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A Comparative study of Islamic Revolution of Iran with Davies Theory

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ABSTRACT

Over three decades have passed from the Islamic Revolution in 1979. However, reviewing the causes and factors leading to this revolution still arises much debate in the academic circles of sociology of revolutions. From among different theories that have embarked on analyzing the revolution, Davies theory enjoys significant importance due to its global acceptance and numerous in different works. There is disagreement among various thinkers on whether Davies theory is capable of analyzing the Iranian revolution.

The paper paper has used Robert Ger`s theory to identify the roots of the revolution, describing the Davies theory, and reviewing the ideas of different thinkers who are for or against this theory. The statistics published by Planning and Budget Organization, the reports issued by the Central Bank, and some other sources verifies largely, the capability of this theory to describe the Islamic Revolution and compare it with the Islamic Revolution. However, this article will show that Davies theory, with its inherent limitations, can merely explain some part of the causes and reasons of the Islamic Revolution, and a more comprehensive review calls for other complementary approaches, especially a cultural approach.

KEYWORDS: the Islamic Revolution, Davies Theory, Economic Growth, Increasing expectations, Economic Decline, Collective Violence, Cultural Approach.

1. INTRODUCTION

The review of the Islamic revolution of Iran, its causes and roots has always captured the attention of the social theorists as a great historical phenomenon. The analysts had explained and analyzed this revolution with different approaches and at different levels .For instance, at macro level, some theories focus on the economic factor of the Islamic Revolution[1], while some others emphasize on the political factor as a significant factor in explaining the revolution[2]. Furthermore, there were some other theories that embarked on explaining the revolution through a “cultural-ideological” approach[3]. At the Micro level, we can mention the “psychological theories” and “Social Theories”[4]. The multiple or combinational approaches that have used a combination of different theories for explaining the Islamic Revolution are among other approaches[5]. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolution of Iran created a great development in the existing theories. One of the features of this revolution is that it has paved the way for adjustments and reforms in the previous readings of the theories of revolution, and even some of these theories faced serious challenges with the emergence of the Iranian revolution. The Islamic Revolution is the great event of the 20th century. In addition to fundamental and pervasive changes in Iran, it has obtained great global achievements and found great resonance all over the world. It has affected, and even transformed many theories and principles that once considered decisive and flawless. (Sadeghi, 2003, p. 9) Due to this

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feature, some have claimed that explaining thee Iranian Revolution through any existing theory is not possible. Therefore, they have insisted on creating and designing a new type of theory (a native approach to the revolution) that can help in explaining the Iranian Revolution. Therefore, they have tried to view the Iranian Revolution from a new perspective and beyond the exiting theories, and interpret it mainly through an ideological- cultural approach (i.e. Ali Davani, Manoochehr Mohammadi, Hassan Katchoueyan, and Mohammad Hazeri)[6]. Another group has criticized single- factor theories and considered combinational approaches as more suitable for reviewing the Iranian Revolution. It is worth mentioning here that despite the importance of the theories mentioned so far, we shall keep in mind that the claims regarding the ability or weakness of the existing theories in explaining the Iranian Revolution is verifiable merely through scientific examination of every single existing theory.

The present article reviews and analyzes one of these theories, that is, James Davies theory, which is generally accepted and is referred to and quoted in many instances and tests and compares it with the Islamic Revolution of Iran. To what extent can the economic conditions of the pre- revolution era matches with the claims made by Davies and his curve? Many researchers , including Hossein Basharyeh, Niki Kadi, John Fouran, Dzabih, Holliday, Moghaddam, and Rafi` pour ,have used, negatively or positively, Davies` curve in their sociological explanations. One of the most important factors for measuring the significance of a theory is the number of references made to it. Therefore, it seems that Davies theory, with such a feature and adaptation of a bi-dimensional approach (economic, psychological)[7] to the revolution, is surely among the most important theories for understanding the phenomenon of revolution in general, and the Islamic Revolution in particular. The present article reviews Davies theory. At the same time, while presenting the pros and cons of comparing it with the Islamic revolution, it addresses the ability of this theory to explain the Iranian Revolution.

1. Theoretical foundations

As mentioned before, there are different approaches and perspectives regarding the revolution. The psychological analysis is among the existing analyses regarding the revolution. This analysis considers the statics and personal behaviors as an effective factor in shaping the political and collective actions. In this analysis, one emphasizes the role that mental and psychological processes play in explaining the behavior of the revolutionaries and regimes. The theories of Marvin Zonis, Ger, and theories that influenced Davies' curve are included in the category (Yousefzadeh, 2009, p. 109).Two approaches are detectable within this analysis: a micro and a Macro approach. The micro approach focuses on the characteristics of the leadership and revolution leaders. In this level, the characteristics, weaknesses, and strengths of the ruler of the regime come in the focus. The socio-psychological framework is a macro- level framework as compared with this. Therefore, some researchers have addressed the revolution with a more macro-level approach and within the socio- psychological framework. They have used Davies and Ger theories (or the school of relative deprivation and disappointment) for explaining the Iranian Revolution (Fouzi, 2005, p. 16). Many have considered his theory as falling within the socio-psychological theories. The Socio-psychological theories divided into four special groups. One of them is the theory of increasing expectations that Tocqueville presented. This theory flourished in 1930s, but later found application in analyzing the revolution by James Davies (Rash, 2009, p. 240). However, a deeper probe into Davies theory and the principles of his thoughts reveals that his theory is rather an economic approach than a psychological one. This approach considers the economy and economic developments as the main cause of the revolution). This combination is among the strengths of his theory, and this is the point that justifies the importance of this theory and makes it applicable to the Iranian Revolution. Therefore, while we consider the hidden psychological dimensions of this theory, we emphasize the economic nature of this theory in our effort to compare it with the Islamic revolution. Many thinkers confirm this approach. For instance, Robert Ger has completed Davies theory in his book,'Why Men Rebel?' , and addition of non-economic factors to it shows that he has merely an economic approach. Davies, with a pure economic view, introduces "Relative Deprivation" as the factor leading to revolution (Ger, 1998, p. 13).

Over four decades has passed from the time James Davies presented his theory about formation of revolutions, in an article titled "Towards a Theory for Revolution", in "American Sociological Review" in

1962. During these years, Davies theory has gained a very significant position in the minds of the majority of sociologists and researchers and is now among the main theories for explaining revolutions. Nearly every significant work on revolution society or at least its fundamentals that translated into Farsi have at least referred in passing to Davies theory. For instance, “The Sociology”, written by Anthony Giddens , “Social changes” by Guy Rouchet, and “The Fundamental Sociological Theories“ by Kouzer and Rozenbureg , combine the long term theory with crisis and economic depression that reduces the economic resources, for explaining revolution (Bashiryeh, 1995, p. 64). It is worth mentioning that Davies theory is rooted in the ideas of four thinkers.

The first thinker is Dullard, who believes that frustration (i.e. conditions in which a sudden interruption and disruption occurs in the way to achieve the goal and prevents its attainment) leads to aggression (i.e. damaging others), which results in freedom from frustration. Low levels of frustration result in low levels of aggression, while high levels of frustration will lead to high levels of aggression. This is so because the psychological benefits of refinement is much more than its cost (Moshirzadeh, 1996, p. 57).For explaining revolutions, Davies has used the behaviorism in the theories of Delard and his colleagues who considered that disappointment and frustration in achieving desired goals results in aggression or violent behavior.

The second thinker is Wilfred Pareto. Ted Robert Ger argues: ‘Paretos ideas regarding political consequences of difference in income distribution, led Davies to the interpretation that economies with very diverse or very centralized incomes are inflicted with political disputes” (Ger, 1998, p. 166).Davies used these materials in explaining the evidences of France and Russian Revolution and Civil Wars in Spain.

Karl Marx is the third thinker that has influenced the ideas of Davies. This common belief that the increasing degradation of industrial workers class will ultimately lead in unavoidable disappointment and rebellion, is not the only point that Marx has stated .At least in one other article, he states a quite contrary idea. He states that increasing degradation of the workers is not a pervasive precondition for rebellion. Rather ,the improvement of economic conditions of the workers that can not be matched with the ever increasing welfare of the capitalists and therefore, results in social tension serves as the precondition of rebellion. As Marx writes: "Therefore, although the workers are better off, but the social satisfaction that they take out of it has reduced, because based on the general level of development in the society, the capitalists enjoy things that the workers do not have access to. Our wishes and joys are rooted in the society….’ (Kouzer, 1999, p. 84).

Finally, the fourth thinker is Alex Tocqueville John Fouran believes that Davies has expanded the statement of Tocqueville who believed that granting some freedoms in the era of increasing economic boom resulted in French Revolution (Fouran, 2004, p. 567).The fact that Davies was inspired by different thinkers has given his theory a valuable multiplicity.

As mentioned before, Davies addresses the economic issues and then, moves to psychological and socio-psychological dimensions through economic factors and ultimately ends in political sociology. Therefore, based on the following model, Davies theory is in a sense, an economic- psychological theory that has political and sociological consequences.



Figure 1: Davies Theoretical model

Davies believes that poverty or "absolute deprivation 'cannot serve as a driving force for riot and revolution, because in absolute poverty, the people, above every thing, try to fulfill their necessary needs and therefore, use their physical and psychological energy merely for survival and keeping alive. In such a situation, the individuals have nothing to do with the society and disengage from every activity that has no bearing on their survival. This, at best, means surrendering to fate and at its worst is synonymous with disappointment and silence.' When people are trapped in the worst situation, it is unlikely that they start riots'. (ibid. p. 242) What matters is relative deprivation[8]. 'It is relative poverty, not absolute poverty, which results in protests'. (Giddens, 1995, p. 662) While if there is a relatively long period of welfare , an expectation sets out during this period that all needs can be permanently fulfilled , and a dynamic trust and continuous expectations for better living conditions will be formed. Now, if a period of decline and decrease in goods and services follows this long period of growth and constant welfare, a feeling of insecurity appears. A vague, special fear emerges that the progress obtained over a long period will be lost, and the people will have no other alternative, but to believe that they will never be able to meet their needs. In such a situation, there will be a wide gap between what people want and what they actually obtain. Of course, there is always a gap between expectations and realities, but under such conditions, the expectations are still growing more or less, and the sudden decline of the economic conditions will result in intolerable gap. Therefore, a high level of frustration and disappointment leads to revolutionary behavior and widespread protests. 'If this gap exceeds a certain level, it will become intolerable and such feeling of frustration will result in collection aggression that can be seen in movements and revolutions' (Moshirzadeh, 2003, p. 19).



Figure 2: Davies J Curve, quoted from Davies, 1962, 6.

Davies continues by stating that political stability or instability depends, ultimately, on the mental mode or the mood of the people of a society. It means that satisfied or indifferent individuals that are poor considering thee goods, social status, and power, may stay politically inactive while those in opposite position may rebel. However, another scenario that is as likely or even more likely is that the unsatisfied poor rebel and the satisfied wealthy people oppose revolution. Compared with suitable provision of food, equality, and freedom, it is more the mental dissatisfaction that may cause revolution. The revolutionary state of mind requires continuous expectation , although dynamic, for attaining more opportunities for satisfaction of basic needs that may well include a wide spectrum, ranging from satisfying the pure physical needs (food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety from physical damage) and social needs (emotional , family, and friendly linkages). Of course, serious and continuous threat to satisfaction of these needs is the necessary, complementary element. However, this is not the threat to individual survival, but the threat that places the individuals in a special state of mind that makes them believe that they are not able to satisfy one or several of their basic needs. Robert Ger later developed Davies theory further. With a psychological approach to collective and political violence, he tries to explain their root cause (He defines political violence as all pervasive attacks within a political society, against the political regime and its actors-including rival political groups and authorities – or its policies). Some thinkers consider Robert Ger`s theories on revolutions as complementary to Davies Theory (J Curve)[9]. It is said that Davies, with an economic perspective ,introduces relative deprivation as the cause of revolution .However, Robert Ger has taken a step forward by identifying increasing expectations of human beings- even in the absence of real deprivation – as the cause for emergence of violence.

With a short glance at Robert Ger`s book, we understand that in fact, he has performed two major tasks in relation with Davies theory:

1-Robert Ger has expanded Davies` theory and has taken it beyond a merely economic explanation. He identifies many other factors in addition to the frustration caused by the decline after economic growth, as the causes of aggression, and thus, provides his explanation with a breadth that is beyond the scope of this paper.

2-He has elevated the concepts in Davies theory from a conceptual definition to the operational level. He writes in his book:" One of the functions of relative deprivation models is that it facilitates the systematic interpretations of the effects of developments in the indexes of social and economic performance. The indexes of economic performance and the financial activities of government provide us with some instances. Instead of resorting to perceived economic dissatisfaction as measured through criteria such as comparing per capita income or relative growth rates of different countries, we can interpret them in a more precise manner. This is possible through patterns such as the short-term decline in productivity following a period of stable production (Declining relative deprivation) and short-term changes in inflation rate, the price of goods or the general productivity in proportion with their amount in the distant past. (Rising or declining relative deprivation) Data on wages and salaries in the form of times series for different groups of occupation exist in many modern and developing countries. Such data one can use for deducing welfare and in some cases, relative deprivation status. Furthermore, we can systematically search for evidence indicating that the existing situation is an outcome of increasing expectations. Such conditions include the increase rate foreducation andliteracy, launching reform programs, presenting ideologies modernization by political leaders, and mobilizing citizens that were not participating before, for political and social activities (Ger, 1998, p. 92).

Therefore, put it briefly, the factors that Robert Ger identifies as indexes of deprivation or social welfare include the following: 1) inflation, 2) overall productivity, and 3) wages. In addition, he introduces these factors as factors resulting in increasing expectations: 1) education andliteracy, 2) reform programs, and 3) presenting modernization ideologies by political leaders. The present paper has selected Robert Ger`s reading or Davies theory, which is certainly one of the best and most comprehensive readings of this theory, for completing our research and as the theoretical basis for comparing Davies theory with Iranian Revolution.

2-1. Proponents of Davies theory regarding the Iranian Revolution

- Hussein Bashiryeh, one of the proponents of comparing the conditions of the Islamic Revolution of Iran with Davies theory writes:"…looking to the conditions of Iran through the above theories, it seems that the 1973-1978 period , i.e. the pre- revolution years, are compatible with Davies theory. In this way, we will show how a short- term increase in economic resources increased the expectations of lower classes ,and how during the ensuing crisis , the expectations were still raising , but the ability of the regime to fulfill such expectations was declining" (Moshirzadeh, 1995, p. 37). Bashiryeh considers "J curve' a suitable theory for explaining the Islamic Revolution, because Davies theory is merely an explanation of the general economic conditions be fore revolutions, the perceptions of the people regarding economic conditions, and the effects of these perceptions on revolutionary activities. Relying on "J-Curve "theory, he tries to answer this question: What are the factors that were lacking in 1963, but have resulted in intensification and continuation of the revolutionary activities in 1978?
- Nikkie Keddie is another proponent of this comparison. In a paper titled "the Reasons of Iranian Revolution", he suggests, 'In the Islamic Revolution, not only many people from traditional and modern middle classes expressed their discontentment, but also many farmers and workers who were isolated from their roots were not satisfied with the existing conditions. In addition, even before revolution, the J-curve phenomenon existed and a collapse had followed a period of economic progress. Anyway, this factor and other economic forces played significant role in the revolution. In The Roots of The Islamic Revolution, Keddie mentions developments at different levels for explaining the Islamic Revolution. Furthermore, he mentions the classical

conditions before revolution, i.e. the emergence of economic conditions after a period of economic growth and boom that resulted in a growing gap between expectations and realities (Moshirzadeh, 1996, p. 42).

- Another thinker is Fred Holliday .Although he does not directly refer to Davies curve and theory, in the economic part of his explanation on the Iranian Revolution; he uses the same theoretical model. In his book,' Dictatorship and Development of Capitalism in Iran", he writes: 'The government has been able to buy temporary support or at least silence through spending oil revenues , increasing consumable goods and inspire some hope for large parts of population. However, from this point onward, especially in 1980s,the government cannot continue these policies due to decrease in oil revenues (Holliday, 1979, p. 295).In his concluding remarks, he identifies oil and the emergence of gaps and changes and crises that appeared before revolution as main causes of the Iranian Revolution.
- John Furan, too, considers the emergence of Davies Curve among the factors that led to the Iranian Revolution.'After 1977, due to historical convergence of several factors, the revolution started contradictions of this model of accumulation, together with the global depression, brought to an end the oil boom and reduced the economic growth rate. This means a downward trend in Davies Curve for the lower and middle classes and intensification of severe economic conditions' (Furan, 2004, p. 532).

In general, those who support this comparison argue that the trend of modernization in Iran that had started years before revolution was the starting point for increasing expectations. This trend later increased the public benefits through the increase in oil prices. However, in the last years, for reasons such as decreasing oil demand in Europe that resulted in reduction of the oil price, a sudden economic depression inflicted the society and resulted in intolerable class gap and expansion of mass protests that finally culminated in the Islamic Revolution.

2.2. Te opponents of Davies Theory of the Islamic Revolution

- In his book, *Modernization and Conflict*, F.Rafiepour writes about Davies theory: 'Regarding Iran, we saw that from 1966 to 1976, the number of literates and university students had rapidly increased. Consequently, the revenues of the people, too, had improved. The Gross National Products enjoyed an unprecedented increase due to the sale of oil at suitable prices .This increase in GNP steadily continued until 1977, when the first sparks of revolution appeared in Qom in 9 Jan 1978 and quickly spread to other cities. Therefore, the "J-Curve " of Mr. Davies , that some analysts and scholars tend to use as a basis for explaining the Iranian revolution is undoubtedly refuted for the Iranian Revolution based on the statistics of the Central Bank of Iran' (Rafiepour, 1998, p. 76).
- Another analysis that is against comparing the conditions of the Iranian Revolution with Davies theory, is a view presented in the university textbook of *the Islamic Revolution and its causes*.the long, anti cultural campaign of the Shah regime, does not lend support to the theory of compatibility of the Iranian Revolution with Davies Curve. In the meantime, the religious mature of the Iranian revolution contradicts Davies` theory. Considering the economic dimensions, it says that in the case of Iran, even if based on the table indicating the growth of the Gross National Product, we claim that there has been a long-term improvement in the living conditions of the people; we must note that firstly, this table does not show how the revenues were distributed. Furthermore, looking carefully at the data presented in this table, we understand that the gap that emerged was in no way great or intolerable (The Representative Institution, 1999, 167).
- In another research, Panahi, too, has shown that the cultural and value driven factor had played the greatest role in the realization of Iranian Revolution and economic factor was of no great significance here. From 659 slogans chanted about the goals and values of the Islamic Revolution, 261 slogans (about 40 percent) related with political goals and values, considering the type of the political regime and its characteristics as perceived by the people and the revolutionaries. However, the bulk of these slogans, that is, 359 or about 54 percent, were about cultural goals and values. This

volume of revolutionary slogans about culture may indicate that the cultural conditions of the society and the regime were causes of greater concern for people. The economic goals and values accounted for 39 slogans (about 6 percent) of the slogans and this indicates the lower priority of economic matters for the people and the revolutionaries (Panahi, 2010).

- Michel Foucault, too, has somehow rejected Davies` theory on the Iranian Revolution. He believes that if the Islamic revolution were an economic revolution, the well- off groups such as the personnel of the Iranian National Airlines or workers of Abadan Refinery should not have participated in it. At that time, the economic problems were not so grave to take millions of people into the streets…' This revolution can not be the outcome of material and economical motivations, because the world has witnessed the rebellion and revolution of our nation against a power, whose economic problems were not so grave' (Yousefzadeh, 2009, p. 109). He believed that what distinguishes the Iranian Revolution form other revolutions, is the Shiite logic and culture behind it.

Some thinkers have considered the economic development and modernization of the regime as mainly political and regarded it as a policy that the regime had adopted for securing its benefits. The modernization of societies in transition, including Iran, had been a very selective trend that the government implemented (Kamali, 2002, p. 66).

3. Research Hypotheses

Claiming the compatibility of Davies theory with the Islamic revolution, based on Robert Ger`s reading, requires realization of three main hypotheses or condition:

1- Before the victory of revolution, the Iranian people simultaneously experienced a rapid economic growth and improvement in their living conditions.

2- In the post-revolution era, the public expectations have increased due to economic growth.

3- During the revolution and in the years that led to revolution, a sudden decrease, deterioration, or reversal of economic conditions has occurred, while the public expectations have increased.

If, the social and economic situation in pre-revolution Iran matches the three above-mentioned conditions, it means that Davies theory can explain, largely, the Iranian revolution. However, if only one of these conditions did not hold true, we can conclude that the Iranian revolution is not compatible with Davies` theory and such a theory cannot fully explain the Iranian revolution. Now we take the most logical way and review our research hypotheses, whose indexes extracted from Davies` theory based on the complementary theory of Robert Ger.

4- Research Findings

4-1. reviewing the first Condition: Did we experience a period of Economic Growth before revolution?

Regarding this theory, all proponents and even opponents of Davies theory admit that during the decade before revolution, Iran has experienced a period of economic boom. For instance, Rafiepour clearly states that the Gross National Product had greatly increased due to suitable prices of oil sale and therefore, the living standards of people had improved. The formal statistics, too, confirm such a claim The Gross National Product with the market prices of 1970, increased from 731.5 to 5047 in 1978 and 6048.5 in 1979. Furthermore, the Gross National Products, with the fixed prices of 1970, increased from 1309.8 to 3363.2 in 1979 (State Statistics Yearbook, 1980, p.742)[10].

The statistics published by the Central Bank also support the same idea[11]. The Gross National Product of Iran had increased from 39.3 units in 1970 (with the fixed prices of 1974) to 124.3 units in 1976, and the revenues in foreign currencies gained from oil and gas export had increased from 1.3 billion dollars in 1970 to 20.7 billion dollars in 1976. A closer look at the figures in this table indicates that in addition to oil industry, Iran had experienced economic growth in agriculture, industries, mines and service sectors. For instance, "the service sector has increased from 47.4 in 1970 to 112.5 in 1976" (Iranian Center of Statistics). In the Industries, that has increased in this period from 8.48 units in 1961 to 15.07 units in 1977, effective steps were taken and the huge resources from oil revenues, set the industries on the oath of

accelerating growth, and industries such as oil, gas, petrochemical, and vast industrial complexes all over the country were established" (Razaghi, 1992, p. 206).

Different statistical sources of this period indicate accelerating growth of industrial sector in this period. 'In 1968, the industrial growth rate reached to 14 percent and climbed to 17 percent in 1973-4, so that most of the industrial units enjoyed tremendous growth. Towards the end of this period, about 2 million persons were been employed in industrial sector and the employment ratio in industrial sector reached from 19.9 percent to 30 percent. The production of consumer industries such as textile, cement, and sugar multiplied. The production of cotton textiles experienced a seven-fold increase from 1959 to 1972 and parts of its products exported to neighboring countries' (Seifollahi, 1995, p. 87). The increasing expansion of small and big industrial workshops in this period suggests that the industrial sector has experienced a tremendous growth within these years. 'The results of the census of Big Industrial Workshops of the country show that the number of these workshops climbed from 3788 in 1971 to 4504 in 1979' (The Statistical Yearbook , 1980, 461). Regarding the Index of "National Revenue"[12], the existing data indicates that the Iranian national revenue has increased from 1005.4 billion Rials in 1970 (with the fixed prices of 1974) to 3549.8 billion Rials in 1976 (Central Bank of Iran). The overall increase of the National wealth during 1963-1975 period, especially the accelerating growth in mid- 1970s that benefited a large part of population including the industrial workers, contributed to the stability of the regime '(Defronzo, 2000, p. 66).

The industrial products also experienced significant growth and increased from 5 percent in 1963 with 1903 factories to 20 percent in 1977 with 7989 factories' (Defronzo, 2000).Apart from the amount of production, the value of this type of products had also experienced great increase. The value of products of big industrial workshops increased from 355083 in 1974 to 549931 in 1976, 573334 in 1978, and 641496 in 1979' (Statistical Yearbook, 1989, p. 482).

Therefore, regarding the industrial growth in pre-revolution Iran, we can say that in 1959, the second Development Plan started and made the golden age of the Iranian economy with the third, and fourth Development plans. In the second and third development plans, the economic growth rate increased to 6.6 percent, while the target growth rate was 6 percent. This significant growth rate was been left unsurpassed even in the years following the revolution. 'From 1963 to 1977, Shah significantly expanded his social and economical plans. The main support for these plans was oil revenues that had increased from 555 million dollars in 1963 to 20 billion dollars in 1976' (Abrahamian, 1998, p.342). All these suggest that Iran has enjoyed a rapid economical development in the decade before revolution and therefore, based on the above data, the first condition of Davies theory holds true.

4-2. Reviwing the Second Condition: Did the public expectations increase before revolution?

Robert Ger considers the increase in the level of expectations with three criteria: 'Increasing education and literacy', "reform programs", and 'presenting ideologies of modernization by political leaders'. From among these three conditions, we measure the level of education and ideological presentation here.

First Criterion, "Education and literacy": Based on the published statistics, at that period, Iranian society witnessed a high growth in the number of literate people. Therefore, in 1956 census, only 15.4 percent of Iranian population was literate, while this figure incresed to 29.4 percent in 1966, 33.4 percent in 1968, 36.9 percent in 1971, 37.7 percent in 1972, and 47.5 percent in 1976 census. In the same way, we can see ever-increasing growth in the number of high school and university students. The number of high school students increased from 6156000 in the educational year 1973-1974 to 8574000 in the educational year 1977-1978,and the number of university students increased from 123114 in 1973-1974 to 160308 in 1977-1978. the number of university students in the educational year 1975-1976 was 151905, which raised to 160308 in 1977-1978 and finally to 175675 in 1978-1979' (Statistical Yearbook 1980, p. 138)[13]. In these years, we observe with the rapid increase of educated and literate people. The number of literate persons increased from 15.5 percent in 1956 to 47.1 in 1976' (Planning and Budgeting Organization, Center of Statistics, 1984, p. 18). In addition, in the same period, we observe widespread demand for attending University Entrance Examination. In May 1977, Keyhan Daily wrote that 650000 attended

University Entrance examination, from which less than 40000 accepted in universities' (Kamali, 2002, p. 111). In his book, titled *Development and Conflict*, Rafiepour writes that the number of students of university and higher education institutes increased from 67000 in 1970 to 154000 in 1976' (Rafiepour, 2002, p. 71).



Iranian Center of Statistics

The Second Criterion:' Presenting the ideology", as another factor in increasing the level of expectations will be studied from two dimensions. The first dimension was those ideas that the regime presented under "Great Civilization", and the modernization programs put forward by the government. The illusionary growth and development favored by shah and the massive import of cheap consumer and service goods increased the public expectations. However, the sudden decline of this condition intensified the dissatisfaction of the masses. On the other hand, the political culture of Shah's opponents was presented in different ways and therefore, was accessible for the main groups and social classes that were damaged by the dependent development in 1970s" (John furan, 2004, p. 552). In this regard, we can say that with the expansion of political and social awareness by the revolutionary leaders, demands such as freedom, political participation, and right of choice were increasingly mentioned by different classes of the society .This condition culminated in increasing public expectations: demands that the regime was not is a position to fulfill easily. Therefore, the second precondition of Davies theory also holds true.

3-4 Studying the third condition: Did the Iran society experience an economic collapse in the years near the revolution?

For answering this question, we shall refer to other definitions. The concept of "Overall Productivity" that is presented by Robert Ger is a relatively general concept, and such statistics does not exist in the indexes published by the Central Bank. Therefore, we have used indexes such as "National Revenue" and "Gross National Product" that are confirmed by the experts instead." Iranian Gross National Product has increased an average of 10 units per year from 1970. However, in 1977, this growth drops to merely 3 units of Gross National Product"[14]. It seems that in 1977, we are exactly on the pick of the "J – curve". It means that an increase in the Gross National Product that is 23 units in 1976 has plunged into merely three units in 1977.although still positive, the downward trend continues in 1978 and in this year, we experienced an intense decrease of 20 units in the Gross National product. On the other hand, all the above-mentioned processes of national revenue face such a downward trend. Therefore, in 1977, Iran confronted an intense budget deficit. "The amount of budget deficit reaches from 169.8 billion Rials in 1976 to 458.4 billion Rials in 1978. This means an approximate absolute increase of 260 percent." (Statistical Yearbook, 1978, 131) Regarding the "inflation rate", it shall be stated that although from 1970 to 1976 , the index of prices for goods and services shows an average growth of 10 units per year, in 1977, we experience a 32 unit increase in the price of goods and services(in fixed prices for 1974). This suggests very serious inflation in 1977"(Yearbook of Statistics, 1979, p. 1016).The highest price increase in 1976 and 1977 were in housing and fuel prices, which are among the basic commodities and can, cause widespread concerns. The direct result of this event was sharp increase in the household expenditures. The

household expenditures in 1977 are about 4 times those in 1973. It means that within three years, there had been 4 percent increase in the living expenditures of the people that had placed them under heavy economical and psychological pressure" (Statistical Yearbook, 1979, p. 1053).

The measures that regime took for confronting inflation and unemployment was not effective. "The welfare policy of the regime had come to a dead end due to reduction in oil revenues. The accelerating migration of villagers to cities that motivated by the inattention of the government to them on the one hand, and the need of cities, especially Tehran, to labor, resulted in the evacuation of the villages, intensified the depression in agriculture, and increased the price of products in this sector. In the second half of 1977, inflation raised to 40 percent. The growth rate for non-oil industries dropped from 14.1 percent in 1976 to 9.4 percent in 1977" (Rahbari, 2004, p. 161).

The last index reviewed for the third condition is "the amount of revenue". Unfortunately, the statistics on the amount of revenue are not complete. However, even this incomplete statistics clarifies many important points. First, although the figures related with the earned revenue of different jobs have increased, this increase has never been in proportion with the existing inflation in the last years of Pahlavi dynasty. Second, the ratio of revenue of the families that earn salaries has increased more, while the free jobs in agriculture and other sectors has experienced a very meager revenue increase (Statistical Yearbook, 1979, p. 718). This indicates that in spite of the economic shock and serious inflation, the salary earning families were able to keep their status, while those families who made a living through other occupations suffered from a very bad economic condition due to insignificant revenue increase. This conforms to the reality that the majority of those who participated in the revolution were from market and small traders.Therefore; the industrial development provided the opportunity for rapid industrial advancement after the fourfold growth of oil revenues in 1973-1975 periods. However, the same development trend resulted in the economic recession from 1976, when the demand for Iranian oil decreased' (Amjad, 2001, p. 145). From early days of 1976, due to the reduction in oil revenues, the execution of constructional projects decreased and as a result, the workers joined the mass of unemployed, because the bad condition of agriculture in villages made their return to villages pointless. The oil revenues made the country increasingly dependant on agriculture as a strategic industry. Devoting huge budgets to military sector, coupled with reduction in oil prices, inflicted the society with economic crisis and recession". The huge salaries that Shah paid to foreign military advisors and technicians, and those Iranians with special technical skills, led to serious increase in inflation and mounting revenue gap among technical and professional workers on the one hand, and the rest of the society on the other (Graham, 1979).

Considering the existing documents and the results, the economic conditions of Iran before the Islamic revolutioin is, largely, in conformity with Davies theory and its three underlying hypotheses. In the Iranian revolution, the three conditions required for realization of Davies theory hold true and the conditions before the Islamic revolution somehow matches the "J-curve". Therefore, the economic factor and the prevailing psychological conditions that were outcomes of an economic collapse (Robert Ger`s interpretation) paved the way for the Iranian revolution. However, a single question still calls for answer: How much can Davies theory explain the economic conditions in the pre-revolution era? In other words, to what extent, can we consider the economic factor as the cause for the formation of the Islamic revolution?

5-**Conclusion**

The existing data indicates that Davies theory, despite all criticism that the critics may level against it, has been successful in explaining the economic dimension of the Iranian revolution. It gains even more explanatory power when it combines with the special reading of Robert Ger (the psychological approach). This approach starts with economic factors and passes through psychological and socio-psychological factors to the political movement and, ultimately, a social revolution. The existing data indicate the accelerating economic growth in a period, followed by a collapse in another period .this is the same thing that this theory claims. However, the explanations that this theory presents in relation with the Iranian revolution, suffer from major deficiencies. It shall be noted that the existing theories are each able to present a partial account of the Great Islamic Revolution[15]. Certainly, no single theory can present

acceptable accounts, since the significant elements of theories are able to transform to each other in different dimensions and times. Davies theory, which is mainly an economical- psychological theory, is no exception. Therefore, there is no consensus among social thinkers on compatibility of this theory with the Islamic revolution. Some of these thinkers have questioned the western principles of this theory and its universal generalizations for the Iranian society and oriental atmosphere. The unreliability and uncertainty of statistical data, especially when the revolutionary society confronts different crises, is the other criticism. The external realities also refute this theory, because in some countries, there have been no revolution despite the existence of the conditions mentioned in Davies theory. For instance, in America, under the most difficult economic conditions at the end of 1920s, that resulted in the bankruptcy of thousands of people and even led many people to suicide due to economic pressures and material loss, there was no revolution. Furthermore, how much can we apply the concept of progress and economic boom as the main claim of Davies theory, to the Iranian society before the revolution? In which fields could we see this progress? Moreover, what was the mechanism of this progress? Improvement in the living conditions of the people, and increase in expectations makes sense only when the oil revenues used for economic development in the real sense of the word. This is what a society with unquestionable hegemony of the government on the main organs of the society could not tolerate. The conditions that existed in the pre-revolution era were, largely, similar to "unbalanced development". Such a growth merely increases the financial power of the government and uncontrolled growth of serve sector, with the cost of ignoring other sectors of the economy[16].

Davies theory is the fruit of a specific society and time and therefore, those conditions affect its status and special features. However, such conditions are not necessarily observable in other societies. Generalizing a part of this theory and applying it on other societies without taking into account the special considerations of those societies would be a wrong generalization. This theory is mainly an economical theory. The theoretical background of the effects of economy on sociological transformations goes back to Karl Marx Critical Sociology. The economic theories on the Islamic revolution include those theories that have embarked mainly on the economic analysis of the Iranian revolution. In this approach, the main role in the emergence of the Iranian revolution as played by economy, economical plans and their problems, and other issues and factors treated as marginal[17].

The economic explanation of the Islamic revolution is merely one of the possible explanations. Such an explanation is surely minimal, when it comes to the Islamic revolution that many local and international thinkers consider as a "cultural revolution"[18]. The realization of the Islamic revolution showed that those thinkers who claimed "the end of ideology"[19] in 1970s were wrong. The Islamic revolution belongs to an age that many call the age of death of ideology. However, this event showed in practice that the religious culture and values are still effective in social and political developments of the society.

Regarding the Iranian revolution, the most significant criticism that some critics level at this theory is that it has ignored the role of cultural and ideological factors in the Iranian revolution, while many researches have confirmed the importance of this factor. In the book on reviewing the slogans of the revolution, it argues: ‘The number of slogans on the political goals and ideals of the revolution stands second, and this indicates that the importance of this dimension is less than the cultural dimension. In other words, one of the causes of the Islamic Revolution was the illegitimacy of the political system, and the nature and function of the political system of Pahlavi Dynasty, whose fundamental transformation had been among the goals of the revolutionaries. Finally, the economic goals and ideals expressed in the least number of slogans and this indicates that the public dissatisfaction with the economic conditions under Pahlavi regime has not been to such an extent that transforming the economic conditions can pass as the main ideal of the revolutionaries. Although emphasizing merely on the cultural factor is as dubious as considering the economic factor as the root cause of the revolution, however, the reality is that the Islamic revolution, despite common perspectives and theories, especially economical and material ones, opens a new perspective for revolutions and the dominant theories of the time (Panahi, 2008, pp. 42-43).

In a paper titled "Towards the Fourth Generation of Revolution Theories", Goldstone writes that in analyzing the "fourth generation"[20] revolutions such as the Islamic Revolution of Iran, factors such as

leadership, ideology, and identity shall receive special attention[21] . Based on his studies on the Islamic Revolution, John Furan has included cultural factor in his theory on the Islamic revolution and considers it as the main factor for explaining this revolution (Panahi, 1999, p. 279). The perspective of cultural approach to the Islamic revolution is not unique to Iran .Rather, we can claim that many distinguished French thinkers and scholars who are as experts on Iran, had followed the same approach for explaining and analyzing the reasons for Iranian revolution.

Therefore, identifying the cause and effect relationships in the Islamic revolution, and the attitude towards this revolution, required a new philosophy and approach that is suitable for the Iranian society. This society, as a religious one, has its unique cultural, historical, and social conditions and therefore, before anything, the social and political behavior of the individuals shall be studied in relation to, and as affected by, the local, religious and Islamic values. Therefore, studying the roots and main causes of the Islamic revolution and formulating an effective model[22] for theorizing about it, is merely possible through such a process and mechanism .These are the conditions that James Davies has ignored in his theory.

NOTES

[1] . Robert Looni, Homayoun Katouzian, Teda Skocpoll, Valerstein. Some of the theories include accelerating modernization Rentier State and the theory of unbalanced development.

[2] . Charles Tilly, Misagh Parsa in a book titled, *The Social Roots of Islamic Revolution of Iran*, and Gerard Green in an article titled “Demobilization as a revolutionary method”.

[3] . Ali Davani in a book titled *Movement of the Clergymen*; Hamed Elgar in *the Roots of the Iranian Revolution*; Asef Hussein in *the Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter-revolution*; Gil kil, Djalal-ed-din Farsi, Hamid Enayat, and Michael Foucault.

[4] . Marvin Zonis, Ted. Robert Ger, James Davies

[5] . Michael Fisher, in a book titled *Iran: from Religious Discord to Revolution*; Niki Keddie in: *The Roots of the Iranian Revolution*, Fred Holliday and John Fouran in *the Vulnerable Resistance*.

[6] . *Revolution and Thought: Discussions on Sociology of Islamic Revolution*, Ali Mohammad Hazeri-Tehran, Research Center of Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution, Research deputy.

[7] . The increase in economic expectations of the people following a period of economic progress and the depression that ensued will induce a mental fear and a revolutionary spirit in the people (Resalat daily, no.6077).

[8] . Relative deprivation focuses on the mental perception of the individuals. The human beings may mentally deprive, while an outside observer may not consider them as in need.

[9] . The basis for relative deprivation theory is the psychological frustration – aggression theory that claims that frustration of the individuals in obtaining their goals has resulted in their aggression, and the more frustration, the more aggression against the source of frustration we witness.

[10] . The Gross National Product as per main groups of economic activities, with the current prices of 1970-1979.

[11] . The total value of all goods and services produced by a country is its Gross National Product or GNP.

[12] . The National Revenue included the total earned revenues of the nationals of a country, within a national economy and in a specific economic period after subtracting the consumable investments.

[13] . The Institute of Scientific-Educational Research & Planning (1980).

[14] . Iranian Statistics Center, calculated based on the figures in Table 2.

[15] . We can measureThe greatness of the revolution by the width of changes and transformations in the elites, old political institutions, and the social structure. (Cohen, 2009, p. 58).

[16] . Extracted from the abstracts of papers presented in the International Congress of Islamic Revolution, 1999, 74.

[17] . The theories of oil monarchy, unbalanced development, accelerating modernization, and Rentier State are among economic theories.

[18] . Hazeri in *Revolution and thought*, Ali Davani in *The movement of Iranian Clergymen*, Manoochehr Mohammadi in *An Analysis of the Islamic Revolution*, Leila Eshghi in *A novel not Like the Others*, Barry Ron in *The Iranian Revolution: Ideology and Symbolism*, Michel Foucault, etc.

[19] . Some theorists believe that the age of ideology and religion as an ideology is over. Edward Sheller used the term "end of ideology" for the first time in 1955.

[20] . Fourth generation is a generation that has set itself free from pure structuralism and determinism, and instead, has focused on numerous such as cultural and ideological factors, and concepts such as resource mobilization, unbalanced development, etc.

[21] . Different writers of "Iranian Islamic Revolution", Qom.

[22] . A model is a mechanism that can help us understand how, and based on what logical sequence, the different components of a theory are related together (extracted from Cohen, 2008).

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