition, 133.
12. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, fifth series, Vol. 485, col. 2410-2411, 21 March 1951.
13. Warbric, *The new British policy of recognition*, 570.
14. FCO 37/902, 13 Dec. 1971.
15. Talmon, *Recognition of Government in international law*, 6.
16. For details see, Government of India, *Bangladesh Documents*, vol. 2.
17. Chowdhury, *Genocide in Bangladesh*, 129.
18. Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Constitutional quest for autonomy 1950-71*, 244.
19. *The Economist*, Vol. 239, no. 6660, April 17, 1971, 32.
20. FCO 37/888, from Syed Nazrul Islam, Acting President of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, the Queen of United Kingdom and of her other realms and territories, 24 April 1971.
21. FCO 37/870, telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 1017, 11 June 1971.
22. FCO 37/888, Letter from Protocol and Conference Department to South Asian Department, 8 June 1971.
23. FCO 37/883, telegram from FCO to the Hauge, no. 75, 16 April 1971.
24. CAB 128/49, CM 71, 21st Conclusions, 22 April 1971.
25. CAB 128/49, CM 71, 32nd Conclusions, 17 June 1971.
26. Parliamentary debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol-820, col. 26, 28 June, 1971.
27. FCO 37/888, Early Day Motion no 592, 'Genocide in East Bengal and the recognition of Bangladesh', 15 June, 1971, enclosed in the Foreign Secretary 23 June 1971, House of Commons debate notes on East Pakistan.
28. House of Commons debate, vol. 828, col. 848, 16 Dec. 1971.
29. *Ibid*, vol. 829, col. 218, 18 Jan. 1972.
30. Among 9 contributors to the debate, 6 members argued for early recognition and other members urged for aid, transport supply, set up a special commission in Dacca for the transition period, etc. For details see Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 829, col. 218, 18 Jan. 1972,
31. *Ibid*, Vol. 829, col. 220, 18 Jan. 1972
32. FCO 37/1019, telegram from Dacca to FCO, no. 66, 10 Jan. 1972.
33. PREM 15/571, telegram from FCO to Washington, no. 3170, 13 Dec. 1971
34. FCO 37/902, from P. F. Walker to Wilford, 9 Dec. 1971.
35. FCO 37/902, telegram from Delhi to FCO, no. 3383, 31 Dec. 1971.
36. FCO 37/1041, Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 8 Jan. 1972; FCO 37/1041, 'message to Nixon from Heath', telegram from FCO to Washington, no. 82, 13 Jan. 1972.
37. FCO 37/1041, Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street on Saturday, 8 Jan. 1972.
38. FCO 37/1041, 'Sheikh Mujib: message from the PM', from Sutherland to Wilford, 10 Jan. 1972.
39. CAB 128/48, CM 72, 1st Conclusions, 11 Jan. 1972.
40. Spencer, *British immigration policy since 1939*, 140-143.
41. FCO 37/930, telegram from Karachi to Islamabad, no. 333, 18 Dec. 1971.
42. FCO 37/1052, 'British tea interests in Sylhet', from Dacca to FCO, no. 78, 12 Jan 1972.
43. Davenport et al. ed. *British business in Asia since 1860*, 7.
44. FCO 37/1135, letter from Pumphrey to Douglas Home, 1 Jan. 1972.
45. FCO 37/1093. From Garvey to Douglas Home, 10 Jan. 1972.
46. FCO 37/1041, Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 8 Jan. 1972.
47. FCO 37/902, from Dacca to FCO, 27 Dec. 1971.
48. FCO 37/1046, telegram from Delhi to FCO, no. 69, 7 Jan. 1972.
49. FCO 37/1019, telegram from Dacca to FCO, no. 42, 6 Jan. 1972.
50. FCO 37/1041, note for the Secretary use in the Cabinet
51. FCO 37/902, telegram from Delhi to FCO, no. 2993, 8 Dec. 1971.
52. FCO 37/1019, telegram from Delhi to FCO, no. 112, 13 Jan. 1972

53. FCO 37/1019, India /Pakistan /Bangladesh, West European Union Council meeting, 12 Jan. 1972.
54. FCO 37/1041, 'Heath's message to Pompidou, 15 Jan. 1972.
55. FCO 37/902, 'Recognition of Bangladesh', from P. F. Walker to Wilford, 9 Dec. 1971.
56. CAB, 128/49, Cabinet meeting (CM) 71, 63rd Conclusions, 14 Dec. 1971.
57. FCO 37/902, India/Pakistan, from T. L. A. Daunt to SAD, 31 Dec. 1971.
58. FCO 37/930, 'India /Pakistan', from Ian Corl to Secretary of State, 15 Dec. 1971.
59. PREM 15/751, From FCO to Islamabad, no. 41, 'message from Heath to Bhutto', 7 Jan. 1972.
60. *The Scotsman*, 21 Dec. 1971, no. 40114, 1.
61. FCO 37/1041, Heath's message to Nixon, 15 Jan. 1972.
62. PREM 15/751, telegram from FCO to Ankara, no. 102, 24 Jan. 1972.
63. PREM 15/751, High Commissioner for Pakistan, London to 10 Downing Street, Bhutto's message to Prime Minister, 19 Jan. 1972.
64. PREM 15/751, Letter from Bhutto to Heath, 19 Jan. 1972.
65. FCO 37/902, 'recognition of Bangladesh', telegram from FCO to Canberra, no. 1314, 24 Dec. 1971.
66. PREM 15/751, telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 144, 21 Jan. 1972.
67. PREM 15/751, telegram from FCO to Ankara, no. 102, 24 Jan. 1972.
68. PREM 15/751, telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 145, 21 Jan. 1972.
69. CAB 128/48, Cm 72, 3rd Conclusions, 20 Jan. 1972.
70. FCO 37/1041, 'Sheikh Mujib: message from the PM', from Sutherland to Wilford, 10 Jan. 1972.
71. FCO 37/1019, telegram from FCO to Bonn, no. 18, 12 Jan. 1972.
72. FCO 37/1019, 'Recognition of Bangladesh', telegram from Islamabad to FCO, no. 115, 11 Jan. 1972.
73. PREM 15/751, telegram from FCO to Ankara, no. 102, 24 Jan. 1972.
74. PREM 15/751, 'Bangladesh: Message from Heath to Bhutto', telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 184, 29 Jan. 1972.
75. PREM 15/751, from FCO to No. 10 Downing Street, 29 Jan. 1972.
76. PREM 15/751, 'Bangladesh', telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 184, 29 Jan. 1972.
77. PREM 15/751, 'Bangladesh' telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 184, 29 Jan. 1972.
78. Musson, *Britain and the recognition of Bangladesh*, 136.
79. PREM 15 /751, telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 144, 21 Jan. 1972.
80. For details see Arnold Smith, *Stitches in time: the Commonwealth in world politics*, 130-153.
81. FCO 37/907, telegram from Washington to FCO, no. 2656, 6 Aug. 1971.
82. Smith, *Stitches in time*, 134-137.
83. Musson, *Britain and the recognition of Bangladesh*, 138.
84. Smith, *Stitches in time*, 144.
85. PREM 15/1268, Record of conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Henry Kissinger at the Princess hotel, Bermuda, 20 Dec. 1971.
86. FCO 37/1041, 'Sheikh Mujib; message from PM', from Sutherland to Wilford, 10 Jan. 1972.
87. Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS) Vol. XI, Document No. 266. Also available on www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon
88. Burr, (ed.), *The Kissinger transcripts*, 56.
89. FCO 37/1041, Heath's message to Nixon, 15 Jan. 1972.
90. PREM 15/1268, Record of a plenary meeting between the UK and the US delegations led by the Prime Minister and President Nixon at Government House, Bermuda, 21 Dec. 1971.
91. FCO 37/1041, from Sutherland to Wilford, 'Sheikh Mujib; message from the PM, 10 Jan. 1972.
92. CAB 128/49, CM 72, 1st Conclusions, 11 Jan. 1972.
93. FCO 37/1041, 'Nixon message to Heath', telegram from FCO to Washington, no. 295, 4 Feb. 1972.
94. Habib Sidky, *Chinese world strategy and South Asia*, 956-980.
95. Transcript of telephone conversation between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon, Washington, 3 March 1972, FRUS, Documents on South Asia, 1969-76, vol. E-7, Document 407. Also available on www.stse.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7/index.htm
96. <http://www.norway.org-bd/news-and-events/press/celebrating-40-years-of-freedom-and-freindship> 4 February, 2012; <http://www.nccib.com/2012/02/06/scandinavian-embassies-celebrates-40-years-of-recognition-of-bangladesh/>
97. Catellino, *International law and self-determination*, 167.
98. FCO 37/1019, telegram from Dacca to FCO, no. 42, 6 Jan. 1972.

99. FCO 37/1019, telegram from Dacca to FCO, no.42, 6 Jan. 1972.
100. FCO 37/1019, *Ibid*.
101. FCO 37/1046, telegram from Delhi to FCO, no. 69, 7 Jan. 1972.
102. FCO 37/1019, telegram from Delhi to FCO, no. 102, 11 Jan. 1972.
103. FCO 37/1019, telegram from FCO to Islamabad, no. 64, 11 Jan. 1972.
104. FCO 37/1041, 'message from Heath to Nixon', 15 Jan. 1972.
105. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 829, col. 216, 18 Jan. 1972.
106. FCO 15/751, telegram from FCO to Dacca, no. 153, 3 Feb.1972.
107. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 830, col. 823, 4 Feb. 1972.
108. *Ibid*, col. 825, vol. 830.
109. PREM 15/751, from FCO to No. 10 Downing Street, 29 Jan. 1972.
110. PREM 15/751, from Alec Douglas Home to PM, 72/1.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, Maudud,1976.Bangladesh:Constitutional quest for autonomy 1950-71. Dacca: University Press Limited.
- Brownlie,Ian,2008.Principles of public international law. 7th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burr,William,(ed.),1998.The Kissinger transcripts: the top secret talks with Beijing and Moscow. New York: New Press.
- Catellino, Joshua,2000.International law and self-determination: the interplay of the politics of territorial possession with formulation of post-colonial national identity.US: Martinus Nijhoff publishers.
- Chowdhury, Kalyan,1984.Genocide in Bangladesh. India: Orient Longman Limited.
- Coggins,Bridget L.,2006.Secession, Recognition and the international politics of statehood,PhD thesis, the Ohio State University, USA.
- Crawford,J.,2006.The creation of states in international law.2nd edition. UK: Oxford Clarendon Press.
- Cunningham,George,1972.The legal status of Pakistani immigrants in Britain. Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies,1(3):216.
- Davenport, R. P. T et al. (ed.),1989.British business in Asia since 1860.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Debnath,Angela,2011.British perceptions of the East Pakistan crisis 1971: hideous atrocities on both sides?. Journal of Genocide Research, 13(4):421-450.
- Dixon, Martin. et al., 2011.Cases and materials on international law. fifth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Government of India,1972.Bangladesh Documents. vol. 2. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs.
- Habib Sidky, Mohammad, 1976. Chinese world strategy and South Asia: The China Factor in indo-Pakistani relations. Asian Survey, 16(10):965-980.
- Harris,David,2010.Cases and materials on international law.UK: Thomson Reuters.
- Lauterpacht,Hersch,1948.Recognition in International law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morgan, Kenneth O.,1990. The people's peace: British history 1945-89.Oxford, New York: Oxford University press.
- Musson, Janice,2008.Britain and the recognition of Bangladesh in 1972.Diplomacy and Statecraft, 19(3):125-144.
- Orakhelashvili, Alexander, 2008.Statehood, recognition and the UN system: a unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo, in Max Planck Year book of United Nations Law, A. Von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum,(ed.), Vol-12. Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill N.V.
- Smith, Arnold,1981.Stitches in time: the Commonwealth in world politics. London: A. Deutsch.
- Smith, Simon C., 2010. Coming down on the Winning Side: Britain and the South Asia Crisis, 1971.Contemporary British History, 24(4):451-470.
- Spencer, Ian, j,1997. British immigration policy since 1939: the making of multi-racial Britain. New York:Routledge.140 -143.
- Talmon, Stefan, 1998.Recognition of government in the international law: with particular reference to governments in exile. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Warbrick, Colin,1981.The new British policy of recognition of government. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 30(3):569-592.

Forging African Unity in a Globalizing World: A Challenge for Postcolonial Nation-Building

Agnes Atia Apusigah

Faculty of Education, University for Development Studies, P. O. Box TL1350, Tamale, Ghana.

ABSTRACT

The paper examines the dilemma of African unity against the background of the multiplicity of political interests and agenda. It examines this in the context of the African Union and its sub-regional groupings and in relation to the diverse competing interests, internally and externally. It argues that the ongoing unity efforts have been simplified and enmeshed in a return to a tradition that from the onset had not understood the complexities of the continent and its history. It shows that the complex mix of forces confronting modern African states today, can only be understood within the context of history and the lived realities of the people caught in its tracks. Hence, such political action needs to be informed and shaped by the radical ideological framings of the early nationalist and post-colonialist thinking reflected in the projects of Conscientization, Ujaama, Harambee and Negritude. Such efforts had blended African traditionalism with modernism to rebuild the fragmented and distorted communities that Africa's colonization had created. It concludes on a critical pan-Africanist argument that unless the current African leadership extricates its thinking and actions from the colonial binds including its newest allies, globalization and developmentalism, in order to embrace a critical postcolonial framework in the on-going nation-building efforts, the unity talks would be in vain.

KEY WORDS: Pan-Africanism, African Unity, traditionalism, Post/colonialism, Nationalism

INTRODUCTION

Balkanized, fragmented, fractured and distorted, are a few of the qualifiers of some anti-colonial, Africanist and postcolonial criticism of Africa's experience of colonization^[2, 5, 21]. During the First African Conference of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora in 2004 in Dakar Senegal, the picture of a wounded Africa was played out, over and over again, to explain the slow pace of development. Perhaps, President Yoweri Musevi of Uganda's treatise underscored best the role of balkanization in the slow pace of the continent's growth. In that speech, he drew parallels to the United States of America (USA) and China and how they had made good their economies of scale to demonstrate how the distortion of traditional social structures and fragmentation of Africa had weakened its negotiation power. Yet, was Africa ever a unitary whole even in its traditional past? Can Africans claim a past that was unified in spite of its diverse politics and peoples? To what extent can the ongoing reclamation effort dwell on such claim and of what worth is that claim for Africa's futures? While supporting the agenda of unification, inarguably Africa's pre-colonial past was diverse and not a unified whole. The emergence and opulence of diverse kingdoms and ethnicities that existed side by side in those days, did not model uniformity but co-operation and co-existence. It was diversity rather than uniformity that gave birth to the powerful kingdoms, rich cultures and innovative institutions and structures of Africa. Therefore, that complex African heritage which has been achieved through what is now feared by modern (read contemporary) Africa because of diversity has become a basis for regression. While that past was not without its own share of woes as empire-building had its own violations and injustices, the achievements of those times should spur on Africa to unity in diversity in the form of regionalism and integration. The pan-Africanist agenda has been driven by an appreciation of unity in diversity rather than the uniformity often suggested by some African leaders in order to explain away Africa's woes while stalling unity talks. It is thus proposed that the independent era nationalists recognised that early in their struggles in their proposition for a United States of Africa, a proposal which remains relevant today and should guide ongoing efforts on regional cooperation and continental integration. Indeed, as eloquently pointed out by Chachage^[6], there have been differences in thinking on the form of a united Africa rather than the need for it. While Nkrumah, then president of Ghana, pressed for a radical revolutionary united Africa now, Nyerere of Tanzania and many other leaders felt African unification should be gradual. Although the gradualist won at the end of the day, what win might that claim be when for over fifty years we have been marking time on gradualism? Nkrumah and his radical instantists did not lose out Africa did. To date the colonialists continue to take advantage of the lack of unity to continue to plunder Africa's resources while majority of its people live in poverty and squalor. The reform of the Organization of

African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2002 was meant to expedite action on African Unity but that was 14 years ago. What has happened?

Far back in the 19th century, during the 1888 Berlin Conference, Africa's lands, together with its peoples and property, were shredded and shared by foreign powers resulting in the widespread pillage and plundering of all of its resources in the name of so-called civilization and modernization. The vast and diverse yet unexplored rich resources of the African continent were easy attractions for the colonial predators. The civilizing mission of Europe, in the form of the westernization of African peoples, who then held on to their rich ancient traditions and charted their own unique pathways of modernization became the target of the cultural genocide that accompanied colonization. Not only were African worldviews and ways of life considered uncivil requiring Western-style modernization, but also the continent's resources were targeted for the Western model of modernization. The results of such violations are not just the ever lingering socio-economic challenges that the continent continually face but also the fragmented and distorted identities and disfigured citizenry with their attendant complicated, often conflicting loyalties, interests, agenda and even identities. Through settlement, occupation and association, the modernizing mission of the West has ended in the plundering of African human and material resources and implanted controversial structures and systems leaving in their wake the hurts and wounds that continue to drive conflicts and violent outbursts on the continent. Yet, in present time, through international trade, development aid and development cooperation similar hurts and wounds are perpetuated and even sustained. Globalization and developmentalism have become the modernizing tools vigorously ploughing away Africa's human and material resources. Token efforts such as economic recovery, structural adjustments, highly indebted poor country initiatives, accelerated growth and opportunities for Africa and foreign direct investment had largely tended to further disenfranchise Africa and African rather than promote the promised growth. ^[19, 5]

In today's globalizing world, where economic integration has meant not just the elimination of market barriers but also the increasing disappearance of geographical boundaries in trade relations, the situation of Africa has been compounded. Through technological transfer, development cooperation and assistance, many African nations find themselves at the receiving end of programmes that weaken internal controls and restrict endogenous initiatives. Multilateral and bilateral relationships have resulted in the implementation of programmes that widen the reach of external partners while weakening intra and inter African cooperation. Under the structural adjustment programmes, widely implemented by African states in the 1980s and 1990s, the poverty reduction strategies that replaced them and the now new aid modalities, the neo-liberal agenda have and continue to yield mixed outcomes. Growth in gross domestic products, infrastructure development and improved social services have been accompanied by the shrinking of local enterprise, increasing environmental degradation, loss of national autonomy and widening inequalities. Progress in the socio-economic growth of African nations has been at great cost. Africa's so-called successes under adjustments have visited on the beneficiaries grave socio-economic injustices with far reaching implications for sovereignty, autonomy and identity of the individual nations and the continent as a whole. Such initiatives continue to erode the continent's pride of place in the world polity. Its fortunes continue to decline as a respectable and effective geo-political bloc. These challenges have been cited time and again as compelling reasons for African unity ^[12, 5, 10]. Indeed, this situation underpinned and gave rise to the pan-Africanist struggles. Such realization gave cause for the first Pan-African Conference which was held in London in 1900 at the instance of Henry Sylvester-Williams ^[19, 20]. Over a century later, Africa has still not settled on how to proceed and remains divided: the instantists versus gradualists, progressives versus conservatives and radicalisms and practicality; as if this was something new. There is a lot of talk but action remains slow. Donald Kaberuka, a former president of the African Development Bank has asserted that:

The 'decades-long prevarication' to implement real economic integration, despite ambitious documents ranging from the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 to those establishing the New Partnership for Africa's Development in 2000, has had a devastating effect on the continent. Intra-African trade- the theme of two AU summits in 2012- remains lower than that of any other continent. ^[8]

While exogenous factors continue to dominate explanations, it is also clear that endogenous factors contribute significantly to derail progress. As Kabureka has explained, the mere lack of continental strategies on the airline industry alone has made travelling elsewhere cheaper than in Africa ^[8].

Even as exogenous factors present their own challenges, Africa and Africans have in many ways not only extended but also created their own demons. The continued allegiances, the struggles over resources and the deeply divisive and unhealthy identity politics, some of which have led to genocidal outbursts can be attributed to, among others, the misguided parochial interests and identity reclamation struggles by segments or entire

populations, internally or cross-border. Internally, Ghana, Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Congo and; externally, Nigeria and Cameroun, Somalia and Ethiopia, have been some of the hotspots. Yet, the continued interest and agenda clashes, all over the African continent, were much anticipated in the post-independence unity efforts starting from Ghana's independence to the first Addis Ababa summit of 1963 and beyond.

The independence declaration speech of Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, was steeped in post-colonial identity politics of emancipation, nation-building and pan-Africanism. The independence decade of the 1960s and the struggles before it, in the 1940s and 1950s, were all steeped in pan-Africanism. At that time, the agenda was set. The anti-colonial struggles were also struggles for African unity. Africanists on the continent and beyond mobilized in various ways and levels to chart an agenda for rebuilding a united Africa, where its destiny would be in the hands of Africans. A new Africa was anticipated that was not only politically free from the shackles of Europe or any others, but also modern and able to champion its own course of development. This presupposed a break away from the colonial tradition to one where modern Africa was liberated and united.

In 2004, when the First Conference of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora was held from 6th to 9th October in Dakar, Senegal, the subject of African unity was couched in a language of modernity. In his speech, then chairperson Konare paid glowing tribute, among others, to African "resistance" while inviting the intellectual community to think with critical minds and new modalities that should invent an African modernity. I argue that at that time and space a refreshing tradition was invented with modernity as its agenda. Unity talks on and in Africa are thus not new. The 2004 meeting was one of many. Unity talks have almost become ritual for African leaders, who meet, consider positions, share their anxieties and close as divided as from start. The 2007 and 2008 and beyond African Summits were no exceptions. How is it possible for Africa to spend over 50 years trying to unite when all that is done is the return to divisiveness in the blocs that continue to characterise and stall the concretization of African unity? What is it that a modernizing Africa requires that is yet to be articulated in the age-old pan-Africanist struggle? What type of modernity is being sought in an Africa where retrogressive rituals have an insane staying power? This is a challenge that needs critical interrogation.

In this paper, I examine efforts at African unity against the background of the multiplicity of political interests and agenda. I examine this in the context of the African Union and sub-regional groups in relation to the varying political interests such as donors, multi-laterals and bilaterals. I argue that the ongoing unity efforts have been enmeshed in a self-perpetuating myth and protectionist divisiveness ritual defiant of progress. It suffers a paralysis that stalls progress in the ways that it lacks the vim of the struggle at its genesis. I argue that for progress to be achieved, we must of necessity break away from that newly acquired debilitating tradition in order to return to the early pan-Africanist tradition; which understood the historical complexities and social diversity of the continent. I show that issues of statism, ethnicity and colonialism, which confront modern African states today, are not new and can only be understood within the context of history and the lived realities of the peoples caught in its entrapments. Hence, such political talk needs to be informed and shaped by the radical ideological framings of the nationalist, early post-colonial era and the projects of Negritude, Conscientization, Ujaama and Harambee. Such efforts, in West and East Africa, I argue, blended African traditionalism with modernity to rebuild the fragmented and fractured communities that colonization engendered to simplify and vilify African diversities and complexities.

The paper interrogates the question of tradition and modernity as two concepts that are intricately linked in change processes with incrementally reinforcing effects but which are often set in diametrical oppositionality to paralyze action. It also examines the pan-Africanist project and its place in the African unity efforts. It demonstrates that from the onset, an agenda of unity underpinned the nationalistic liberatory discourse. It advocates for a break away from traditions that are rooted in self-serving destructive rhetoric and rooted in parochial individualism in order to enable the embrace of a progressive perspective of tradition that foster section toward strategic change and collective responsibility. It draws examples from the Negritude, Conscientization, Ujaama and Harambee traditions as political agenda and relevant learning points for contemporary unity efforts. In addition, it examines the current unity talks: what they hold for Africa's future and how they might shift from paralysis to action by learning from the well-established pan-Africanist traditions. Issues about colonial allegiances and their shaping of the new Africa are discussed in the context of finding newly inspired pan-Africanist pathways. It concludes that modern Africa's future lies in its ability to learn from its traditions, one rooted in unity in diversity and in ways devoid of mere rhetoric.

The paper is based on a contextual analyses that draw on concept and content analyses techniques to examine existing literature. It is framed by critical postcolonial analysis which is premised on complexity, eclecticism, multi-perspectivalism and shaped by a liberatory agenda. The analyses are presented in sections covering a

revisitation of the concepts of tradition and modernity followed by an analysis of Pan-Africanism in the context of African regionalism ending on an examination of African futures and post-colonialism.

Tradition and Modernity Revisited

Discourses on Africa's growth and development are often steeped in its cultural history and, rightfully so, in ways meant to set it apart from other regions of the world but especially so from Europe and the West. For Africanist scholars, such as Franz Fanon, Kwesi Kra Prah, Masizi Kunene, P. Tiyaambe Zeleza, Ali Mazuri, Claude Ake, Thandika Nkandawire, G. Sefa Dei, Ama Mazama, Molefi Kete Asante, Catherine Odora Hoppers and Oyeronke Oyewumi, among many, that departure does not just establish difference or even dissonance but also liberates scholarship and African people from imperial representations and dominations. They argue that it liberates scholarship, especially that of the West, from its distorted histories and fragmentation of identities through deliberate othering. Coming from a past where African peoples and cultures have been misunderstood and misrepresented and their histories told from a distance, for right or wrong reasons, Africanists must rightfully take their place in the world stage and embark on a re/telling of their stories from within in order to set the records straight. Not only have such Africanists been interested in repositioning Africa in the world stage as a credible participant in global civilization, there have been direct efforts to legitimize and revalorize African traditions as unique and diverse. Such efforts seek to position African as the main driver of the continent's modernization, as distinct from but connected to the West and/or East. Consequently, discourses on and about African development, which blame its failures on imperialism, have often been framed in a naïve return to cultural traditions or indigenous knowledge systems. These radical, neo-traditionalist efforts have been fraught with problems especially when they have led to paralysis or morbidity. They have tended to take on a form rightly identified by Setunya Mosime (2010) as renegade neo-traditionalism.¹

While the return to African roots continues to dominate anti-imperialist scholarship, and rightfully so, its utilization for parochial political interests is troubling. The trouble presents in two ways. First, against the background of the dynamics of contemporary times, they do not only fail to address Africa's own growth and resilience but also lack an appreciation of the continent's history and a historicization of its past against the present and future. Second, when the flight to tradition becomes a matter of political expediency and selective allegiance, they do not only render suspect the motives of the flyer, low or high, but also become the basis for discursive paralysis. The insecurities and violence in many African countries today have been traced to such selfish elite manipulations of ethnic pluralism for parochial political gains.^[14, 16] Yet, this is only an extension of similar manipulations of the colonial past, against which the post-colonial state purports to stand in contention. Through their manipulative indirect, and even direct, rule and associationist policies in Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, the British colonial administration perpetrated and endeared traditional authorities to its regime and thus succeeded in entrenching its hold on those African people of their so-called overseas territories. On their part, through assimilationist policies, citizenship became the allure of the French colonialists for baiting and co-opting the educated elites of Senegal, Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Guinea to the side of the "master" and of imperialism. The elite chiefs and scholars put their parochial interests above that of their peoples; their dignity, rights and well-being. Yet others such as Cheik Anta Diop and Sekou Toure chose a path of dissidence and reactionism in their struggle to pull their people out of the new form of enslavement, a cultural imperialism.

Today, in an era of postcolonial² state, these same compromised elites use various means to perpetuate their selfish interests at the expense of their states and continent. Through nepotism, patrimony, despotism and patriarchy, African politicians build patronage to entrench themselves in office. In both cases, under colonial and post-colonial regimes, divide and rule tactics have become successful manipulative destabilizing tool for setting one group apart from and against another. In the end, this divisiveness becomes a weapon for fomenting and entrenching one crisis after another. Undoubtedly, the modern African state has been built on its past traditions including its colonial past. The postcolonial appeal is the challenge to knead both histories strategically to the inurement of benefit rather than losses.

At independence when the early nationalists sought for African versions of governance, they found socialism a plausible alternative due to its proximity to the framing of African communal values while growing (developing) from them. The versions that emerged in East Africa such as Ujaama and Harambee (to be elaborated in a later section) built on traditional values with the view to improving the lots of all and not some or even set one group apart or against another. Yet, the return to traditionalism, i.e. neo-traditionalism, makes sense in a fractured continent which has been consumed by ill-informed individualism and materialism in the form of

¹In examining, voyeuristic returns to traditionalism in Botswana in time of HIV/AIDS, S. Mosime argues that violence have been visited on women in the form of rape and beatings. As well, rationality has been traded for brutal resistance, which she calls renegade neo-traditionalism.

² Used in a narrow sense to refer to after colonialism and without the criticalness in its broad sense.

the insane obsession with misguided statism, ethnocentrism and traditionalism in the name of autonomy. We can at least figure out what modernization and its related word modernity are derived; what it has been; but can we say exactly what it is? I argue that the same applies to traditionalism, new and old, and its related words.

Traditionalism and modernism are two concepts that are often presented as diametrically opposed. Yet these concepts are intricately related as complements rather than oppositionalities. Hence, both concepts should be appealing in the search for practical action and responses such as those presented in Africa's development. A senior colleague and director of the Institute of Ayurveda and Indigenous Medicine in Bangalore, India, who has been vehemently opposed to attempts to split tradition and modernity argues that the "modern is emerging tradition."^[17] He explains that what is modern is change that sets a new tradition. Indeed, the collective productions of a people result in incremental change that shifts them from one position to another. Tradition and modernity are thus different stages of a continuum, one propelling, resulting in and implicating the other. They constantly trade places as change happens. This is a constantly interactive, iterative and transitional process that is hardly stable although it entails some of the linearity of westernized modernization.

In the context of African unity, many of the early nationalists and pan-Africanists understood that our past traditions should serve as strong basis for integration and regionalism. They foresaw and drew on a case where modernity could build on and evolve from tradition. Here, I want to present tradition as a rallying point from which action exudes. This notion has been articulated by Katarxis as follows:

Tradition and modernity are not contradictory or exclusive. They are merely two different classes of things which can however interact beneficially. Tradition is still very often considered as a "thing of the past" without any contemporary legitimacy, and modernity is often mistakenly considered as modernism. ... the "contemporary", the "modern" and the "traditional" are defined in a context of practice of "virtue" and in the perspective of the "good life", based on the potentials of our time, and the selected wisdom of past times.^[19]

The former is the appeal of this analysis while arguing that the later is characteristic of the western sense of modernization. This fluid notion of the traditional and the modern offers possibilities that are mutually beneficial. It enables the forging of connections between the past and the present; an appreciation of history, in ways leading to renewal and growth. I argue that this is what has been intended in efforts such as the Ujamaa and Harambee as well as in critical Africanist discourses. It is a post-colonial position that should challenge the neo-traditionalist sentiments of current African leaders in the search for an alternative paradigm to violent westocentric development, pejoratively called developmentalism; that which is forced on and not emergent from natural and culturally-inspired and relevant processes of change.

For the purposes of their paper, this notion of modernity offers two probable readings: one Africanist the other Westernist. For the Western sense, where the journey to modernity has entailed a specific project of denying the past, a cautionary note of relevance is sounded. But for the Africanist, the note is one of taking a progressive reading of the traditional. As already noted above, Africanists, whether academicians or politicians, consider a return to the past as a political project of self-reclamation and departure for imperialism^[7]. The argument is however one of whether that past remains static and whether the persistent romanticization of that past is realistic in the face of evidence of a progressive African past that compares and even sometimes surpasses the West. That would be an engagement of the romantic. Africanists such as Molefi Kete Asante, Van Sertima, Gloria Emegwali and G. Sefa Dei project what I call a radical rendition of a progressive African nationalism with people and nations in fluidity rather than the fixity implied by Africanist romantics. Yet, their radical renditions of Africa's progressive past is often misconstrued and misused in a retrogressive manner.

For instance, in Claude Ake's *Democracy and Development in Africa*, he shows that Africa's attempts at development has been anon-start not just for their imperialist politics but also the failure by African states to set their priorities right. Ake raises the two issues of patronage and parochialism as the bane. In the process, he is not only critical of the persistent conflicts and their inherent contradictions which paralyse actions but also the inability of African states to seek strategic interests that can progressively drive their political and socio-economic interests. By extension African leaders have either been over zealous modernists devoid of their traditions or irrational traditionalists steeped in parochialism. He offers an alternative that calls for a blend of the traditional and the modern as follows:

At the beginning of the independence period, African leaders, with few exceptions, were so absorbed in the struggle for power and survival and so politically isolated by their betrayal of the nationalist revolution that they could not launch a national development project but instead opted for dependent

development, letting their metropolitan patrons determine the agenda and find the resources to implement it. Thus, policymaking was largely divorced from political responsibility and development strategy was dissociated both from social needs and from the cultural and historical realities of the developing society. This dissociation led to development policies that have been more disruptive than developmental. Development could not proceed in a situation in which the national leadership had no vision or agenda of its own and relied on outsiders.^[5]

What is clear from Ake's analysis above, is the need to understand the exigencies of contemporary Africa, not merely in the context of their past but also of the present, both of which are relevant for shaping Africa's futures. Ake's was not a proposal for African leaders to turn their republics into monarchies where patronage looms large. Of course, it is a good example of the Africanization of Western democracies into monarchies! Like the West, kings and chiefs are for life and are made by birth but even so they have to wait their turn to rule. Self-perpetuating rule cannot count as democratic. Yet, in Togo and the DR Congo today this has already happened as the older Gnaissingbes and Kabelas have perpetrated themselves through their sons. In Senegal, Egypt, South African and Nigeria, the once revered African democrats were on the verge of despotism but for the outcry and reaction of their people. Others like Paul Bier of Cameroun, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, once heroes of the liberatory movement now persist in unleashing untold hardships on their people with their extended stay and hold on power. Africa has also had its fill of despots such as Gnaissing be Eyadema of Togo, Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire and Iddi Amin of Uganda. Others such as Yahaya Jammeh of Gambia have not only been blatant but have been heavy-handed in suppressing decent and pillaging public resources. The question that remains however is whether that is the path African leaders want to follow in this era of increasing modernization and collective consciousness?

Africa's traditional heritage forms the basis of its identity; that which distinguishes it from non- Africans. It constitutes the foundation of a unique identity that has been shaped by not just settlement but by the realities of the clashes of various cultures resulting in cross-fertilization and renewals that can only be conceived of as the fusion of complementing cultures. This has been captured by Africanist scholars as unity in diversity borne out of a multiplex heritage that gives rise to the forging of integration. Thus, to speak of Africa and its traditions as if there is one Africa is to deny difference and the very basis for appealing to tradition; that which is based on diverse cultures and peoples.^[10, 2]

Often those who take a static view of the traditional in Africa imply two things: First, that Africa means black Africa and by extension that skin pigmentation is the most important bond for forging that identity. It also suggests that those Africans who are not black, if ever acknowledged, are not real Africans. Hence, the Arab north or even the South Asians or even white or mixed race Africans are not African enough. Yet, this is the reality of Africa today. As a multi-racial, multi-ethnic continent, deliberately engineered or not, this is the character of contemporary Africa and any moves at unity must first reckon this in addition to that of the multiplicity of countries with their diverse ethnicities, governments and peoples as truly African in heritage. The nationalist fighters did not exclude the Arab north. Leaders such as Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat were at the forefront during the foundational phase. Even when they took a position on apartheid South Africa, it was for majority rule and the liberation of an African state comprising Asians who had been forcefully removed from their roots to Africa, whose ancestors had laboured to move Africa that far and who have suffered perhaps not the same fate but similar humiliations as Africans as slaves, indentured labour and low class people. The great Nelson Mandela, a bantu, was thrown into the same jail with Estrada, a non-bantu, to do their time with hard labour.

The second is the tendency of what, for want of words, I will call the ethnicization of Africa. The is notion of Africans as culturally stilled ethnic people who have not been touched by modernity and for that matter remain unscathed by external forces and factors. There is an apparent Puritanism that is based on origins, roots and closeness with nature. A picture is often painted using characteristics such as traditional believers, rural dwelling and simple living. Such traditional Africans cannot be Christians or Muslims, schooled, urbanized or even operate in the formal system. Such characterization has been used to epitomize traditionalism in contradistinction from modernity. The reality, however, is that there are no such Africans any more. Perhaps, they were there before, in the very far past, but have not been so for a long time now. The Africans of today are both of nature and of culture. Hence, in the new configurations, which I expect of a new Africa, it is intuitive to work with both conceptualizations. It is this notion of ethnic purity that becomes the subject of manipulative and propagandist ethnocentrism. Ethno-nationalisms draw from such misinforming to foment conflicts and war, many of which engulf our continent today. The xenophobic attacks on other African nationals whose governments fought solidly beside anti-apartheid forces of South Africa become easy objects of the attack of some disgruntled South Africans whose anger against socio-economic injustice drive them to vent off so

brutally. Also, the African political landscape is corrupted by divisive ethnic sentiments such as those resulting in the ethnic cleansings of Burundi, Rwanda and Sudan. Not only are leaders manipulating the multiple localized ethnicities but they are doing so even at the sub-regional and regional levels.

During the early African liberation struggles, skin coloration and ethnicities did not matter; why should they matter now? Why should it matter when Arab, Black or Asian Africans suffer similar plight of deepening poverty, gross inequalities and stark rights abuses in a globalizing world? In this case, when skin colour and cultural background matters, we are denied the collective agency and bargaining power to act for change. Yet in some times, it should matter. It should matter in times when racialist and ethnocentric policies unduly discriminate and perpetuate injustices on some but not others. They should matter because it is only when those differences are acknowledged and worked with that we can unify the continent. They should matter because it is only when we can all see ourselves as Africans of diverse races and ethnicities who make and contribute to the development of the continent in diverse ways that the selective targeting of programmes and policies can be adopted to protect the vulnerable and at-risk while empowering all citizens. It is only through such that divisive sentiments can be set aside. Hence, in the new struggles and pan-Africanist movement we need to be guided by that notion and that history.

Additionally, it will appear that there is an aversion to modernity and insane fear of how it breaks from African traditions and destroys our cultural heritage and peoples. Founded on the notion of modernity as Westernization, this posturing justifiably provokes repulsive sentiments. This justification stems from multiple factors including the cultural alienation that accompanies the colonization process, sustains itself in developmentalism and globalization and which utilizes the tools of education, religion, trade and aid to expand and entrench its hold. Vilified as primitive, barbaric and uncivil, indigenous African cultural systems and practices continue to be considered blocks to development.

Pan-Africanism and African Regionalism

A century and one score ago, Africans and peoples of African descent saw a great need to build a united front in their struggle to restore African dignity and to liberate African nations from the shackles of colonialism. This move was possible even at that early stage and at a time not too far after European partitioning and colonization of the continent. The visionary leadership at the time understood the place of collective mobilization in a way that recognized not just the new divisions but also the emerging allegiances. It understood how such allegiances were planted to manipulate and set one group against the other. It also understood the political implications of not forging a common collective struggle in spite of the artificial borders and more importantly to not allow those borders to become barriers but weapons of negotiation and not conflict.

At the dawn of independence, there was certainty of what direction and form African liberation should take and clarity on doing so as a united Africa. Declarations such as “the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked to the total liberation of Africa,” made by the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, at the dawn of Ghana’s independence, demonstrates the desire at that point for a new Africa freed from its fragmented past. For political, economic and social reasons the nationalist leaders at the time such as Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda also imagined an Africa without its fractured and distorted past. Pan-Africanism was set as the agenda for not just liberating all of Africa and its splinter states but also positioning it as a powerful force in geopolitics. These pan-Africanist leaders, many of who became first presidents of their countries such as in Ghana, Kenya, Guinea and Nigeria, were wary of the weaknesses of balkanization and the need to de/balkanize the continent. Yet, they conceived this in the form of integration and cooperation such as the weakening of physical/artificial boundaries for the free flow of people and trade. Radical others such as Nkrumah of Ghana in his advocacy routed for not weakened but a borderless Africa in his proposal for the United States of Africa.^[6]
^{9]}To date, it is not too clear what a united Africa might mean. Hinged largely on leadership rather than people talk, the unity talks have depended on the dispositions of their leaders. It is however, clear that economic integration and sub-regional integration have stronger appeal. Although unclear what form and shape a debalkanized Africa would take, there was reason for unifying the fragmented and fractured continent whose political patronage rather than social history was shaping and continues to shape its very existence.

The proposal for the United States of Africa had as its elements economic, social, political and military elements. Economically, integration of markets and currencies was proposed. Socially, the collapse of artificial barriers for the free movements of people and goods was strong on the agenda. Politically, the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was a start while militarily the proposal for the establishment of the African High Command was intuitive. The extent to which each or all of these have been achieved is up for all of our judgement. What is clear is that over 50 years on, these issues are still up not for judgement but discussions. Ironically, the reality of our time suggests that we cannot hold off anymore. Nkrumah explained

this in no uncertain terms as follows: “We all want a United Africa, United not only in our concept of what unity connotes, but united in our common desire to move forward together in dealing with all the problem that can best be solved only on a continental basis.”^[20]

The reconstitution of the AU, the formation and strengthening of sub-regional unions such as ECOWAS of West Africa, SAEDC of Southern Africa and COMESA of Eastern and Southern African are pointers of the need to move more swiftly. Each of these constituencies has had to, at one time or another, respond to some crises or the other. Economic, political and social crises in countries like Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan, among others, have necessitated swift regional responses. In 2003, the Asmara Declaration proposed the adoption of regional languages that could assist in further integration. The East Africans and North Africans have done so well with Swahili and Arabic respectively but the same cannot be said of the rest of Africa. Hausa seems to hold promise for West Africa but actions to propel its adoption and use as a sub-regional language remains unclear. Hausa is spoken (also written) in Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone and Cote D’Ivoire. With a stronger ECOWAS and the movement of peoples within the sub-region, my inclination is that the use of Hausa is spreading continually across the sub-region. These are strong indicators for unification which render hollow the continued hold on closed and weak nationalisms and especially so in a globalizing world. Ironically, such nationalisms are rooted in Westernism not only in the use of borrowed language such as English, French and Portuguese but also politics, trade and security.

Africa has had to stand up and respond in unison through regional or sub-regional bodies such as ECOMOG; the military arm of ECOWAS, which has responded to and helped curb crisis and maintained peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, among others. Over the years, the various sub-regional unions of West, Central, North, Southern and East Africa have become strengthened in response to their socio-economic and political welfare. The situations in Darfur, Southern Sudan and Somalia would have been still swirling without subregional mobilization and intervention. Cross-border movements for trade are also growing making it much easier to move within a subregion compared to across subregions. Short of common subregional currencies, relaxed border regulations allow people within their subregion to move more freely, trading with various convertible currencies. Such uninterrupted and well-managed internal and localized arrangements prepare the grounds for greater collaborations within and beyond the subregional groupings.

While Africa’s own internal conditions present their own challenges, happenings on the global scale make unification not only compelling but also strategic. The sporadic responses which have now been institutionalized to form more responsive bodies have become expedient in the face of increasing globalization. Call it African localization of globalization even as it becomes more and more integrated in the global world stage. A UNECA report confirms this:

The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of regional integration groupings at a global level. The challenges of African development are compounded by the globalization and liberalization of the world economy, greater economic integration of financial and money markets, and a shift towards the creation of large trading and economic blocs. These developments offer not only challenges but also timely opportunities to Africa, and there is a need to broaden the concept of regionalism and to rethink Africa’s regional integration strategy.^[20]

While corroborating UNECA’s assertion, it is also the case that Africa has had its own agenda of integration from way back to the origins of the pan-Africanist project. There is need to return that project in order to respond more effectively and strategically to regional needs and global challenges. Apart from the USA model, there is now also the EU one that Africa can learn from as it returns to work on its pan-Africanist project. The EU in particular is fast redefining global development cooperation in the way that utilizes its regional structures as a powerful force in negotiations, at the same that the independent states maintain their sovereignty and bilateral relations. This does not only increase their influence in global politics and economics as a body but also opens opportunities for supporting and accelerating the development of weaker nations through regional trade, educational exchange and labour movement as well as policy regulations and governance mechanisms that benefit individual states and the regional body. In spite of the recent exit of Britain, which is already telling on the British economy and the growing insurgency of the far right movement headed by diehards like Marie Le Penn of France, the EU remains a strong force in the global economy. It remains a good example for challenging those who hold on to and use their various colonial allegiances and still hang on imperialist-drawn boundaries and egoistic sentiments to stall progress.

More and more African countries have had to deal with the EU rather than their traditional colonial benefactors resulting in cut backs on cooperation funds. The united front of the EU enabled it to break into the African front

to deal with individual nations at the time that the AU was building up steam against their Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EU succeeded in foisting down their plans on individual African countries amid popular protests. The power of the euro today is another example. It remains one of three strong currencies of the world which continues to drive market trends its way. This glowing example was not lost to the pan-Africanists. Rather, it informed their project and indeed we also have our example of the mass liberation of African states in the 1960s. Ghana became an important power and inspirational site for not only nurturing the ideology but also training pan-Africanist nationalist leaders and a centre for mass mobilization. Zimbabwe and Tanzania did same for southern Africa in the struggle against apartheid. Resources and intelligence were mobilized all over Africa to support the anti-apartheid campaigners of South Africa in their struggles. It was Africa as a whole, rather than regional, national or ethnic groupings that mobilized to support a noble course to successfully overturn that brutal regime. It is sad that in today's Africa, nationalism and ethno-nationalism have become the basis for crippling the pan-Africanist project. Even within nations, ethnocentrism has become the mobilizing axis for genocide and constant conflict with dire consequences as in the case of Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda.

Yet, W.E. DuBois, the great pan-Africanist, foresaw this in the following:

If Africa unites, it will be because each part, each nation, each tribe gives up a part of the heritage for the good of the whole. That is what union means; that is what Pan Africa means: When the child is born into the tribe the price of his growing up is giving part of his freedom to the tribe. This he soon learns or dies. When the tribe becomes a union of the tribes, the individual tribe surrenders some part of its freedom to the paramount chief.^[10]

This analogy should be familiar to any African who grew up in their roots. Even in the Diaspora, this notion of community has been employed to keep families and black people together. In migration, internal and external, we hold on to these time tested values. This is what Du Bois proposed a long time ago. Although he did not examine the situation of the chief who worked for the colonial governor like it happened in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria or the chief who raided, annexed, enslaved or even sold off neighbouring peoples in the coastal regions, he highlighted the principle of communalism and what it meant for individualism.

Some impediments to the Africa unity agenda has been the reluctance and even insecurities and suspicions of sovereign nations, what I call statism. Leaders, dating back to the early nationalist era, appear to have been more keen on guarding their national turfs rather than heed to forging a united Africa^[21, 8]. Recent efforts to fast forward progress have been marked by such insinuations. At the 2007 AU summit in Accra, Africa was returned to the same old schisms of the 1960s which gave birth to the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs^[13]. Today, we speak of the Instantists and gradualists or radicalist and conservatives. While the former categories are calling for a united Africa now, the latter want to steer a slow course. The latter group inclusive Kagame of Rwanda and Mkapa of Tanzania cited the same old tales of uncertainty, insecurity and diversity to stall progress while others including then Gaddafi of Libya and Wade of Senegal argued for unity now starting at sub-regional groupings and with those nations ready while working to include all. Today the two leaders are no more in government with Gaddafi brutally murdered by the allied forces.

Perhaps we need both radicalism and gradualism and not one or the other. Regional integration efforts that are steered by a radical declaration starting with some members and gradually including others worked for Europe, why not Africa? Even amid the far rightist decent and machinations, the EU still stands tall and firm. The fact that the recent EU challenge has been formulated and championed by rightist forces should send strong signals to the AU and its leadership to fast-track progress toward unity. No doubt that the forces of division and the local cronies will always work in oppositionality to dismantle progressive voices. An integrated Africa which looks within for market and aid threatens the West and even East as they increasingly depend on the unfair African market for the exploitation of resources. With a vision to: build an Africa that is integrated, prosperous and at peace, led by its citizens and constituted dynamic force on the world stage, anti-liberatory forces shudder. Come to think of it, why will the EU resort to lobbying individual African countries to foist its EPAs, when the AU, it parallel exists and can better negotiate for a united Africa?

Integration has always underpinned the pan-Africanist project, sometimes misconstrued and even misappropriated to serve the imperialist ends. Even in the very early times, some African leaders were convinced and believed that they were going to lose their positions to Nkrumah, the strongest and most radical advocate who was fast establishing his leadership as a likely candidate. Perhaps they looked to the United States of American model of one presidency. Without the smart EU model of a rotating presidency in view, there was nowhere else to look for lessons. So the fate of the proposed United States of Africa was squashed way too early

for the lack of useful lessons. Today, the new group of hesitant leaders are expressing similar fears out of what can be called the possible shortening of the newly found positions and the luxuries that attend them. A few years ago, it was the fear of Gaddafi's radical leadership. Yet, Gaddafi was the only North African leader who was committed to continental Africa after Anwar Sadat, who was himself brutally murdered, and perhaps Ben Bella. Gaddafi, who became a pan-Africanist firebrand for about a decade poured resources and rhetoric in the unity talks, himself has suffered a similar fate. The Sirte Declaration was an important step toward the reinvigoration of the unity talks^[11, 1]. Like Nkrumah the removal of Gaddafi was a victory for the gradualists. Above all, with big guns such as Gaddafi, Wade, Mbeki and Obasanjo no longer at the table, it is hard to say where the tables will turn. The current AU Commission chair, Dhlamini-Zuma, continues to push the agenda forward^[8] but to what end?

Yet, the truth is that pan-Africanism and African integration have been seriously misconstrued. The tenets of pan-Africanism of old and now suggest a blend of radicalism and gradualism. The model is simple: let's start now with those ready (radical) while gradually working to absorb others (gradualist). Africa needs a committed political agenda of change that works using both radical and gradual tactics. The establishments of economic, security and political institutions have always been viewed as the starting point for forging an African unity in the pan-African project. Nowhere in that project has it been stated or even suggested that a united Africa is a one nation Africa otherwise the proposal for the United States of Africa will not have made any sense. I say this bearing in mind the form that the United States of America has taken. Yet, I dare say so because Africa is not the Americas and has its own understanding of unity, one based on diversity. African socialism, which characterised post independence development and suffered similar misconstructions is an example. African communal living which was so aptly defined by Nyerere's Tanzania under Ujaama and Kenyatta's Kenya through Harambee were projects that understood that living. The working and sharing together as a community was not same as European Socialism or the Communalism of Marx and Mao.

In spite of its own implementation challenges, the implementation of Ujaama in Tanzania had made that country not the most affluent but an egalitarian country. The defiant Nyerere, unlike Kenyatta who succumbed too early to Western imperialist pressures and unlike Nkrumah, whose Conscientization mission was cut short through military action, succeeded in building a society that Tanzanians found worthy. Tanzania adopted Ki-Swahili, an indigenous language with blends of Arabic and European influences. Also, Tanzania's Arab population who like their German colonizers had delivered their own doses of violence on the indigenous Africans, were not thrown out or even sidelined. Nyerere worked tirelessly to unite the island of Zanzibar with Tanganyika in order to build the union of Tanzania. The benefits have not been only the delivery of freedoms and liberties for all but also the high levels of parity especially in the area of gender but also in ethnicity and class. These are useful examples for African unity in this globalizing world.

In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah embarked on radical socio-economic programmes in the form of educational expansion, health delivery, infrastructural development and industrial development that were aimed at accelerating progress while challenging imperialist policies and programmes. The defiant Nkrumah, like Nyerere, insisted on import substitution industrialization and the building of infrastructure that would increase internal and regional autonomy. His political agenda of conscientization tackled neo-colonialism head on through education and training at the same time that his pan-Africanist activism was strongly articulated at continental fora and the world stage. This sowed the seeds of the fear that gripped fellow African leaders and local Ghanaian opposers as well as paved the way for the imperialist manipulations that resulted in his fall and eventual demise. A similar political project was carried out in Franco-Africa by leaders who understood the dehumanizing outcomes of the denationalization efforts of the French colonialists. Scholars like Cheikh Anta Diop of Senegal and leaders like Sekou Toure of Guinea ought tirelessly to restore African dignity and citizenship while recovering African values and identities through the Negritude movement^[13, 8]. The African humanism agenda of the Negritude served to restore African dignity and forge a unified struggle for liberation.

Today, African leaders have adopted what they call a gradualist approach, which is based on the strengthening of sub-regional cooperation for the eventual integration at the continental level. This cannot be considered a radical deviation from the radical position. The only disjuncture is in implementation. The OAU has metamorphosed into the AU yet has not been weaned of its traditional sloppiness. The AU maintains its tradition of slowly responding to African needs and accelerating the pace of integration. While our leaders openly express strong need to unify, this has also been marred by a slowness to action. It still lacks the impetus to call irate leaders to order or even sanction when necessary. Today the sub-regional unions are much stronger but the same cannot be said of the regional union and the integration efforts. African states and leaders continue to make pledges which they persistently neglect to honour. They are quick to heed to western pressures at the expense of the continental union agenda. A case in point is the EU's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) which it has tried to shove down the throats of African nations.

While debates were widespread and calls were being made by subregional and regional groups of civil society and political unions, nations like Ghana, Nigeria and Cote D'Ivoire were quick to succumb and nothing has been done to them. That a huge country like Nigeria with the benefits of a large internal market, wide range of resources, oil power and political stability should kowtow to external pressure can only be considered an irony. Nigeria should be standing shoulder to shoulder with any world nation such as the USA for the Americas and UK and Germany for Europe by leading the African region in its development rather than pan-handling for resources and aid! African unity will remain mere rhetoric without such leadership; yet each time a leader seems to appear fears rather than good sense takes over. The cases of Nkrumah and Gaddafi are evident. A Nobel prize, the late Wangari Maathai of Kenya, had affirmed the African unity leadership crisis during an Eminent Persons Round Table on the opening day of the Pan African Media Conference in Nairobi in March 2010 by pointing out that Africa lacks visionary leadership. This should be understood to mean a selfless and forward looking leadership committed to making bold decisions to change that moves Africa ahead. Such a leader should be able to blend African traditions with the offerings of the contemporary world and dare to speak out and be different.

Amoako (2010) in his appeal for expediting action on African unity explained:

We know that with renewed political impetus, it is important that we also take a candid and critical look at our record, in order to make our shared aspirations of the African Union a concrete reality. Why has African unity fallen so far short of its early promise? Let me offer a few of the key reasons. For one thing, political commitments of member states to regional plans have far too often not been translated into national policies and action. For another, national policies have conspired against a higher degree of private sector-driven regional integration, resulting in low levels of intra-regional as well as inter-regional trade. On the institutional side, the integration agreements have contributed little to the higher levels of industrial growth envisaged for the continent's development. Overlapping memberships of the regional economic communities have worked against the overall exacerbated objective. And let us not forget that in every subregion, endemic political instability exacerbated by persistent conflict has undermined the effectiveness of regional integration.^[20]

Amoako speaks eloquently on the challenge of African unity that illuminates the core of the problem. Continually, African leaders make commitments but do not act on them. The unity now (radical) or later (gradual) seems to have become yet another tradition. Yet, this is far from the sense of tradition offered by Shankar.^[17] After over 50 years of political independence, the unity efforts have not been able to go past the gradualist tradition, as excuses upon excuses are offered to delay action. Excuses such as the building of internal structures, strengthening of sub-regional unions and need for a well-thought out strategy have remained on the discussion table for far too long. During a press encounter in March 2010, hosted by ALL Africa Global Media, the majority of participating leaders, political and civil, although agreed on the need for integration were absorbed in demonstrating and protecting their national interests. Presidents Kagame, Odinga and Mkapa, in their responses to questions on African unity concentrated on explaining how their nations were fairing rather than how they were working toward African unity. Some kind of lip-service was paid to the unification efforts by suggesting stronger commitments to individual nationalisms. To be fair, there are tangible reasons that need lots of work but should they block progress? In the case of Europe, they did not have to be at the same level to establish the EU! Why should Africans seek to level the ground even before the unification takes place when the point of unification is to help with such levelling of some sort? Is it not the same fears raised above that are gripping the current crop of leaders and even the older ones in these globalizing times when integration is inevitable? This is a postcolonial challenge in a stage of the rapid integration instanced by globalization and developmentalism.

African Futures and the Postcolonial Challenge

The postcolonial has been defined diversely to include a blending of the pre-modern, modern and beyond. As a discursive project, it doubts projects that offer uncritical universalizing positions, conclusions and judgements. Rather, it challenges and explores possibilities for constant contestation and confrontation meant to open up discourse, offer fresh insights and expand possibilities and opportunities. It thus challenges all majorities and minorities, metropolises and dependences, superordinates and subordinates to exercise agency in interrogating and contesting their positions in their bid to re-shape and improve meaning and responses. As argued by some scholars, postcolonial criticisms contribute "epistemic, knowledge frameworks and material insights to hegemonic power relations, and in particular global violence" by specifically raising questions with the divisive retrogressive geopolitics and its implications for various subjects. It is this challenge that should appeal to African leaders.^[3]

The African unity efforts can benefit from the postcolonial challenge by not just offering the space for interrogating and contesting imperialists spaces to unveil their implications in Africa's development challenges but by also illuminating existing discourses and opening them up for fresh meanings for charting new courses and building strategic alliances. Also, it will enable Africa to embrace the blending of the traditional and modern as equally valuable and legitimate spaces for participating strategically in the globalizing world. It will afford the embracing of both in ways that are mutually reinforcing so that as Shankar (2010) asserts the modern can become an emerging tradition. It will help set that debate aside for the good of Africa.

Meanwhile, the seeming oppositionality between the gradualists and instantists, radicals and conservatives, remains worrying. However, a third way is emerging that seems to hold promise, if only it does not suffer the same paralysis that often holds and keeps down radical ideas for change in Africa. During the 2007 AU summit in Accra, Prime Minister Meles Zenawe was quoted to have said that: "there is only one position, of the practicalists," in an emotional response to the schism around Gradualism and Instantism. What is that practicalism, opted by that Zenawe? Could it be the same pragmatism offered by Nyerere? The practical realities of Africa in the form of poverty, disease and inequalities amid affluence and vast resource endowments require practical action and rightly so. But is it not the case that a united African would help leverage those iniquities? Africans and African leaders must act with conviction and one voice in order to stem the tide of the ever present imperialism and underdevelopment that continue to undermine and erode progress. Africans must challenge yet work with tradition and modernity toward purposive ends that respond to African needs collectively and individually, now and the future. This is a postcolonial offering.

At the 2007 Accra Summit, the participating leaders concluded on setting a time table for the "realistic but radical integration process"^[12]. The following year in Addis Ababa, at the heads of State meeting, this position was given further reaffirmation. About a decade down the line, the story remains the same, at least from the outside. For how long can Africa maintain the rhetoric? When will Africa ever be ready to take action and swiftly too? A Deputy Executive Secretary of the ECA, Lalla Ben Barka corroborated Zenawe's position as follows:

I strongly believe that Pan-Africanism is even more relevant today than it was in the 1960s. Then, it was necessarily visionary but it was this very idealism that served to limit Pan-Africanism to a dream, limiting its scope and to a large extent derailing it. When the hard reality of development set in, the ideals of Pan-Africanism were quietly forgotten and were put on shelf to gather dust. Yet, Africa's place as an equal partner at the global table can only be assured if it thinks and acts regionally.^[20]

Ben Barka sums up the urgency of regionalism today but also the weak responses to Pan-Africanism as the bane. What is evident, in view of the present dire socio-economic conditions, which have been blamed largely on the injustices that Africa has suffered in terms of unfair trade relations and incriminating donor conditionalities, is the need for radical change.

As we move on, I will like to re-echo the lessons from the past in the form of the traditions set by the pan-Africanist and early nationalists. I also want to state that Africa cannot afford to snail walk in the face of the challenges of these times. Want it or not the peoples of Africa, fortunately, and not the leaders, unfortunately, are breaking the barriers. This sounds the warning bells for the wake up. The people move when they find sites of prosperity. Ghana and Nigeria and now South Africa are hotspots for people movement on the continent. I am impressed by how Ki-Swahili had made it possible for people within the East African community to move freely to seek better career fortunes within the region. I have also been horrified by the mass and xenophobic outbursts in South Africa, which resulted in the wanton destruction of life and the properties of fellow Africans. Unfortunately, those who suffered in South Africa were blacks and not whites; many were citizens of nations that hosted anti-Apartheid leaders during their struggles.

I want to invite us to return to the founding ideological traditions. In Ujaama and Harambee we find communal living models that promote egalitarianism and exemplary leadership. If well implemented good governance can be promoted. Conscientization will empower people to think Africa and claim an African nationalism that is based on Africa for Africans. In Negritude, we find a citizenship model that is based on Africanist identities; open, warm and welcoming. These ideologies are up for exploration for building the economic, political and social integration, regional and unification models that are African-centred but are also appreciative of a new Africa that stands for growth and progress for and with the people; the masses. It should withstand the challenges of globalization and developmentalism while fulfilling the postcolonial promise of a truly liberated Africa. Above all, it is rooted in pan-Africanist ideals.

The debate has been further inspired by Nyerere (1997: 276) who admonished African leaders thus:

This is my plea to the new generation of African leaders and African people: work for unity with the firm conviction that, without unity there is no future for Africa. That is, of course, if we still want to have a place in the sun. I reject the glorification of the nation-state, which we have inherited from colonialism, and the artificial nations we are trying to forge from that inheritance. We are all Africans trying to be Ghanaians or Tanzanians. Fortunately for Africa we have not been completely successful ... Unity will not make us rich, but it can make it difficult for Africa and the African peoples to be disregarded and humiliated. And it will therefore increase the effectiveness of the decisions we make and try to implement for our development.^[12]

Nyerere spoke from hindsight and from the experience of sitting at the same table with Nkrumah and all the pioneer leaders. About three decades later he was in a better position to admonish current African leaders. But did they listen and will they ever listen. African unity continues to hang in a balance while African nations continue to wallow in their old problems.

Conclusion

The paper has entailed a critical reflection on the African unity challenge. It has examined the perennial challenge confronting African leadership effort to unify the continent for effective socio-economic integration. It traces the history of African unity to the 1960s efforts by the early independence nationalists such as Nkrumah of Ghana and Nyerere of Tanzania. It reveals that African colonialist and neo-colonial allegiances to the imperialist past has been a bane to progress on African Unity. It has drawn from diverse sources to show that debates around gradualism and instantism have historical roots traceable to past colonial history and an enduring neo-colonial present but also internal factors around the parochial interests of nationhood/statism and indivisible political interests. It explains that the challenges of the past, at the onset of pan-Africanism in Africa continue to plague the continent. However, no matter the persuasions or dispositions of the African leaders, who have tended to dominate and drive the discourse over their nationals, the unity talks remain relevant. The socio-economic exigencies of today, spurred on through globalization and developmentalism, which rob Africa of its human and material resources, compel a continued pursuit of African unity devoid of the divisiveness that continues to cripple and debilitate progress. It views the efforts at the subregional levels as useful pointers of the possibility for unity. It argues that the benefits accruing from military and economic mobilization in times of crisis and development can be extended to help with the continental integration. Hence, we cannot remain content with the successes at that level only. It suggests that both instantist and gradualist positions are relevant but that their integration is the only way of levelly the ground for expedited socio-economic progress of the nation states and the continent; citing the EU model as suited for the African case. However, such borrowing need to reflect the early pan-Africanist ideals of multiplexity and diversity and build on the ideologies of conscientization, ujaama, harambee and negritude.

REFERENCES

1. Abdul-Raheem, Tajudeen, 2009. Gadafi and African Unity. Pambazuka News. Online. <http://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanis/gadafi-and-african-unity>. Feb. 5 Date Accessed 10/01/2016
2. Adesida, Olugbenga and Otteh, Aruna, 2004. Africa: Visions of the Future. In. African Voices, African Visions. (eds. Adesida Olugbenga and Arunna Otte). pp. 10 – 19. Stockholm, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute.
3. Agathangelou, Anna M and Heather M. Turcotte, 2010. "Postcolonial Theories as Critique and Challenge to 'First World-ism'." *e-International Relations* (online). Available: <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=4068>. DA: 12/03/2010.
4. Amoako, K. Y., 2001. Towards the African Union: A Development Perspective. (Statement by the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa). 74th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organizations of African Unity. Lusaka, Zambia. (5th July)
5. Ake, Claude, 2003/1996. Democracy and Development in Africa. Abuja, Nigeria: African Centre for Democratic Governance.
6. Chachage, Chambi, 2009. African Unity: Feeling with Nkrumah, thinking with Nyerere. Pambazuka New [online]. Available: <http://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/african-unity-feeling-nkrumah-thinking-nyerere/> DA: 10/10/16

7. Dei, G. Sefa, 2012. Research Methodologies: Issues, Contests and Option for an African Context. Tamale, UDS/CAPTURED Africa Project.
8. Louw-Vaudran, Liesl, 2015. African Unity: How far have we come? This is Africa (online). Available: <http://thisisafirca.me/african-unity.far-come/> DA: 10/10/16
9. Louw-Vaudran, Liesl, 2014. African Unity stil a pipe dream. Institute for Security Studies [online]. Available: <http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-22-african-unity-stil-a-pipe-dream/> DA: 10/10/16
10. Mazrui, Ali, 1992. The African Condition. New York: Press Syndicate/Cambridge University Press.
11. Nolan, Robert, 2011. African Union After Gaddafi. Journal of Diplomacy [Online]. Available: <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/12/the-african-union-after-gaddafi/> DA: 10/12/26
12. Otchere-Darko, Asare, 2007. Latest on AU Summit: It Looks Like the AU Gradualist Have It. General News of Tuesday, 3 July 2007. Online: <http://www.ghanweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=126594>. Date Accessed: 05/09/2010
13. Piana, Libero Della, 2007. Zones of Conflict: Challenge to African Unity. People's World [online]. Available: <http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/zones-of-conflict-challenge-to-african-unity/> DA: 10/10/16
14. Prah, Kwesi Kwaa, 2002. "Race and Culture: Myth and Reality." In Norman Duncan, Pumla Dineo Gqola, Murray Hofmeyr, Tamara Shefer, Felix Malunga and Mashegu Mashige (eds). Discourses on Difference, Discourses on Oppression. pp. 9 – 36. (CASAS Book Series No. 24). Cape Town, SA: Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS).
15. Prah, Kwesi Kwaa, 2006. The African Nation. Cape Town: CASAS
16. Schalk, Sandile, 2002. "Ethnicity: Colonial Legacy, Ethnic and Political Manipulation as Hindrance to Democracy and Nation-Building." In Discourses on Difference, Discourses on Oppression. (eds. Norman Duncan, Pumla Dineo Gqola, Murray Hofmeyr, Tamara Shefer, Felix Malunga and Mashegu Mashige). Pp. 407 – 425. (CASAS Book Series No. 24). Cape Town, SA: Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS).
17. Shankar, Darshan, 2010. The Traditional Medical System of India. Paper presented at a Seminar at the University of Bern, Bern Switzerland. (October) (unpublished).
18. Steil, Lucien, n.d. Tradition and Modernity. Katraxis No. 2 [online] available: <http://luciansteil.tripod.com/katraxis/id1.html>
19. Stock, Robert, 2004. Africa South of the Sahara: A geographical Interpretation. 2nd Edition. New York: Gilford Press. pp. 99 - 132
20. UNECA, 2010. "Historical Roots." Towards a United Africa!! [Online]. Available: <http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/riefforts/hist/htm> DA: 05/09/2010
21. Zeleza, Paul Tiyumbe, 1997/2003. Manufacturing African Studies and Crisis. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA
22. Zhangazha, Takura. 2014. Africa Day 2014: African Unity? This is Africa [online]. Available: <http://thisisafirca.me/africa-day-2014-inventing-future/> DA: 22/02/16

INSTRUCTION TO AUTHORS

Manuscript Submission:

Send your manuscript with attachment by mailing it to submit@textroad.com, textroadjournals@gmail.com along with [covering letter](#).

Manuscript Preparation:

- * Title
- * Author names and addresses
- * Abstracts (Not more than 300 words)
- * Key words
- * Introduction
- * Materials and Methods
- * Results and Discussions
- * References (Use numbering in the text instead of full references).
Give full references at the end of the file
- * Photographs should be of high quality (Minimum 300-600 dpi)
- * Graphs should be in clearly visible form so that it may become easy to redraw
- * The manuscript must be submitted in MS-WORD file format.

INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS

Submission

Submit manuscripts as e-mail attachment to the Editorial Office at:

textroadjournals@gmail.com or submit@textroad.com along with [covering letter](#). A manuscript number will be mailed to the corresponding author same day or within 48 hours. The authors may also suggest two to four reviewers for the manuscript (JBASR may designate other reviewers). There is no page limit. The submitting author takes responsibility for the paper during submission and peer review.

Terms of Submission

Papers must be submitted on the understanding that they have not been published elsewhere (except in the form of an abstract or as part of a published lecture, review, or thesis) and are not currently under consideration by another journal. The submitting author is responsible for ensuring that the article's publication has been approved by all the other coauthors. All enquiries concerning the publication of accepted papers should be addressed to editor@textroad.com.

Review Process

All manuscripts are reviewed by an editor and members of the Editorial Board or qualified outside reviewers. Decisions will be made as rapidly as possible, and the journal strives to return reviewers' comments to authors within one or two weeks. The editorial board will re-review manuscripts that are accepted pending revision. It is the goal of the JBASR to publish manuscripts within 4 weeks after submission.

Style of Manuscripts

Manuscripts should be written in clear, concise and grammatically correct English (with 10 font size and Times New Roman font style) so that they are intelligible to the professional reader who is not a specialist in any particular field. Manuscripts that do not conform to these requirements and the following manuscript format may be returned to the author prior to review for correction. The entire manuscript, including references, should be typed single spaced on one side of the paper. All pages should be numbered consecutively in the bottom centre starting from the title page. The manuscript should be presented in the following order.

Title and Authorship Information

The title should be a brief phrase (capitalize first letter of each word in the title) describing the contents of the paper. The Title Page should include the authors' full names and affiliations, the name of the corresponding author along with phone, fax and E-mail information. Present addresses of authors should appear as a footnote.

Abstract

All manuscripts should not exceed 250-300 words and should describe the scope, hypothesis or rationale for the work and the main findings. Complete sentences, active verbs, and the abstract should be written in the past tense. Standard nomenclature should be used and abbreviations should be avoided. No literature should be cited.

Keywords

Key words (5-7 words) should be provided below the Abstract to assist with indexing of the article. These should not duplicate key words from the title.

Introduction

This section should include sufficient background information, provide a clear statement of the problem, the relevant literature on the subject, and the proposed approach or solution. The aims of the manuscript should be clearly stated. The introduction should not contain either findings or conclusions. It should be understandable to colleagues from a broad range of scientific disciplines.

Materials and Methods

This should be complete enough to provide sufficient detail to allow the work to be repeated by others. However, only truly new procedures should be described in detail; previously published procedures should be cited, and important modifications of published procedures should be mentioned briefly. Capitalize trade names and include the manufacturer's name and address. Subheadings should be used. Methods in general use need not be described in detail.

Results

Results should be presented in a logical sequence in the text, tables and figures; repetitive presentation of the same data in different forms should be avoided. The results should not contain material appropriate to the Discussion. It should be written in the past tense when describing findings in the authors' experiments. Results should be explained, but largely without referring to the literature.

Discussion

The discussion should consider the results in relation to any hypotheses advanced in the Introduction and place the study in the context of other work. Results and Discussion sections can be combined.

Conclusions

If an optional conclusion section is used, its content should not substantially duplicate the abstract.

Acknowledgment

The acknowledgments of people, grants, funds, etc should be brief.

References

Bibliographic references in the text appear like [1, 2, 5, 6], using square brace in superscript. References should be numbered consecutively, with style:

Journal paper:

1. Hadjibabaie, M., N. Rastkari, A.Rezaie and M. Abdollahi, 2005. The Adverse Drug Reaction in the Gastrointestinal Tract: An Overview. Intl. J. Pharmacol., 1 (1): 1-8.

Books:

1. Daniel A. Potter, 2002. Destructive turfgrass insects: Biology, diagnosis and control. Wiley Canada Publishers, pp: 24-67.

Chapters in Book:

1. Bray R.A., 1994. The leucaena psyllid. In: Forage Tree Legumes in Tropical Agriculture (eds R.C. Gutteridge and H.M. Shelton) pp. 283–291. CAB International, Oxford.

Titles of journals should be given in full. 'In press' can only be used to cite manuscripts actually accepted for publication in a journal. Citations such as 'manuscript in preparation' or 'manuscript submitted' are not permitted. Data from such manuscripts can only be mentioned in the text as 'unpublished data'.

A Report:

1. Makarewicz, J.C., T. Lewis and P. Bertram, 1995. Epilimnetic phytoplankton and zooplankton biomass and species composition in Lake Michigan, 1983-1992. U.S. EPA Great Lakes National Program, Chicago, IL. EPA 905-R-95-009.

Conference Proceedings:

1. Stock, A., 2004. Signal Transduction in Bacteria. In the Proceedings of the 2004 Markey Scholars Conference, pp: 80-89.

A Thesis:

1. Strunk, J.L., 1991. The extraction of mercury from sediment and the geochemical partitioning of mercury in sediments from Lake Superior, M. S. thesis, Michigan State Univ., East Lansing, MI.

Tables and Equations

Tables and equations should not be submitted in a format exceeding the A4 page size (in portrait form). **All tables should be embedded within the manuscript, and must be captioned and numbered sequentially.** Each table should be on a separate page, numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals and supplied with a heading and a legend. Tables should be self-explanatory without reference to the text.

Figures / Illustrations / Photographs

Graphics should be supplied as high resolution (at least 300-600 dp.i.) electronic files. Digital images supplied only as low-resolution print-outs cannot be used. Graphs, diagrams, chromatograms, photos, etc. should be prepared as clear, original positives, suitable for reproduction. **All figures should be embedded within the manuscript, and must be captioned and numbered sequentially.**

Proofs

Proofs will be sent via e-mail as an Acrobat PDF file (e-mail attachment) and should be returned within 3 days of receipt. Page proofs are considered to be the final version of the manuscript. With the exception of typographical or minor clerical errors, no changes will be made in the manuscript at the proof stage.

Check List

We recommend that you ask a colleague to read over your paper prior to submission to ensure it is of a high standard and conforms to a high level of scientific writing.

Before submission of your manuscript, please check that:

- All references cited in the text are included in the reference section.
- All figures and tables are cited in the text.
- Figures are at least 300 d.p.i.
- The pages are numbered.



[Home](#)










[Journals](#)

[Instructions to Authors](#)

[Manuscript Submission](#)

[Join Us](#)

[Contact Us](#)

	Journal of Basic and Applied Scientific Research		Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies
	Journal of Basic and Applied Chemistry		Journal of Basic Sciences and Applied Research
	Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological Sciences		Journal of Computer Sciences and Communication
	Journal of Pharmaceutical and Biomedical Sciences		Journal of Engineering and Higher Technology
	Journal of Agriculture and Food Technology		Current Economics and Management Research