The Impact of Ideology on Iran’s Security Policy, in the First Decade of Islamic Revolution (With Emphasis on Defensive Military Doctrine)

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ABSTRACT

After the revolution, Iran due to its specific characteristics and universal orientation, have constantly faced with security challenges in and out of its borders. During the years 1979-1989 severe tensions arose between Iran and other regional countries, for survival, led to Iran-Iraq war. This paper is trying to reply this question that in the first decade of revolution on which principles the security policy of Iran is based on, regarding its unique features, what problems and obstacles had been facing, and the characteristics, obstacles, problems, and the results deriving from security policy of Iran in this part of the history is being discussed. First decade of revolution divided into three periods according to country’s political structure: the victory of revolution until fall of provisional government, since fall of provisional government till impeachment of Banisadr and the complete authority of the revolutionists which last until the end of war.

KEY WORDS: revolution, the Islamic republic, politics, security policy, defense policy, defense, government.

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of security and security policy in internal and external dimensions and the quality of obtaining, had been a significant concern of the world countries, and each country following the power sources, governance structure, geographical location and type of ideology, has tried to design and use its own security policy for the goal of achieving overall security.

Iran, after the revolution with respect of features and characteristics of revolution, has had more sensitivity to the issue of security. These security concerns has caused the first decade of revolution to be the most stressful stages of Iran’s recent history. Iran considered its security dependant to this issue that should not be confined within its borders.

This policy was opposed from two sides, on the one hand, liberal and pragmatic factions (within the country) and the other hand, regional countries and superpowers (worldwide) who were extremely worried about the expansion of Islamic revolutionary ideology. Firstly Islamic revolutionary ideology which stems from the nature of Shia Islam, simultaneously was under the severe pressure from home and abroad, and after an abundant rise and fall and resignation of provisional government, a partial victory was achieved, but ideological dichotomy of revolutionary faction and liberal party was completely insurmountable and survived through the government body, revolutionary command council and after the presidential elections.

In this period, the security policy of Iran concentrated on preserving the territorial integrity and conveying the revolutionary messages to the world and other regional nations.

On the contrary, regional countries and global powers, had conflict with this country due to the fear of influence and spread of Islamic revolutionary ideology.

In foreign policy the connection with the nations took the place of the relationship with the governments, this issue caused their reactions to be under Iran actions.

Initially this article for the evaluation of Iran security policy in the first decade of revolution, discusses about the concepts of security policy and the influential factors in designing security policy, and in the next section, with the title of Iran security policy after the revolution, this period of ten years is divided into 3 sections. It takes into consideration as the follows: first section, since the victory of revolution till the fall of provisional government and the second period since the fall of provisional government till Banisadr impeachment.
The concepts of security policy

One of the most principal concepts which has efficacy on the realm of international relationships and military strategies is “national security”. Occasionally, the term of national security is whether related to the nation-state or to the extent of international structure. Some define the national security as the feeling of self-determination or autonomy, in pursuit of fundamental goals and the absence of fear and serious danger to the vital and fundamental political values that will be attacked. (Aghabakhshi, 1362, 172) some other define the security policy as an national relief from threatening to the loss of whole or a part of human resources, economic structure and capacity and its physical integrity and territory. (Jock Plano, 1988, 40) The word security means being safe and this feature can be achieved when there is no threat or danger. A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war. (Ayoob, 1993, 5)

If based upon described above definitions, the preserving national security means the independence and territorial integrity and national dissemination of values and beliefs, people’s welfare, the country political stability and provision of leisure facilities to deal with various threats, the security policy contains a country provisions designed to fulfill the mentioned items, practical policies and plans about foreign relations, economic and defensive planning of a country as well. In better words, the national security is the consequent of security policy and defense policy is also a part of security policy.

Considering these points, while regarding different aspects of Iran security policy in the first decade, the current literature has more emphasis on defensive sector, because the independency and territorial integrity of each state has the most significance and any government tries to avoid other states’ interference and invasion to its borders.

The effective factors on security policy underpinning

The effective factors on security policy which is essential for the nation’s stability and the security policy can be achieved through these items which are briefly as the follows:

The objective and tangible factors as 1. Land 2. Geopolitical position 3. Population 4. Economic power 5. Military power, among tangible items, the land area is a major factor. Of course about the discussion of the land area and its positive points, the issue of government ability in accessing and ruling all part of the land should be taken in to consideration (aalam, 1376, 96) which excessively depends on huge population.

Land area also represents other dimensions of power including political, civilization, historical and cultural power. (Mirheydari, 1375, 13). The 19th century’s scientist, such as English “Miconder” German “Hoscher” and American “Alfred Mahan” also have discussed about the role of geography on politics and have established a new course namely as geopolitics. (Mohammadi, 1377, 85)

The outline of the country on a geographical map such as its longitudinal or circular shape and strategic depth, good weather, natural undulation and access to the free international waters is one of the powerful factors. Population factor also in case of availability of material or spiritual factors such as quality of leadership, national mood and effective ideology, flourishing economy associated with population health, high percentage of literates especially the experts can be effective to develop the national capability which leads to increment of economic power that has a basic role in power factors.

Economic power means high economic growth which have decisive impact on relative power of the state and its strategic achievement. Economic power has a direct effect on military power because it is based on financial blooming and technology advantageous. (Paul Kennedy 1376, 602) also military power as the other tangible factor is strongly dependent to the economy, information and communication factors and by their absence the military power (if any) will be inefficient.

But this is a fact that military power has the significant effect over the countries’ relationships. There are the main characteristics of military power as advanced weapons, military techniques, transportation facilities, military personnel and the quality of their moods and having a reinforced ideology. A country will be militarily powerful which has enclosed these factors (Ghavam, 1371, 93). These factors are in close relationship with leadership factor.

2. Subtle and intangible factors including, 1. Reliability or national prestige. 2. Leadership. 3. Ideology

Reliability or national prestige is one of the intellectual and intangible factors which can be obtained through the pre-explained material/tangible factors and describes the political unit’s position in the international community. This factor- though in contrast with the strategy of other countries- also is in relationship with other conditions such as: economic development, technology, the rich history of historical/civilization and national unity, possessing independent strategy in the global stage.
The leadership has an impressive and guidance role in decrement or increment of national power which had been effective on ideological, political, economical, military and diplomatic management.

Foreign policy management and their method of implementation necessitates the leaders who can ensure their own country’s profits by knowing and identifying the international situations and requirements. (ghavam, 1371, 84) The leadership can reproduce or reinforce another factor as ideology. Raymon Aron believes that the ideology consists of a serial events apparently managed which interpretations, ideals and predictions have been added to it (Aron-R1975, 3).

When ideology— as a security policy tool— in the national power is effective which the nation have a faith toward it. It describes the relationship between the leaders and the people and enhances the political system legitimacy and makes the problems and inadequacies tolerable for ordinary people.

The mentioned items are the main components of country’s national security and the tools for security policy. Any country, according to its specific characteristics, may have more emphasis on one of the factors; it means regarding advantages and disadvantages, one or more factors will be considered as a baseline of the security policy.

Characteristics of Iran security policy after the Islamic Revolution

Iran’s security policy, as an actor on the international stage, is based on the pre-explained cases. But considering its unique characteristics which have been mainly based on Islamic revolutionary ideology, has likely excluded Iran from other political units. Due to the nature of Islamic revolution and the necessity of its maintaining and survival without losing the revolution concept, the revolutionary ideology has been diagnosed as the best solution for maintaining the country and revolution entity. Iranian revolution was different from other revolutions in the world either in third world countries or in developed one, because it emphasized on a religious ideology (Nikki. Kiddle T 1988.300) the philosophy of jihad and martyrdom, sacrifice, monotheism, resurrection, are all stimulus and reinforcing factors by which Iranian youths arranged an unequal war in this decade. After the revolution, Iran appeared as a spokesman of an ideal. This ideal which derived from Shia Islam had the potentiality to penetrate among Sunni nations and proposed a new pole as “third pole”. On the one hand this revolutionary policy of Iran became a reliance point for the nations and Islamism groups, because from their view points Iranian revolution for the first time had broken down the common framework. On the other hand, the regional conservative governments and superpowers were also concerned about the expansion of Islamic revolutionary ideology, because it had either special plans about national and international dimensions due to the universality role of Islam’s specific thoughts and notions that yielded a kind of world which in it the comprehensive master of the superpowers on Islamic countries was denied, hence Iran considered one of its significant security issues on spreading the relationship with the Islamic nations. (Mohammadi, 1377, 95)

During the first decade of revolution, the main point in Iran’s security policy, is that the other mentioned power resources, were absolutely under the service of ideology and its expansion, while many of governments applies the ideology at the service of nationalism.

Due to the mentioned points we understand that Iran during this period considers itself as the bearer of justice (naturally undesirable to the will of global current structure) so, the survival and durability of the revolution can not rely on the common principals and ordinary unity and alliances. Iran revolution within itself has a message and mission that if opposing any country (that didn’t happen) its existence and survival were in conflict with superpowers and allies of regional countries. Iran leaders either should have been accepting the current global situation and associate with the flow and or didn’t protest, in this case, both methods were in contrast with the Islamic revolution mission.

Now, according to the main components of a country’s security management that design and plan the security policy, and considering the specific features of Islamic revolution and country’s security structure during the first decade, we study the security policy of Iran in three levels by the emphasis on defensive sector.

First level: since the victory of revolution till the fall of provisional government (moderation period)

Based on an empirical principal that Crane Brinton in anatomy of four revolutions tries to affirm that: each national revolution after the victory, will experience a period of moderate governing and then revolutionist one. After a short period of time, the revolutionary agents which have been consisted of different parties, have the dispute on administrative affairs and since the moderate’s party was more familiar and experienced than the others, assumes the power.

These groups possessed the features of operational history, wealth, prosperity and educational degrees. At this stage the revolutionary forces have no tendency toward the power, because they have no
sufficient and essential experience and on the other hand, the oppositions are hopeful and adopt the dedication and tolerance policy by ruling the moderates. (Brian Tune1362, 152). The moderates are charged as revolution opposition due to its conservative characteristic and the community moved toward the polarization, this trend is in favor of revolutionary faction. (Bashiriye 1379, 127). The main reason of dissension is insufficiency of regime change by the revolutionists and they are seeking missions for developing their ideas in other countries, but the moderates have focused just on politics and economy and have no interest in ideological missions.

Till the fall of Banisadr, Islamic revolution of Iran had a moderate approach and is a pursuant of Crane Brinton thesis.

**Ideological dichotomy and its impacts on national security**

After the revolution, “the displacement of strength theory between revolutionists and moderates” has been largely in accordance with Islamic revolution and its earlier developments. After the revolution there have been many parties which claimed for rulership, such as democratic and liberal, secular and pro-government leftist forces, pro-Marxist advocate. Nehzat e Azadi (Freedom Movement of Iran) regarding itself as a national-religious movement in comparison to the other parties was much closer to the revolution leadership, so the leader of this movement became the head of revolution’s interim government. But the dispute arose soon between two factions, because the liberal policy of interim government was in contrast with the revolution. The liberal notion was adopting and insisting on tolerance and lack of bigotry, especially in religious affairs. It believes that the religion is a private affair and should not be taken in to account as a signboard in politics and government affairs. The members of freedom movement and the interim government believed in democracy and the separation of religion and government (non-theocratic government) and following this trend, they rejected revolutionary courts. (Stample 1387, 75) Nehzat e Azadi (Freedom movement) had no belief in revolution as a transition factor and confided the theory of “revolution within the regime” until the last months of former regime and in case of supreme leader’s acceptance intended to establish the government within the framework of monarchy. (Stemple, 1378, 178)

Although, they regarded a peaceful struggle against domestic tyranny, but had no belief in fighting against imperialism, this problem, namely the fight against foreign colonialism and domestic tyranny was the main slogan of revolutionists and the revolution leaders believed in the dependency of tyranny and hubristic. (Mohammadi, 1377, 107). Revolutionists expected the government to distort promptly the entities remained from the former regime through the revolutionary reactions and settle the security problems in east and north-east provinces, but the prime minister believed in assumption of step by step mode of policy.

**A: Diverge in domestic policy**

The domestic policy of interim government, in many economic and security aspects, was affected by liberal demarche. While the revolutionists called for a wide clearance of the military, the state tried to appoint Shah’s military generals in new positions and couldn’t accept their removal and the revolutionary courts’ trends. Therefore, from one hand they were looking for military budget reduction and on the other hand, considered the qualitative reformation of these forces, thus, they opposed to purge the former regime forces. This paradox remained until the last part of the interim government lifetime. (Ismaili, 1380, 95)

The interim government optimistically intended to return or sell the aircrafts “F14” and replace them by the tractors (Mohammadi, 1377, 109) but Imam Khomeini intended the total maintaining and strengthening of the army, on 26th of day 1357, meanwhile, warning the monarchy council and the parliament, for resignation, stated:

U.S. government wants to retrieve the weapons and artilleries from Iran which have imposed us against the looting of oil during the years. I warn the army to stop this.

(Gharabaghi, 1368, 283) But the interim government reduced military duration to one year and transferred the militants to their habitat. This action had a great effect on the reduction of combat power of army. Iran’s main problem at this time, moreover the arise of dispute about the reconstruction of army forces, was the flow of separation and self-determination in some areas including Kurdistan. The performance of the government wing and the policy of neglecting toward the separatists were followed by the severe protest from the revolutionary wing. The state dispatched a board as the board of goodwill to Kurdistan headed by Dariush Forouhar (Behnoud, 1377, 76). While negotiating with their leaders, the dual view to the problem lead to the invasion of separatists’ bases by the fighters of Air Force. When Major General Gharani, the chief of staff was protested, he replied: “I am not willing to give ransom to the separatists and I will continue until their disarmament.” (Etelaat, 1358). The government dismissed
this brave officer and all the commands about the Kurdistan problem were cancelled. (Samiei, 1371, 76 ). Prime minister of interim government, following his liberal trend, on 15th of Farvardin 58 announced: “If the requested self-determination by Kurdish means controlling over the domestic problems, the state accepts willingly.” He promised that the plans of self-determination will be set on public voting. (Etellaat, 1358)

The state intended to oblige them to comply with the central government by giving rights. The interim government’s reasons of non-assertive reply to the request of Kurdistan’s autonomy were the military weakness and harsh violence of former regime toward the Kurdish. The extent of appeasement manner of interim government toward the separatist group lead to interfering and issuing the command for the army by the revolution leader (in order to rescue Paveh city) which had been surrounded. (Samiei, 1371, 189 ). Besides the problem of Kurdistan and along with it, similar conflicts were going to arise in Gonbad kavus. Subsequently the state announced that we are looking for a unique formula about the autonomy in Kurdistan and Gonbad. (Etellaat, 1358)

B: The conflicts within the foreign policy

The interim government, in dealing with foreign countries, adopted neutrality and defensive policy and hoped this method will support the national security and prevent the foreign aggressions. This view led country’s deterrence power to be ignored. Some believed that interim government, in terms of security policy, was following the former regime and lacked for independent defense strategy (Ardestani, 1377, 76) and considered the Soviet Union as a main threat and tried to have some negotiation about this by establishing a close relationship with U.S. Embassy. The only significant difference between both liberal and radical factions was about the method of dealing with U.S. government. Bazargan was not willing to free the Americans, but the opposite side wished for ending this presence (Stample, 1378, 277). the prime minister of interim government, according to its policy, without coordination with the revolution leader, had a meeting with Brzezinski the national security adviser of U.S president which this raised the anger of revolutionary forces (Mohammadi, 1377, 110). In this regard, the quality of dealing with powerful countries, the liberal faction considered the existing global system as a fact which there was no choice except adopting it, but the revolution leadership believed in challenging to remove all aspects of U.S. influences (either economical, military, or political and cultural, (Imam Ruhollah, 1366, 19)) The revolutionists believed in an unequal distribution of power in the worldwide. In their opinion, accepting this imbalance relationship was against the religious commandments and orders. They had no tolerance in dealing with powerful countries and wished for a revolutionary approach in the global stage, because they believed that if the revolution is being hindered it would fall. The basic policy of revolution was the relationship with the nations and it included two missions. At first the nations who were adherent to Iranian revolution would set aside their affiliated states and take the power or by putting the pressure on the states, would avoid them to interfere in Iran affairs.

The relative victory of Ideology over pragmatism (the fall of provisional government)

After the allowance of shah by America, the students of Islamic association which later were called as “followers of the Imam’s line” captured about 65 of American embassy personnel on Aban 58 which 52 citizen were held hostage for 444 days. Bazargan government fell the following day of event and the revolutionary command council was appointed to take the control over the country affairs. The late Bazargan, knew that the incident of capturing the U.S embassy and the collapse of his state were irrelevant and believed that his state had already resigned earlier twice, at the same time, one day before the incident, the government resignation had been presented to Imam. However, many domestic and foreign experts consider the collapse of interim government as the consequence to this incident. This action, strengthened the revolutionist faction and neutralized the U.S. attempts to prevail and direct the events to its own advantages. Taking over the U.S. embassy and disclosure of many document which revealed some of the members of liberal faction relationship with U.S. government caused the public atmosphere severely arise against them. The U.S. attempts to resolve the hostage’s problem, in the foreign aspect of this problem, through diplomatic council, was unsuccessful, because they couldn’t accept the student conditions and tried to solve it without concessions. This confrontation with U.S. was totally unprecedented from a third world country. Now an advanced country which had the capability of sending human into the space, was caught in the grip of a national policy which was suffering from the confusion resulted from its own revolution. (Salinger, 1362, 65) U.S. military attempts, for rescuing the hostages resulted in a failed mission and since then, Iran’s most important confrontation against global dominant system initiated. Conquering the U.S. embassy allowed the stability of revolution within the country and
the relationship between U.S. and its fan groups was disrupted. Therefore, this country’s efforts to exert pressure on Iran, was transferred to foreign countries.

Section 2: since the collapse of interim government until the dismissal of Banisadr

Taking over U.S. embassy, in first decade of revolution, is considered as a notable segment. This practice had many internal and external impacts and within the territory it caused the straightness of revolutionary faction and their presence in the stage of power implementation.

The liberal notion survived in another shape and in favor of following the supreme leader and could take the advantage of presidency. But the government and parliament were under the control of revolutionists. In this section, we discuss internal problems within this era and the beginning of Iraq invasion and the problems resulting from dichotomy in country’s defense and solving the hostage’s problem and eventually the sovereignty of revolutionists.

Revolutionary council government and continuity of dichotomy

After the fall of interim government, the revolutionary council proceeded to run the ministries. Since the most members of revolutionary council were from revolutionist faction, they assigned the overall policy based on the revolutionary concerns.

Dr. Mostafa Chamran, who was appointed as the head of defense ministry in the interim government, reinstated on 18th Aban 58 and his predominant reaction to opposition parties became as the pivot of domestic national security. The army and revolutionary guard corps were directed to work together based on the planning which Chamran assigned for armed forces. (Behnud, 1377, 107)

The concept of relationship with the nation policy was affirmed in revolutionary council government and Iran from the point of political, military and cultural view was against the U.S.A. The revolutionary faction could pursue the basic principals and rallied Iranian nation. The incentive for supporting the revolution enabled people to tolerate the problems, the revolutionary council government which served just for 8 months faced with 2 main problems. First, it was the procedure of solving the crisis of hostages and the conflict with the U.S and, the other was the implementation of constitutional referendum. After the referendum, presidential elections were held and revolutionary council broke up after formation of Islamic consultative assembly of Iran

Solving the problem of hostages

Liberal representatives in revolutionary council and the president had different views to the problem of hostages (though this time they were in minority) and their views seemed to be politically unofficial. But the official policy towards the hostages, were as the follows: the extradition of the Shah, his family and releasing his assets, unlocking of Iranian assets in America, an expression of remorse or and apology for the U.S historical role in Iran, and promise not to interfere in the future “

But after the death of Shah, in the summer of 1359 and the proximity of the U.S. presidential election, the value of the hostages decreased as well. On the other hand, the country’s main problem was Iraq war which had created an undesirable situation in southern and western provinces. The new conditions lead Iran to diplomatic approach in order to achieve the optimal agreement with U.S. ( Mohammadi, 1377,120) the negotiation between two countries started by Algerian intermediaries and the hostages crisis finally resolved by U.S promising the issues including unfreezing of Iranian assets ,finalizing any claims from American firms and citizens against Iran, providing the information about Shah’s assets, and a pledge by the United States that “it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene in Iran's internal affairs.”

America due to many excuses minimized Iranian assets and the crisis of 444 day hostages finally resolved (Salenjer, 1362, 68)
The hostages were released on the first hours of Reagan presidency.

Iran-Iraq war and a defensive dual viewpoint

Intellectual and ideological struggle in the higher section of Iranian revolutionary structure had a basic role on Iraq decision for beginning the war. This factor ruined the opportunity of army’s recovering and rebuilding. Country’s military forces were in a disastrous condition. The ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country and the interim government’s neglecting method had destroyed the security in Iran and the army couldn’t have the capability to take a control over a big war. ( Cordesman 1984,15 ). In the domestic policy area, Iran had no coherent plan for defense. Revolutionary forces and at the head of them Imam believed a complete defense based on revolutionary method. But liberal faction and the President Abulhassan Banisadr insisted on a classical war and international reactions to stop Iraq.
Somewhat, Iran’s situation and condition could not correspond to a classical war, 4 classical war operations were unsuccessful and couldn’t obtain significant result, but the president announced: “but this is the army which is fighting bravely against Iraq and not the army of guardian, they are more significant and stronger than the guardians.

( Ardestani, 1378,99) . In consequence of excluding the revolutionary forces, Khorramshahr collapsed after 34 days of bravely fighting and the promises of chief-of-staff to help the defenders could not be achieved. Some were convinced by the fall of khorramshahr that it is impossible to expel Iraq from Khorramshahr and other occupied areas because the classical style of fighting due to the inequality of the weapons and manpower had no efficacy. So, from their viewpoint the fall of Khorramshahr was leading the war to a dead-end and the rescue of city could be achieved just by diplomatic affairs and recourse to the superior powers. On the contrary, the revolutionary faction believed that one is winner in the battlefield who will be the winner on the negotiations table too and we should enforce the enemy to knee down in the battlefield.

Political developments, foreign invasion and civil war (impeaching of Banisadr )

The political conflicts between two factions in the country and simultaneously the war in the borders and occupation of vast territories had an unfavorable impact on the battlefield. The political stress intensified after the failure of military operation called as (Nasr) or the operation of (15th of day) which led to the martyrdom of many followers of the line of Imam students. According to this, the revolutionary faction believed that the president, regardless of the military principals had announced the withdrawal of operating forces while the army’s armored forces have withdrawn and this message had not been retreated to the front infantry forces ( which were the mentioned students) thus , they were besieged and massacred by the enemy attack.

The incident on 14th esfand of 59 at Tehran University revealed the borders of two notions. On this day, those who called themselves as the pros of president beat the other faction pros. This event as a turning point finalized the dichotomy in favor of one party. The tolerance of the supreme leader toward the president had no consequences.

Imam was forced to interfere and while warning declared: “the day which I feel Islam to be threatened, it is not the case that I relax and just advise “(jomhuri eslami newspaper, 1360) at this time, the liberals made their most strategic mistake and that was the coalition with people’s mujahedin of Iran. This organization, in terms of political and ideological supported the Marxism and followed the Stalin’s dictatorship style while Banisadr and liberals apparently insisted on western liberal principals.

The opposition groups, such as Marxist left and nationalists and... announced a demonstration on 25th of Khordad 1360. The reason for their movement was a protest against the bill of retaliation. This was a decisive day for both parties because they could display their general mobilization. The supreme leader asked from the religious members of this coalition (probably The Freedom Movement and Banisadr) to obey the public will and return to the embrace of Islam, by making the speeches which broadcasted the same day. ( Army of the Guardians of the Islamic revolution 1364.45 ) when the speech broadcasted, people came to the streets and at the appointed hours of demonstration which have been prescribed by the oppositions, nobody was in the streets except the revolutionists. The liberals and other groups concluded from this event that they have no capability of mobilizing the people. The Islamic consultative assembly, after this peaceful street confrontation, voted for Banisadr’s political mismanagement and was confirmed by the supreme leader. MEK, after the dismissal of Banisadr declared armed conflict and the country entered into a civil war condition. Opposition forces in accordance with the foreign invasion began a destruction and terror situation. During the summer of 1360, terrible assassinations and explosions occurred.

The leader with his extraordinary power could fill the gap caused by the assassinations of the top officials and took the control over the civil situations more than before and stimulated the war fronts.

In the domestic field, the revolutionists during this period (after the dismissal of Banisadr) could hold two courses of presidential elections and the terrorist troops were reeced. In Iraqi battlefields, the first non-classical victorious war operation carried out and eventually Abadan was liberated.

Third stage: revolutionary Islamic ideology, based on macro policies

After the complete withdrawal of the pro west liberals and defeat of anti-revolution guerillas , the integration of the country came under the control of revolutionary factions which were called “Hezbollah”, a kind of social-political participation was introduced in the country which controlled the battlefields successfully under the affection of revolutionary ideology and also rearranged domestic economical and social problems. In foreign policy the relationship with the liberation movements had
been flourished in respect of relation with the nations. Iran supported the liberation movements among the international organizations. In this period the main concern of Iran’s security policy was the defense stage and the other parts, such as economic, foreign policy fields & so on, were pursuant of the defense field. Country’s defense policy was strictly ideological and many armed force deficiencies were not tangible due to its role on the scene of war and shortly led to the big victories respectively.

In the aggressive policy based on revolutionary ideology the operators justified in such a way that the facilities and the power elements such as population, natural resources and ... and ordinary calculations and for defending the country should just rely on its revolutionary Islamic ideology. This principal with up and down was set as the main base of defense till the end of war. The media and western experts also conceded this point and wrote: “those who try to play with Iranian according to the rules are just burning their hand; we have learned that you can not come along with Iran like an ordinary country (policymaking body of Sepah, 1366, no.37). Ideology was effective on increasing the value of combat forces (in various aspects) because one of the important features of ideological fighting forces was neglecting the non-spiritual, in fact what they did, was assumed as a task and the materialistic demands based on instrumental rationality had no value in their minds. Muslim warriors always knew themselves owing to their ideal cult and did not discriminate an independent identity from the leader. These forces did not operate as a limited organization of the government but they were known as an umbrella organization which encircles all the segments of the society. This type of combat association and organization which called as “Basij” was the backbone of the defense policy at the same time.

**Defensive war, in the shadow of revolutionary ideology**

As the revolutionary government was established the war got the priority significance. The operational plans for expelling Iraq from the occupied areas were prepared by the army and revolutionary guard’s commanders and offered to the authorities. Revolutionary guards focused on developing its combat organization whereas before this time it was disregarded by the president and the commander in chief. As guards exited from the state of militia, started to compose combat units and divisions. In several operations it could plunder about 600 tank units by which the composition of the armored corps was initiated (IRGC political bureau 1366, no.50) Iran not only considered the war as an ideological one, but also Iraq and its supporters emphasized basically on this point that they have the same issue as well. Taha Yassin Ramadan, the Saddam’s deputy said: “this war last until the destruction of Iran, for the basic conflict is not just over a few kilometers or half of the Shat al Arab (Arvand Rud),…our war is not a border one which could be delayed, but a decisive war.(IRGC politburo, 1364, no. 4). Some assumed this war as an upheaval following Islamic revolution. Le Figaro in this regard writes: “the conflict between Iran and Iraq is not the war but a revolution which has no border. To comprehend this issue, we can consider Lebanon and what is going on in this country. The main concern is the flow of Shia Islam spread which has annoyed the Arab world and if not halted, one day will ruin the stronghold of Iraq. (IRGC politburo, 1366, no. 6) In terms of military equipment and even the personnel, Iraq had a full advantage over Iran so never had the panic of being revenged classically because it was not comparable due to their weapon quality and quantity aspect. But this advantage was neutralized in the shadow of revolutionary ideology. Economist wrote: “Iranian showed how they can arise with astonishment by crossing thousands of soldiers over arvandroud with hundreds of motorboat. Iranian forces are the true follower of Ayatollah Khomieni who are ready to be sacrificed. This untouchable advantage has an indescribable value against some weapons and missiles. (Corps politburo, no. 19, 1369)

**Iran’s security policy, in the third period (1360-67)**

In this period Iran’s Foreign policy is not apart from the defense policy and the war against Iraq. Country’s political structure composed of virtue practicing and most of these countries had no desirable relationship with Iran according to Islamic revolutionary values and Moslem country’s political structure. All Arab countries except Syria, Libya and Algeria were along with Iraq. Even during the war Iran assisted liberation movements politically and culturally and tried to put the pressure over the super powers and regional supporters of Iraq. In this part, we are trying to investigate the type of Iran’s feedback with regional countries and super powers.
A) The type of feedback toward the regional countries

The principles of Iran’s foreign policy, was based on developing the relations with the third world especially with Muslim countries, but their attitudes toward Iran’s new doctrine including political, economical, cultural resumption without relying on the superpowers were all in disbelief. On the other hand, because of the super power’s unsparing support of Iraq, Iran could put them under the pressure through its minor supporter. In this regard, Persian Gulf Cooperation Council apparently was created for the reason of economic cooperation among the members, but truly it was for confronting the physical and ideological penetration of Islamic revolution. Iranian policy in Persian Gulf was the security for all. Iraq never used from the area directly because all goods were delivered to Arab ports and then transferred to Iraq, so it attacked Iranian naval missions. Therefore, the Iranian officials declared: this is a raw imagination to attack our oil tankers, and surround the oil terminals and we sit and watch the oil to be exported. (jomhuri eslami newspaper , 1363) Iran initiated the inspection of the naval ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz and by using fast boats attacked the ships headed to the ports of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in response to Iraqi attacks. But Iran’s more serious reaction against the efforts of Arab countries was, to put the pressure on these countries through the support of their Islamic movements’ opponents and the reason for Persian Gulf Cooperation Council could be the same issue too. This council was constituted of 10000 people who had a close relationship with U.S. rapid deployment forces. The role of U.S. rapid deployment forces was determined as a defense against the foreign threatening and rapid forces of cooperation council in order to suppress the civil unrest resulting form Iran’s supporters (Assadi, 1371,,146)

B) The foreign powers under the influence of Iran’s plans

The regime after the revolution and passing the turmoil and disorder which have been pointed out in this article and the integrity of revolutionary notion in year 60 unlike the usual trend in third world had the demand for being independent in domestic and external fields. It was the will of decision makers in Tehran which caused the reactions of super powers, in other words, it was Iran’s decision which determined the playing field.

In this part, we investigate the impact of Iranian policy over the reactions of the global stage actors.

1. U.S.A

U.S after conquering its embassy in Tehran and inability to solve the crisis, shifted angrily toward Iraq as one of the allies of the Soviet Union. An ideological enemy of U.S. which was in the communism camp, lacking of democratic principles and some authoritarian tendency manner and exactly when Iraq applied chemical weapons, and acted as a threat to the shipping in the free seas, (Nikki Keddie, 1379, 137) U.S implemented a dual policy which seemed to be under the influence of Iran’s policy

“ Hope and Horror “. U.S. supported Iraq, but it was hopeful to reconstruct its relation with Iran. Some of U.S. foreign policy bodies in National Security Council, attempting to rebuild a type of relationship with Iran for selling the weapons. (Nikki Keddie, 1379, 137 ) while the other groups in U.S. staff, helped Iranian oppositions parties. White House while receiving the signals which assumed as Iran tendency for relationship with U.S. put it into action and sent secretly its national security advisor McFarlane as an envoy to Iran. McFarlane in this regard says: “Reagan’s tendency was so excessive somehow, when he was informed about the consequences and the results of this decision, he explicitly admitted the acceptance of all associated risks (Nikki Keddie, 1379, 226) but McFarlane’s trip to Iran was not so pleasant. Iranian had to reserve the right of suspending about McFarlane’s mission and U.S. staff completely. It was a right for Iranian to suspect about the McFarlane’s trip and U.S government. Colonel Oliver North as a member who accompanied McFarlane’s dispatched committee confessed that he was always lying to Iranian low officials. (Nikki , keddie, 1379,189 )

Lebanon the second battlefield between Islamic and American ideology

After Islamic revolution, the relationship with Lebanese shia was increased, as far as Shahid Mohammad Montazeri was going to dispatch ten thousands force of revolutions to assist Palestinian combatants to Lebanon. (Ehteshami, 1378, 76)

After Israeli invasion to Lebanon, French, American, and British forces entered this country but in fact for the reason of order settlement. Deployment of these forces which had no action against Israel aggression, the Lebanese youth considered it as a kind of occupation, which was followed by Lebanese severe reaction.
This problem which occurred at the peak of Iran - Iraq war, regarding the close relationship between Iran and Lebanon, led to adopting Iranian fighting pattern and some of its symbol as “Hussein Fahmide” for the Lebanese youth. Particularly Imam as the undisputed leader of Shia complimented this trend. The explosion in U.S embassy and its Marine headquarters and also French and Israeli military bases in the occupied “Sour” city was the result of this conception. After these operations, the multinational forces left the Lebanon. The Lebanese in order to put the pressure on these countries and also compel the Israel to withdraw took a few of western nationals as hostages. This put a lot of pressure on U.S. because once again after the Iranian hostage crisis it suffered from the same problem in Lebanon as well and searched a clue to solve this problem in Iran. U.S government under the influence of this problem in Lebanon tried to have a close relationship with Iran. Foreign policy experts had come to this conclusion, that if Iran wasn’t the victorious in the battlefield with Iraq, would not be the loser either, and the hostages liberation is totally related to Iran’s cooperation, and the need of Iran for western weapons, would reinforce its cooperation with U.S (Mohammadi, 1377, 150), according to this and some other reasons, McFarlane was dispatched to Iran, but he failed to visit Iranian authority and by delivery of some weapons the hostages were released.

2. Soviet Union

Since the beginning of revolution victory former Soviet Union tried to adopt a cautious stance. Iran’s leaders due to the historical performance of tsarist Russia and Soviet Union had no trust on it, but unlike the liberal wing, it wasn’t as a threat, but they considered it as a main base of colonial policy besides U.S. with another shape.

Imam knew the superpowers regardless of west or east as an outrageous structure, and believed that all of them are seeking to invade the others. Tehran, Moscow and Washington had a common strategy and despite of their differences, both had common targets (Shahram Chubin, 238). The main point of hostile between two countries was the conflict between Islamic ideology and Marxism. Moreover the treaties of “Golestan” and “Turkmenchay” (which its memories was the reminder of Iran humiliation ) the Soviet support of Tudeh party and its avoidance to cancel the sections of 5-6 of 1921 treaty (which had no validity for Iran) reinforced the problem, on the other hand, the Soviet policy in Afghanistan could not be acceptable according to Iranian revolutionary principles. After the fall of provisional government and Banisadr, which had a liberal demarche, Soviet government became satisfied and anticipated to compromise with anti-American religious people. But the supreme leader declared that: “as far as our confrontation with western imperialists we will stand against the international communism too, beware that the communism threat would not be less than U.S danger (Imam’s Noruz message)

End of war with Iraq

Iranian youths in the form of “Basij” in association with army and Sepah could repel Iraqi forces from the vast occupied areas within one year, but a dominant and honesty peace could not be achieved, because Iraq had withdrawn none of its claims and the international community called for ceasefire disregarding the clarification of the region future status and without any guarantee for Iran in case of the subsequent invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, all happened events and the ruins of two years war were ignored.

Therefore, Iranian inevitably continued the war till reaching to a certain point. Some time after the operation of “ Karbala 5” U.N security council issued the resolution of 598 which included an extent of Iran’s demands. Iran neither accepted it formally nor rejected it clearly as well, but requested for the displacement of some items. After the adoption of this resolution, the west determined not to present more than what have been issued to Iran. Following this time, west, expanded its military presence in Persian Gulf, established the support of Kuwaiti ships and attacked Iranian’s oil platforms. Consequently, the extent of battlefields for Iran, including Persian Gulf, expanded to more than 2500 kilometers. World comprehensive economic, political and propaganda pressures over Iran and strengthening Iraq resulted in Iraq inducement and regaining some other parts such as “ Fav” and “ Majnum” areas. Iran’s security policy which was based on protecting the revolution and territorial integrity could be achieved by the war and somehow the 598 resolution affirmed it. Changing the situations and formal adoption of resolution by the supreme power necessitated the changes over the tactics. The total political, economic and military circumstances of Iran on the national, regional and global level showed that preceding the war was a violation against the revolution intent. Adopting the resolution changed the global and regional poor situation in favor of Iran and Iraqi peace slogans faded by the reinvasion to Iran. Iran’s general mobilization against reinvasion of Iraq and heavy conflicts of the last weeks of war revealed that Iranian would keep this right for their territories. Once again, Iraq had to withdraw and the opponents’ operations
against Iranian government in” Islamabad gharb “vigorously defeated and eventually Iraq accepted the truce and war ended.

**Conclusion**

Iran’s security policy in its various aspects and particularly in defense dimension was under the influence of Islamic revolution ideology and its dominant principles. Since the creation and strengthening of revolutionary cores in all around the world was supported, the export of revolution strategic slogan was discussed not in the issue of invasion and occupation of others’ territories. Thus, Iranian revolution promised a new global structure which according to the current realities, was ideal and unachievable but stimulated the super powers and their regional allies. This viewpoint came under the challenges within the country. A segment of revolutionary forces which had liberal democratic tendency and according to the theory of Crane Brynton were considered as moderate, and at the first year of revolution had executive authority, strongly opposed the principles proclaimed by revolutionists. They assumed the revolution as an internal regime change and not a universal revolution. This party from the aspect of national security and the type of reaction to revolution’s entities and separatists in some part of the country disagreed with the revolutionists. In international aspect they considered it as a vain challenge with the superpower and a structure composed of weak and strong in relationship was a common issue which neglecting it was an ideal and irrational tool. The political life of this party was shaken after U.S. embassy crisis in Tehran and revolutionist took the control over the executive power. In defense area, the president as a representative of liberal view believed in classical war, but the revolutionists believed in assimilated war and revolution with public support, because the classical war has its own supplies which Iran lacked it at the current situation. After impeaching of Banisadr, the revolutionary regime could hold the presidential elections twice within 3 months, identify and arrest the destructive forces and also in fronts of war with Iraq could attain the first victory (liberation of Abadan). With the establishment of new government and presidency of Ayatollah Khamenei, the internal stability was achieved. In economical dimension, a relative stability in supplying the general needs achieved. The warriors in battlefields could withdraw Iraq from vast occupied areas especially in Khorramshahr. The internal consolidation of revolution and the entrance of Iranian forces to Iraqi territories for Iran’s lack of warranty in future to accept the ceasefire was an alarm for regional countries and their superpower supporters. In this era, Iran considered its security in being the winner of the war, either put the pressure on Iraqi fronts, through the pro- Islamic revolution minorities in regional countries or the governments who supported Iraq (whether regional or international) such as U.S. so that Lebanon in addition to Iran- Iraq fronts, had become the arena of confrontation between Islamic revolution ideology and capitalist thesis. This challenge resulted in financial, criminal and prestige losses for U.S and western countries. By the further pressure which Iran put over Iraq, eventually the international community led by U.S considered some advantages for Iran in the resolution 598 and were determined that in case of Iran denial, they won’t restraint a direct fight. In this new situation, two fundamental principles of Iran security policy, it means, the maintaining of territorial integrity and the protecting the revolution, were at risk, but on the other hand, resolution 598 guaranteed Iran’s demands. In this decade, the main characteristic of Iran security policy was its ideological component or in other words, the exposure of the other facilities and components at the service of the ideology. Iranian revolution could pass the internal, political, military and foreign war conflicts. In this decade, the country’s foreign policy was based on the relationship with the nations and simultaneously following the war, the regional and international supporters of this country, were threatened intensively through the revolutionary notions and its supporters. In all cases, the revolution gained the national comprehensive support. So the first decade of revolution came to an end and Iranian while maintaining the ideological and territorial integrity, could pass an intensive and surprising decade and entered to a new constructive decade though many nations came under the influence of this revolution’s concepts.

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