

## **Crisis of Democracy in Pakistan and Power Elite Perspective: An Analysis of Benazir's First Term in Office**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Democracy sustains if there is no struggle for power among the elites. It was this struggle among power elites in Pakistan that democracy suffered many times in the history of the state. This paper seeks to find out the pragmatics of the dismissals of Benazir's term in office in 1990, and attempts to bring to the front the political crisis the political elites suffered from in the struggle for personal gains. It also attempts to point out how democratic and non-democratic elites as a group of power elites played their role in deepening the crisis among the main political elites. The periods of Benazir's provides a sorrowful picture of the politics in the polity. Benazir Bhutto was mandated with majority in the elections of 1988 and became able to form government in the center. However, her relations with the President, and a group of power elites (the military and the oppositions) and with the provinces especially with the province of the Punjab deteriorated with the passage of time. This gave birth to the power struggle among the power elites out of their personal interests. As a result, the government of the PPP was dismissed apparently amid charges of corruption, mismanagement, worst law and order situation in the state. On the whole, the chapter analyses that how political elites were engaged in the struggle for power in collaboration with democratic and nondemocratic elites. The crisis of democracy is analyzed in the light of power elite theory and descriptive-analytic method is used to analyze the dated.

**KEY WORDS:** Crisis, Democracy, Power Elite, Benazir

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### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Benazir assumed power as a result of elections in 1988 after the long spell of the military government under General Zia. However, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the National Assembly on 6<sup>th</sup> Aug, 1990, under the Article 58-2(b) of the Constitution on charges given in the preceding lines. The Federal government was not running according to the provisions of the Constitution. It became, therefore, necessary to seek fresh trust of the public. Moreover, the culture of horse trading was rampant in the state and corruption was widespread in every institution of the government. The PPP broke all records of corruption. Its corruption was of such volume that the words corruption and politics became synonymous in Pakistan. On top of all these, the government failed to establish peace, law and order situation in the polity (Anjum, 2009, pp. 255-262). As a result, he had to dismiss the government of the PPP in 1990.

The political scene in 1990s was not different from what the state had experienced the past. The procedure adopted was well thought out even words used by the men on the helm to legalize their actions were the repetition of what we had heard before while leveling charges against the targeted government of the day (Wynbrandt, 2009).

The case of democracy in the Benazir Bhutto first term in office is analyzed in the light of the power elite theory of C.W.Mills. He analyzed the politics of the USA into three categories in his book "the Power Elite". They are the politicians, the corporate sector and the military. He is of the view that the power in the USA is regulated among these categories out of personal interests. Together they are known as the power elites. The case of democracy in crisis in Pakistan in the history and Benazir's first term in office could be best seen in the light of power elite theory. The crisis of democracy was due to the power struggle among the president, Benazir, army and the opposition in the centre and in the provinces. Together they could be clubbed as power elite. The transition to democracy just after the death of General Zia ul-Haq implanted hopes in the democratic loving populace that a new era would start in the polity. However, such hopes failed to bear any fruit. This sort of affairs casts shadows of doubts over the role of leadership, and raised questions why they failed to do away with the problems which were inherently democratic in nature.

## 2. Benazir's First Term in Office: An Analysis (1988-1990)

### 2.1. Pragmatics of the Crisis of Democracy: Rivalry, Benazir, and Ishaq

In the beginning, Benazir adopted a reconciliatory position and reconciled with the President Ishaq and the army with regard to the domain of authority. She tried hard to maintain good relations with the President and the army. However, the main tussle between Benazir and the President Ishaq and his collaborators emerged on powers. In the opinion of Iqbal Akhund, Benazir could win this struggle for power if she had observed her principles without caring for the support she would receive from the hung parliament (Akhund, 2001).

The democratic transition, in 1988, instilled optimism in the masses that democracy would take roots in the polity. However, that optimism was certain to meet pessimism as the political elites, in collaboration with systemic factors, soon engaged in controversies and betrayed democracy for personal gains. In the elections held in 1988, the PPP got the majority and secured 93 seats of the National Assembly. The IJI, the brainchild of the President and the army, obtained 54 seats. However, it was mandated with 108 out of 240 seats in the Punjab. As a result of the elections, the PPP formed government in the center. Subsequently, the IJI formed government in the Punjab under Mian Nawaz Sharif. In Balochistan, the JWP and the JUI (F) had the majority to form government in the province. With such a diverse composition of the governments, the PPP had to rule in the polity in 1988. As a result, the confrontation among them became one among the other reasons that provided a pretext to the President to dismiss the government of the PPP in less than two years.

As a matter of fact, the reason behind the dismissal was the existence of the rivalry between the PPP and the President and the army and their cronies. It is opined that the army was not happy with the results of the elections of 1988 (Aziz, 2009, p. 97). It was, therefore, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan renowned as "the Machiavelli of Pakistan (Kukreja, 2007, p. 242)" took two weeks in consultation with his friends before inviting the PPP to form the government in the centre. It was agreed that the PPP would not interfere in the appointment of the senior brass of the military as well as in the policy of Afghanistan. Benazir Bhutto made this reveal in her several interviews. She said that she had been allowed forming the government in 1988. However, her hands were tied. And when she attempted to use her authority, her government was dismissed without any delay. As a matter of fact, this compromise among the elites was not short of adjusting one another's interests within power sharing paradigm. Otherwise, the majority of the PPP was enough qualification for making government in the centre according to the majoritarian model of democracy of the polity.

In those unfortunate years, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was active to perform his role in collaboration with the army and the opposition on the political scene of the polity. Benazir Bhutto wanted to limit the role of the military in politics. As a result, she substituted General Hamid Gul (the Head of the ISI) with General Shams-ur-Rahman Kalu (Retired). Besides this, she also sought to replace COJCS Admiral Iftikhar Sarohi. However, Ghulam Ishaq Khan refused to extend his approval in those matters. Hence, the establishment especially army realized that she was going back on her words that she had pledged with Ghulam Ishaq Khan in November, 1988.

During the period of General Zia ul-Haq and of Muhammad Khan Junejo, a majority among the members of the IJI had acquired loans from the banks and also had got those loans waived off. However, the government of the PPP sought to retrieve from them. This move of the government of the PPP affected the beneficiaries who were the members of the IJI. Moreover, Benazir wanted to start an operation against the business community for the collection of tax. That community was consisted of the influentials of the IJI. As a result, the IJI made strenuous efforts to dismiss the government of the PPP. This move of the government of the PPP against the members of the IJI antagonized the President and his associates because the IJI was the brainchild of the President and of the army. Hence, the President sought to teach a lesson to the PPP.

The Presidential powers of the dissolution of the Assemblies were going to be ended possibly in March, 1990. As a result, the Prime Minister would become the center of the power. It was this power shift that made the President and the IJI worried. The IJI, therefore, demanded of the President to dismiss the government of the PPP before it was too late.

The differences occurred between Benazir and the President Ishaq over the former recommendations regarding changes in the internal policies. However, the President always rejected the proposed changes and used to advise her to get them pass from the parliament. The President knew well that she could not do so as she had no majority there. Besides this, the President Ishaq appointed General Asif Nawaz following the likely retirement of General Aslam Baig in August 1991. However, Benazir was least bothered in this matter (Aziz S. , 2016).

For the sake of staying in power, Benazir Bhutto agreed to what she might otherwise not to agree to. She agreed to extend her support to Ghulam Ishaq Khan's candidature for the slot of the president of Pakistan. Besides, she pledged that she would not interfere with the agreements made by the caretaker setup with IMF in ill-conceived way (Shafqat, 1998, p. 243).

Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the president of Pakistan on 12 December 1988. However, he never reconciled with Benazir Bhutto's government and played his role as a neutral man as was expected of him. He embroiled himself in shady deals with the opposition political parties in order to how to make weak Benazir Bhutto's government (Maluka, 1995).

When Benazir Bhutto was dismissed, a caretaker government was formed under Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. He belonged to the province of Sind. He had left the PPP and was a rival. He had founded his own party in the name of the NPP. This maneuver of the President Ishaq Khan was only to break the votes of the PPP (Aziz, 2009, p. 105). Moreover, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi nomination as the caretaker Prime Minister was the reflection of the President Ishaq Khan's rivalry toward the PPP. He also headed the investigation team which was investigating corruption and maladministration charges against the members of the government and Benazir (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 234).

## **2.2. Benazir, the Opposition and the Crisis of Democracy:**

It was opined if she did not engage herself in confrontations with the provincial governments and allowed them to rule and set aside the obsession to strengthen the position of the PPP in the rest of the provinces of the state, she could assert her authority as the head of the government beyond any doubt. However, their infighting for power put democracy at stake and provided others with the space to take mileage of the crisis. It is a common held thought that elite groups worldwide with few exception suffer from worries when their respective states are beset with the political instability at random basis. The case of the polity of Pakistan, however, is much different from the cases around the world. The elites groups in Pakistan are less imaginative about the political instability. Once they pitch against one another in political infighting, they take this to the finish (Waseem, 2017).

The PML fielded its electoral candidates which were 80% of the total candidates of the IJI. As a matter of fact, the alliance was consisted of nine parties. It was just the successor of the PNA at least in the number of political parties. The PNA was an alliance made against ZA Bhutto in 1970s. It was also consisted of nine parties. Six political parties were Islamists in the alliance of IJI. In addition to the Jamaat-e-Islami and a faction of Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI), these were Jamiat-e-Mashaikh (Society of Spiritual Leaders), Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith (Society of the Followers of the Prophet's Tradition), Nizam-e-Mustafa Group (Group for the System of the Prophet), and Hizb-e-jihad (the Party of Jihad). The Islamist touch might be an added characteristic of the IJI to attract more and more against Benazir Bhutto (Haqqani, 2005, p. 133).

In the election campaign, some of the religious elites of the IJI even spoke of Benazir Bhutto and her mother as gangsters in bangles. She was tagged as the spearhead of western culture. She was propagated as westernized woman. Their opponents airdropped her and her mother's swimming costume pictures over various cities in the state. They proclaimed that she would corrupt the morality of the people if allowed to come in power (Lamb, 1991, pp. 36-39). Benazir Bhutto faced with criticism from religious section of the society while assuming the office in 1988. Some of the ulemas (religious elites) even came with fatwa (religious edict) and proclaimed that a woman could not rule an Islamic state (Akhund, 2000, p. 58).

Benazir Bhutto took the office as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Media was given freedom somewhat. The PTV aired music programme. The actresses were allowed to appear bareheaded on the screen. This was banned in General Zia's regime. The fact that Benazir Bhutto herself wore scarp in public but this had no effects on Islamists. They protested vigorously and proclaimed that the government was supporting vulgarity which could damage the Islamic culture (Haqqani, 2005, p. 134).

As a result of the elections in 1988, the PPP became able to form government in the centre. However, it failed to form government in the Punjab. It sought to form its government in the province of the Punjab. For this purpose, it tried hard to bring the members of the IJI in its fold. As a result, Mian Nawaz Sharif used the Punjab card in order to instigate the Punjabi nationalism. If the PPP allowed the government of the IJI in the Punjab to rule, it was beyond any doubt that the PPP would have governed in the center. As a result of this mutual cooperation, the crisis of democracy could have prevented from emergence and would allow democratic transition to take roots in the state.

This is a flaw of the character of the power elites that they scarcely cooperate with their rivals. In her first term in office, Benazir had hardly any spirit of cooperation towards opposition. This lack of cooperation was best reflected in her move that she never extended invitation to the Chief Ministers of the Punjab and of Balochistan to attend the cabinet meetings. This lack of trust upon one another emerged in the politics of confrontation. Besides this, she also ignored the government of the Punjab and of Balochistan in the Peoples Works Programme. She tasked the party heads of the PPP at the districts level with the implementation and the monitoring of the said programme. On top of this, the PPP tried hard to weaken the role of the Senate of Pakistan as it had no majority there.

This kind of situation resulted into the politics of confrontation and political elites engaged in political infighting. Consequently, Mian Nawaz Sharif did not comply with the orders received from the center in connection

to the postings of the senior officers to and from the province of the Punjab. Besides, he founded the Bank of the Punjab because the branches of the National Bank of Pakistan in the province either created hurdles or denied financial assistance not only to the Itfaq Group of Companies but also to the businesses owned by the members of the JJI.

Moreover, He also objected at the schemes under the Peoples Works Programme and demanded of the centre that the said schemes to be implemented via district and union councils elected in 1985. In the province of Balochistan, the government of Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali was weak as he was able to form government in the province by narrow margin. The speaker's vote was decisive. Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali, however, succeeded to form his government in the province with the help of the members of the PPP who were only three in number. But his government was short lived as one member of the government joined hands with the opposition bloc. And, his government was dismissed just after twelve days. That was how Nawab Akbar Bugti formed government in the province with the help of the JUI (F) and soon joined hands with Nawaz Sharif to confront the center.

In the province of Sind, although, the PPP had majority but it entered into alliance with the MQM. However, the alliance broke when ethnic violence over Sindhi and non-Sindhi controversy erupted in Karachi and Hyderabad. Besides, the PPP failed to deliver what it had pledged in its elections' manifesto. The MQM withdrew its support from the PPP in 1989. In response, the government launched an operation against its activists across Sind. In that operation, the MQM activists were either gunned down or they received fatal injuries. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan also cited the operation as one of the reasons of the dismissal of the government of the PPP in 1990.

Benazir's alliance with the MQM, although, helped her to make government in the centre but this alliance suffered from failure when the MQM failed to support the PPP in parliamentary action. Moreover, she was criticized in the party especially by the sindi nationalists who were her arch supporters when she struck alliance with the rival (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 242).

The trust deficit was so deficient that the political elites had no faith upon one another. It was this lack of faith that Benazir kept the portfolio of the Finance Minister with herself during her first term in office. Besides this, in order to strengthen her grip on the affairs of the state, she established a new Board of Investment to grant permissions for the establishment of new industries. She even chaired its meetings in person. Moreover, she founded a cell in the Prime Minister Secretariat under the supervision of the leaders of the PPP. It was tasked with the responsibility to place the trustees in the various departments of the state.

Amid such power struggle, the COP initiated a vote of no-confidence against the government of the PPP. The PPP had 44 seats in 217 seats of the house. If the opposition had succeeded to bring three or four members of the FATA in its fold along with the 14 members of the MQM, the government of the PPP could have been sent to the home. This game of buying the loyalties of each other's members resulted into horse trading on high level. Each side tried its best to keep its members away from horse trading. For this purpose, the ruling party kept its members in its custody in Swat (KPK) and produced them just before the voting day.

Besides, the ruling PPP tactfully applied a tactic to show some of the members of the opposition in a meeting with the leadership of the PPP on the state media in order to convey a message to the COP. This sort of situation between the ruling and the opposition elites gave birth to the rumors of the military coup being talked in the polity. However, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan rejected those rumors of the possible army coup in a meeting with his close associate Sartaj Aziz on 14<sup>th</sup> June, 1990.

The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was of the opinion that the army imposed Martial Law when the breakdown of civilian government became imminent in public and in its own perception. However, no such situation is existed at present in the polity. Moreover, I had the power to dismiss the government under 58-2 (b) of the Constitution. However, there was no need to invoke the 58(2-B) at this moment (Aziz S. , 2009, pp. 97-105). These all show that how much political elites believe in the sanctity of democracy. Besides, they openly talk to dismiss the public government without any hesitation.

The government of the PPP was faced with the Shariat bill. The bill was passed unanimously with amendments on May 13<sup>th</sup>, 1990, in the Senate of Pakistan. It was pledged that every aspect of the daily life would be lined in the light of sharia. It had vast implications. If it had implemented, it would have been affected judiciary, economy, and mass media. Besides, the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan would have got powers to declare the decisions of the courts null and void if it had been unislamic. It was a severe test to Benazir's government.

If Benazir had extended her support to the bill, her office would have been in danger and if she had declined her support, she would have been accused of as an enemy to Islam. On July 19<sup>th</sup>, Benazir Bhutto said in response to the questions of the media persons at Lahore airport, that she would keep intact the supremacy of the parliament and did not think proper cutting hands and ears of the human beings. She was criticized in the religious

spheres over the statement. That was how she antagonized the religious elites who had already harbor enmity toward her due to their rightist inclinations.

Salman Rushdie published a book known as “Satanic Verses”. The book became a source of problem for Benazir Bhutto and her government. The Islamists considered her government as pro-west. They linked her person with Rushdie’s. As a matter of fact, the publisher, who published Rushdie’s book, had earlier published her book “the Daughter of the East (Akhund, 2000, p. 60)”.

The IJI was consisted of wealthy persons and many of whom considered themselves to be the heirs of Gen.Zia ul Haq and were pro-army (Newberg P. R., 1989, p. 572). In reaction to the overwhelming support of the Sindhi, the Punjabi political elites portrayed Benazir Bhutto’s Bhutto and her political party, the PPP, as the political party of Sindhi .Nawaz Sharif feared the dominance of Sindi even in the IJI (Newberg P. R., 1989, p. 572).

In the words of Saeed Shafqat, Nawaz Sharif was the symbol of the alliance of socio-economic groups that Gen.Zia ul Haq wanted to promote and encourage in the province. As a result, Nawaz Sharif got successes to bag down the PPP in the province of the Punjab with the help of the military and secured 108 seats of 240 in the provincial assembly. The PPP got 94 seats and independents got 32 seats of the Punjab assembly. Thus the IJI became able to form the government in the province with the help of the independence candidates. That was how Benazir Bhutto and the PPP scored low in the elections for the provincial assembly of the Punjab. This gave a message that Nawaz Sharif was on the solo flight towards political prominence in the power structure in the days to come (Kamran, 2008, p. 144).

The Chief Minister of the Punjab Nawaz Sharif was too much vocal demanding the provincial autonomy. He established his own provincial banks in order to translate that demand into reality. As a result, a situation was created which had been considered adverse for the newly established democracy in the polity. As the tension between the centre and the province rose, Benazir Bhutto image deteriorated .This weakened her government’s ability to foster intimate relations between the centre and the provincial governments. This was also the case with the MQM .The Pakka Qila incident broke the relations between the PPP and the MQM which left adverse effects in the days to come on the politics of the province of Sindh. Thus the relations between the political actors reminded broken and provided an opportunity to the president and the army to make the point that Benazir Bhutto Bhutto’s government was not capable to see the affairs of the state and provided them with an excuse to dismiss her government (Kamran, 2008, p. 145).

Benazir Bhutto went a step further in her nepotism and favoritism. She gave her mother Nusrat Bhutto, the portfolio of senior federal minister, and made her father-in-law the member of the parliamentary public accounts committee. There went bitter confrontation between the PPP and IJI. Their rivalry was only for power. Their differences were not on any national policy. The central government sought to put pressure on the government of the Punjab. In response, the government of the Punjab bounced back in strong terms defying the federal government. The political culture in the polity of Pakistan had been suffered from degeneration historically as a result of authoritarian rule that destroyed the development of institutions. Otherwise, such situation between the central and the Punjab government could be dealt in a democratic way. However, in the absence of such institutions, the federal government had the responsibility to restore the house and bring the state on the track of political stability but the worst of the matter was that actually Benazir Bhutto sought to have power in the Punjab by hook or by crook (Musarrat, 2013, pp. 261-263).

Benazir Bhutto’s political attitude transformed into bitterness as Nawaz Sharif campaigned publically to malign the government of the PPP. The PPP used unconstitutional means against the PML (N) government under Sabar Shah in NWFP (later KPK). The PPP leadership in the province while employing various tactics using money brought down the PML (N) government and enforced Governor Rule in the province. Later, the PPP formed its own government in the province. Demonstrations and protest started across the province maligning openly the PPP government. Nawaz Sharif proclaimed that this was unconstitutional and against the norms of democracy .The opposition, in the National Assembly, boycotted and protested publicly to malign the government and its undemocratic moves (Musarrat, 2013, p. 266).

The PPP leadership has lost too much energy in attempt to destroy the opponents. However, it failed to adopt new policies while engaging in administration and good governance. But to handle the opposition in such a way could be tantamount to an adverse response. The PPP leadership failed to resolve the pressing social and economic problems. This could be impossible until politicians on both sides set aside differences and develop consensus on issues in a democratic way. However, currently each was involved in intrigues rather than in parliamentary deliberation. In such state of affairs, some of the politicians from opposition benches even had the belief that martial law was better than Benazir’s government (Bray, 1990, p. 114).

The Deputy Secretary of the USA was reported to have stated that 1990 was going to be the year of the new elections in Pakistan, and the IJI wanted to defeat the PPP in the elections. Besides this, they also sought the

elections to be held under the caretaker set-up which had been grown in the dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq. However, he said that the PPP was adamant and sought to get rid of the caretaker government which was consisted of the men who had the blessings of Zia.

### 2.3. Benazir, the Provincial Governments, and the Crisis:

The lack of cooperation between the center and the provinces gave birth to such a situation that had expedited the crisis of democracy in the polity. However, the responsibility lies with those who are at the helm and it was the foremost responsibility of the government at the center as well as at the provinces to protect democracy and played their roles to end this political infighting. But it was a matter of great regret that the political elites put the national interest on their back and engaged in power struggle.

With the passage of time, the politics of confrontation between the center and the government of the Punjab assumed bad shape. The leveling of accusations on each other became a norm in elites' circle. If one group of elites takes a positive step, the other one used to adopt negative role. As a result, they thought the rival responsible for this crisis. This rivalry between the centre and the opposition touched the high water mark when the PPP moved a vote of no-confidence against the Chief Minister of the Punjab Nawaz Sharif. He although survived the move, but it engaged both of them in eternal enmity. As a result, they spent their energies in accusations and counter-accusations rather than worked to strengthen democratic transition in the state.

Benazir showed her anger against the IJI in her maiden press conference and made the occasion to direct the plethora of complaints against the Chief Minister of the Punjab Nawaz Sharif and the IJI of having stolen the provincial elections. She termed their activities as separatist tactics and ordered the members of the PPP in the Punjab Assembly to leave the House as a protest against the Nawaz Sharif's elections as the Chief Minister of the Punjab (Ziring, 1997, p. 512). Besides, she branded him as "the GM Syed of the Punjab (Inayatullah, 1993, p. 2).

The government of the PPP faced the criticism of the alliance of the elites in the shape of the rightist parties which were renowned in their traditional enmity towards the PPP. That alliance of the elites consists of those religious parties which were against the leadership of a woman as well as of those who had grown under the shadow of Zia and were active to provide reasons to General Zia against the restoration of democracy in the polity. And now those elements were bent upon to sabotage democratic transition.

During the vote of no-confidence move against the government of the PPP, horse trading outshined every precedent in the past. The members of the Assembly were kept in custody at Murree (Punjab) and Mingora (KPK) with all necessary pleasures and produced them on the voting day. This was an open instance of struggle for power between the political elites. Besides, the MQM broke alliance with the PPP on this critical stage only to bring it down. It could be held that it was the constitutional right of the opposition to move a vote of no-confidence against the PPP but this constitutional right should have been used for the welfare of the nation rather for the satisfaction of the personal ethos.

The PPP survived the move of the vote of no-confidence. In the meantime, the supporters of the IJI increased and this was an eye opener for the PPP. Toward the end of the month of April, Benazir Bhutto offered dialogues to the government of the Punjab for reconciliation. On May 3<sup>rd</sup>, Chaudhry Shujat Hussain and Ghulam Haider Wyne called on Nawaz Sharif to solicit him for the dialogues between the center and the Punjab. In the meeting, the proposal of dialogues from the center was discussed. On that very day, a special committee of the federal cabinet made an initial contact with the government of the Punjab. The dialogues, although, were not successful completely but it was hoped that reconciliation between the rivals would make its headway.

Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, a member of the National Reconciliation Committee, called on Nawaz Sharif at Model Town Lahore on May 12<sup>th</sup> and conveyed the message of Prime Minister Benazir. According to him, Nawaz Sharif exhibited his willingness to establish working relationship with the government of the PPP. Consequently, a three-member committee was constituted. That committee was consisted of Mian Manzoor Ahmad, the Speaker of the Punjab Assembly, Ghulam Haider Wyne, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, and Malik Naeem. It had the responsibility of holding dialogues with the center on matters of political deadlock.

It is thought provoking that how political elites played a game against each other to have power in their hands. On one hand, efforts were being made to restore normal relations between the center and the provincial government. On the other hand, the COP convened a National Convention in which a charge sheet of corruption, nepotism, financial irregularities, and mismanagement against the government of the PPP was presented. The conveners demanded direct action of the President in the interests of the nation.

Nawaz Sharif locked himself up in political conflict with Benazir Bhutto. This kicked off confrontational politics between political leadership. Nawaz Sharif demanded provincial autonomy from the centre. He defied the federal government authority on many occasion (Shafqat, 1997, p. 231).

Nawaz Sharif's strategy to oppose Benazir Bhutto was two pronged. On one hand, he made alliance with Islamic political parties. They continuously questioned Benazir Bhutto's ideological credentials. On the other hand, he used the ethnic card "Punjabism" against her as she belonged to the province of Sindh. He also joined hands with ethnic political parties and struggled for provincial autonomy. He made them believe that provincial autonomy would now be achieved as a leader from the Punjab had joined them (Haqqani, 2005, p. 132). In reaction, Benazir Bhutto, with consultation of certain cabinet minister, attempted to dismiss Nawaz Sharif's government in the Punjab. She moved a vote of no confidence against him in the Punjab provincial assembly (Shafqat, 1997, p. 232).

The government of the IJI in the Punjab was dependent on the loyalty of several Independent Members of the Assembly. Consequently, the PPP tried hard to win over their support. They were offered amenities. However, it failed to win over even a single member. Nawaz Sharif paid in gold to retain their loyalties. The PPP failed to defeat him from the office of the CM. In reaction, Benazir Bhutto attempted to harm Nawaz Sharif's and his family's business. As a result, her government registered cases against him. The cases were related with the evasion of bank loans, corruption and, many others. Benazir Bhutto's government even stooped so low in its rivalry that the PR refused to take raw materials to Sharif Foundry from Karachi to Lahore (Akhund, 2000, pp. 64-65).

Nawaz Sharif faced threats and cases with smiling face. He had the support of the army and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He even publically asked for their help (Haqqani, 2005, p. 132). The president Ghulam Ishaq Khan played the second fiddle. His policy was more of divide and rule in the center-province relations. Benazir Bhutto government was engagement with Nawaz Sharif's government in confrontation in the province of the Punjab. It is a naked truth that democracy could not win unless and until the political leaders had tolerant behavior towards one another. In the democratic setup, the opposition has an important role to play. However, contrary to such role, Nawaz Sharif denied to accept the authority of Benazir Bhutto's government in the center (Lamb, 1991).

Nawab Akbar Bugti mitigated his grievances against Benazir Bhutto's government. The president Ghulam Ishaq Khan played an important role to boost up those grievances against the government. Besides, the CM of Baluchistan Nawab Akbar Bugti joined hands with Nawaz Sharif, excessively driven by power to bring down the government of Benazir Bhutto in the centre. The PPP claimed that it stood for the poor and fought for their rights. Besides, it sought Pakistan to be a social welfare state, however, not any function, stood for the agenda it proclaimed. Its party functions were held in five star hotels which were by itself an indicator of that what it stood for. The main purpose of the PPP was to get power and pursue policies in accord with circumstances (Khan Faqir, Fakhru'l Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).

During the rule of Benazir Bhutto, the civil bureaucracy faced with a new challenge. As a result of growing enmity and political conflict both political stakeholders, the PPP and the IJI, used the civil servants for their own purpose and used them as instruments amid the struggle for powers. The centre government called back five bureaucrats to Islamabad who were working in the province of the Punjab. The transferred civil servants were included the Inspector General of Police, Superintendent of Police, Information Secretary, the Additional Chief Secretary, and the Chief Secretary in the Punjab. According to the centre government, these civil servants used their powers for the interests of the provincial government. Anwar Zahid's transfer was successfully resisted by the Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif. In addition to, the PPP faced resistance from the Punjab government with regard to the implementation of the PPD in the province. The Punjab government did not allow the work under PPD even the D.C bulldozed the work (The Dynamics of Power: Military, pp. 8-9).

#### **2.4. Benazir, the Army and the Crisis:**

The government of the PPP sought help of the army during its operation against the MQM in 1989. The government wanted the army to handle the situation arising out of the operation. However, the army sought full-fledged power under Article 245 of the Constitution of the state to be granted. But the government was adamant to grant such powers. This state of affairs further aggravated the relations between the army and the government of the PPP.

The gulf between the army and the government of the PPP kept widening with each day. In such a situation, Benazir decided to have reconciliation with Nawaz Sharif when she felt that her relations with the army were going towards a point of no return. For this purpose, she deputed her closest confidant Mr. Happy Mannola to seek rapprochement with Nawaz Sharif. However, his efforts could not bring any results. In the mean time, the COP demanded of the President Ishaq to take action against the government of the PPP in a convention in which a charge sheet against the government of the PPP was presented. This shows that political elites do not hesitate to take advantage of the situation in order to defeat their rival.

The observers had the opinion that some persons of high importance in the civil and military bureaucracy wanted anarchy like situation in the polity to make the public believe that only civil and military oligarchy could run government successfully in the state. For this purpose, they instigated political parties in their respective offices on

non-cooperation. This was how political elites provided the military with an opportunity to take mileage of the situation. In their struggle for power, they forgot democracy and its ideals.

On July 28<sup>th</sup>, General Mirza Aslam Baig (the COAS) called on Benazir Bhutto in the Prime Minister House. Col. Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, the Minister of State for Defense, was also present on the occasion. They had detailed discussion over the constitutional role of the army and the operation against miscreants in the province of Sind. The COAS also informed the Prime Minister of the proceedings of the Corps Commanders Conference held the previous day.

However, a report published in the UK newspaper "the Independent" revealed that the confrontation between Benazir Bhutto and the army over the situation in the province of Sind had acquired the form of conflict. Moreover, this tussle had also affected the national and foreign policy. It was certain, the report maintained, that she would face many problems in the days to come. Many a member of her political party had refused to obey her authority. However, she was reluctant to grant infinite powers to the army for the eradication of law and order situation in the province of Sind. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto was trying her best to have better relations with India and trying to reduce the current tension between the states due to the problem of Kashmir (Anjum, 2009, pp. 241-255).

Benazir Bhutto provided information to Rajiv Gandhi about those Sikhs in Pakistan who were helping their fellows engaged in the Separation Movement against India. Her information not only revealed the role of Pakistan intelligence agency but also caused damage to the right of self-determination of Kashmiris. This made the intelligence agencies of the state against her government and left no stone unturned to turn the table on her (Kazimi, 2009, p. 278). In this regard, her letter to the USA Senator Peter Galbraith in which she had discussed the current situation in the polity as well as her relations with the then Indian Premier, stands as evidence.

Benazir wanted India to call back her army which was deployed near the border. However, the army of Pakistan was confident of its capability to meet the Indian aggression. It was, therefore, the military insisted that the government should not bow against the Indian demand. The government of Benazir had the feelings that the expenditures over army for keeping active for seven months had shattered all hopes of economic progress in the state.

Benazir also sought to take the foreign policy of the state from the army and wanted to give back to the foreign office as soon as the foreign powers proceed towards the solution of the Afghan problem. She enjoyed the support of the USA at the problem of Afghanistan and issues with India. According to the American Ambassador Robert Oakley, the support Benazir Bhutto had from the USA even further antagonized the army. This support of the US to Benazir's government was actually in the backdrop of its reservations over the Pakistan army growing relationship with Iran.

The senior ministers of the PPP charged the army with blames that it was trying to destabilize the government and sought to divide the PPP. This shows that how elites in Pakistan in the light of power elite theory struggle to tighten their grip on the power they hold for which they do not hesitate to surrender national priorities or thwart uniformity of national interests.

An electoral alliance in the name of IJI was made to counter the PPP in the general elections being held in 1988 in order to keep the PPP from sweeping the elections realizing its popularity in the masses. The idea of this alliance was floated by the ISI chief General Hamid Gul who told COAS Aslam Baig if the PPP swept the elections, it would pose danger to the many causes dear to the army. The COAS Aslam Baig hailed the advice in his interview with the Herald in 2001.

The relations between Benazir and the army were cordial. However, the relations suffered from deterioration when Benazir replaced the ISI chief Hamid Gul with General Kalu (retired). Aslam Baig was happy over the Benazir's decision as General Hamid Gul had become political. However, he was not happy over her nomination as she had rejected his list of nomination. Benazir, in her interview with the Voice of America Radio, revealed that Aslam Baig was also a part of the plan according to which her government was dismissed in 1990. She said that he was made convinced by Ishaq and some members of the agencies that she was going to replace him (F. Paracha, 2016). It was the same Aslam Baig whom Benazir awarded with Tamgha-i-Jamhooriyat (Aziz S., 2016).

General Aslam Baig, in his interview with the Nation, revealed that the ISI was mandated with the formation of the right-wing political alliance in order to deter the expected sweeping majority of the PPP in the elections in 1988. As a result, the ISI helped arrange the reunification of the two factions of the PML and also encouraged other political parties to join the alliance. Consequently, a political alliance in the name of IJI was established. In addition to that, the ISI supported the IJI during elections campaign and even devised anti-PPP elections slogans (Nation, 1995). In the elections, the main contender IJI, a counterweight to the PPP, was, in fact, the competition for power between the ideas and programme of the progenies of the General Zia and of the ZA Bhutto (Ziring, 1997, p. 509).



In September-October 1988 two officers of the ISI were tasked to launch an operation “Midnight Jackals” in order to win over the national assembly members of the PPP to help succeed the vote of no confidence against Benazir. That was revealed by the officer in his interview with the News on July 9, 1994. He told that his mission was not to dismiss Benazir’s government but he was tasked to do so (News, 1994).

Besides, the agencies played active role to force the MQM to break alliance with the PPP and extend support to the opposition in its move of the vote of no confidence against Benazir. (Rizvi, 1998) P.101. In addition to that, Benazir sought General Aslam Baig to avoid legal actions against those who had been removed from the service for indiscipline over their resentment at the capital punishment administered to the former Prime Minister of Pakistan Z.A Bhutto. The COAS resented the advice and thought that an interference in the affairs of the army (Pakistan, 1995). The army had strong reservation over Benazir’s attempt to have normal relations with India. It looked with suspicion at Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in December 1988 and July 1989 respectively and thought Benazir to be untrustworthy (Rizvi H. A., 1998, p. 102).

Despite the fact that Benazir Bhutto compromised with the establishment, even then, she was not in their good books. They apparently accepted her person as prime minister but actually they considered her as their rival for power. On many occasions, General Aslam Baig reiterated the army role as the King maker. He further said, “We have bigger things to hijack, if we want to (Akhund, 2000, p. 55).”

Presenting himself to be pro-democracy, General Aslam Baig publically warned Benazir Bhutto not to interfere in the affairs of the army and advised to toe her line as she had promised. This resentment from the top position of the army came forth when she sought to make appointment in the top hierarchy of the military. The COAS Aslam Baig’s supposedly likeness for democracy could not overshadow the army historical prejudice against democracy in Pakistan as it had ruled the state for more than 23 years (Ali, 1990, p. 2240).

The Pakka Qila incident deteriorated the relations between the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the army. The incident occurred on 27<sup>th</sup> may 1990. This incident widened the gulf between Benazir Bhutto and army. It was the Muhajirs settlement in Hyderabad. The PPP government had the information that some terrorists were hidden there. The government launched an operation against them and the police killed at least 30 terrorists. However, the operation was not brought to an end due to the lack of resources. Moreover, the police proclaimed that the terrorists had the support of the managers of the ISI. The incident however, was seen as an ethnic conflict in which the Sindh police killed many Muhajirs. As a result, the relation between the army and the PPP both from personal and institutional point deteriorated.

The COAS, Aslam Baig belonged to the Muhajirs community. Therefore, reservation on the incident was a natural outcome. In addition to, the relations between the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the COAS also got strained as Benazir Bhutto wanted to extend the term of Lt.Gen. Aslam Jan Mehsud as Corps Commander in Lahore, however, he was replaced with Lt. Gen. Ashraf Janjua. This interference from Benazir Bhutto, however, proved a last straw that broke the camel’s back. It became evident to the army high command that her government must be dismissed (Kamran, 2008, p. 143).

The army allowed the elections in 1988 and hoped that the PPP would not be able to win the elections. For eleven years under Gen. Zia rule, the army had developed animosity towards the PPP and condemned it as anti-establishment. Moreover, Benazir was thought as security risk. The army had thinking of Benazir Bhutto as an enemy who even had inspired her party workers against the army. Consequently, distraction and enmity existed between the army elites and Benazir Bhutto (Shafqat, 1998, p. 243).

Gen. Aslam Baig in September 1980 reiterated that democracy 'has its own dynamics and in-built mechanism to correct itself. Our responsibility and duty is to provide security to that system'. However, he influenced Benazir Bhutto to replace the CM of Sindh Qaim Ali Shah with Aftab Shaban Mirani in February 1990 (Bray, 1990, p. 111).

### **3. Analysis of Discussion: Power Elite Theory in Perspective**

The case of democracy in the Benazir Bhutto first term in office is analyzed in the light of the power elite theory of C.W.Mills. C.W.Mills analyzed the politics of the USA into three categories in his book “the Power Elite”. They are the politicians, the corporate sector and the military. He is of the view that the power in the USA is regulated among these categories out of personal interests. Together they are known as the power elites. The case of democracy in crisis in Pakistan in the history and Benazir’s first term in office could be best seen in the light of power elite theory. The crisis of democracy was due to the power struggle among the president, Benazir, army and the opposition in the centre and in the provinces. Together they could be clubbed as power elite. The transition to democracy just after the death of General Zia ul-Haq implanted hopes in the democratic loving populace that a new era would start in the polity. However, such hopes failed to bear any fruit. The civilian government was characterized with political infighting, corrupt practices, conspiracies, and what not. Consequently, the so-called

democracy failed to take roots in the polity. This sort of affairs casts shadows of doubts over the role of leadership, and raised questions why they failed to do away with the problems which were inherently democratic in nature.

General Pervez Musharruf, who was himself a coup-maker and had rolled back democracy in October 1999, had the opinion with respect to the role of civilian leadership that it was all the mistakes made by politicians and made the state suffered out of their mutual political infighting from economic and political problems (Siddiqi, 2007, p. 93). This opinion could be biased but it does help one to look into the role of politicians in the so-called decade of democracy.

Democracy was characterized with political infighting among political parties, struggle for power between ethnic and regional forces. The power corridor consisted of a number of stakeholders. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was an ex-civil servant, was pro-Zia and military. Mirza Aslam Baig was the COAS. Nawaz Sharif, who was the CM of the Punjab, was a staunch political opponent of Benazir Bhutto. Benazir Bhutto, who was the daughter of ex-prime minister ZA Bhutto, was an entrant in politics and had remained PM twice. And finally, there were the regional and ethnic forces in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan which sought provincial autonomy (Kap, 1991, p. 150).

Benazir Bhutto appreciated the role of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the COAS while accepting her person as the Prime Minister of the state. This brought an end to their mutual enmity after years of opposition (Haqqani, 2005, p. 132). This behaviour stands witness to their belief in democratic values. Benazir Bhutto, despite possessing majority, was not allowed with ease to form government in the centre. Her appreciation also speaks volume about her political acumen and belief in public verdict. Power was the main goal for which everything even including political morality could be compromised.

The relations between Benazir Bhutto and civil-military leadership deteriorated soon after she assumed the office. She described this sorry situation in such words. "Phone calls were being misdirected, files going missing, her own servants blackmailed by General Hamid Gul's ISI" (Lamb, 1991, p. 39).

The political scene in the polity was characterized by confrontation, political squabble in the so-called period of democracy. Benazir Bhutto assumed the office in 1988 and soon locked into confrontation with her rivals. The confrontation was bitter, nasty, and for the sake of power only. There were many problems the state was faced with. However, they remained unattained on account of this mutual infighting and rivalry. The Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto too much dependence on the military diverted her attention from national and international issues. She failed to tackle economic problems. She also failed to address the issue regarding women. The back door politics was mainly responsible for this sort of affairs and the PPP was no exception to this (Ziringan, 1990, p. 127).

"Nawaz Sharif's performance reminded many Pakistanis of the authoritarian patterns experienced during the Zia period" and also his "seemingly open call to the president and the armed forces to intervene in domestic political affairs" show his belief in democracy. Benazir Bhutto had risen to power because of her mandate from the people. A year after her coming to office, Ziring pointed to her "apparent reliance on the armed forces (Ziringan, 1990, pp. 129-130)."

The elections held in 1988 set political trends for the next eleven years in the politics. Benazir Bhutto was new in politics and had zero experience in the statecraft when she took the office of Prime Minister in 1988. She was the daughter of ZA Bhutto. She was a college student when he was the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1970s. In addition to, the PPP remained in opposition against military-cum-civilian government for eleven years or so. Its leadership and workers were either tortured or jailed. The politicians, who had started their political career during the days of her father, either did not like her as she was the daughter of ZA Bhutto or adamant to extend their support as she was too young.

Besides, the veterans of the PPP joined hands with army for the sake of political gains and all that. Consequently, Benazir Bhutto had only an inexperienced lot in her camp. On top of this, the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the COAS Aslam Baig, and most importantly Nawaz Sharif considered her as their main opponent in the politics since the day one. The Islamists also had reservations over her and opposed her faith and patriotism vigorously (Haqqani, 2005, p. 133).

Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the JI had of the opinion that Benazir Bhutto should not be criticized on the basis of being a westernized woman and on her gender that she could not lead an Islamic state. He substantiated his stance with as the mandate that she had of the majority of the people who had bestowed their trust in her person. So she was not a problem for them as she was demonized. However, her stance on national security issues could not be underestimated. He advised the IJI to criticize Benazir Bhutto on the basis of security issues and considered her person a security risk to the state, to its nuclear programme, and to jihad in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2005, p. 134).

From the start, Benazir Bhutto failed to create workable relations with the provincial governments. Her government's relations with the province of Baluchistan remained deteriorated throughout her first term in office. In the same way, she had no good relations with the Punjab. Besides, Cities in her home province Sindh were engulfed

in violence, chaos and anarchy. On top of all these, she and her family were accused of corruption and embezzlement. She earned the enmity of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan when she replaced the ISI Chief General Hamid Gul and announced the JOCS Admiral Sirohy's retirement (Yasmeen, 1994, p. 573).

Benazir Bhutto, when came into power, put stress on having good relations with the USA. The Islamists and the military had the contrary view and opposed relations with the USA. In the meeting of IJI, JUI leader Maulana Sami ul-Haq opined at the person of Benazir Bhutto and her political acumen. He said, "Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability simply cannot be safe under the leadership of a westernized woman. She cares more for American approval than for ensuring the *Umma*'s first nuclear bomb (Haqqani, 2005, p. 139)."

The COAS Aslam Baig accepted the nuclear programme publically. The USA resented this open realization. He had no political cover. However, he had of the opinion that Benazir Bhutto would take the responsibility for the statement. Contrary to his hopes, she did nothing of the sort. This open acknowledgement made the USA apprehensive about Benazir Bhutto's role too. She failed to restrain the COAS from the nuclear programme.

Once the USA acquainted that she had no control on army. It did not put any weight against to resist her removal from power. Its protest almost disappeared when democracy was derailed in the state. According to Haqqani, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan confided that the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government had come from the military (Haqqani, 2005, p. 140). However, the COAS Aslam Baig proclaimed that he "was not instrumental" in Bhutto's removal and that "it was the president's decision (Ali, 1995, p. 13)."

The ISI worked to dismiss Benazir Bhutto's government when she took the office of the Prime Minister. It even bought the loyalties of the members of the PPP who were once hard-times associates. Now they had the opportunities to take advantage of the situation. Besides, her husband, Asif Zardari, was involved in kickbacks and shady deals. This also provided the ISI with an opportunity to propagate her husband corruption stories in the public. In such circumstances, the IJI also worked side by side in building the perception of the public about the corruption being done by the PPP (Haqqani, 2005, p. 140).

It is relevant to refer to those cases which were registered against Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Zardari when her government was dismissed in 1990. None in those cases proved against them. Roedad Khan was made the head of the special Accountability Cell to look into those cases. Roedad Khan was a retired bureaucrat. However, he failed to prove any case against them till 1993 when Nawaz Sharif's government was dismissed on the similar charges of corruption and all that. In the end, the cases were dropped without any success (Yasmeen, 1994, pp. 577-578).

There was conflict over who would take the office of the Prime Minister. The COAS Aslam Baig sought Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to be the Prime Minister. However, Nawaz Sharif had the support of General Hamid Gul and several other Generals who threw their weight behind him on the basis of ethnicity. The Punjabi Generals wanted Nawaz Sharif to be the Prime Minister. In the elections held in 1990, the IJI had landslide victory in the Punjab. To make this victory a basis for his claim, Nawaz Sharif proclaimed that the Punjab gave its verdict in favour of him and wanted him to be the next Prime Minister. Besides, he acknowledged in public that he had the support of the Punjabi Generals. The house of the IJI was divided on who should be the Prime Minister. However, in the end Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister in November 1990 (Haqqani, 2005, p. 141). This symbolizes that how elites struggle for powers without any care for group loyalties.

Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of ZA Bhutto, and her assumption of the office of Prime Minister of Pakistan as the Premier was not less than that of the dynastic succession. She held meeting with the COAS Aslam Baig on 23<sup>rd</sup> November on dinner. It was the acknowledgement of the military elites' importance in the politics of Pakistan. In the meeting, she agreed to the proposal of the constitution of Defense Council. The President of Pakistan would head the council in her place. The service and intelligence chiefs would make up as members of the council. Besides, she also agreed not to make any reduction in the defense budget. She agreed to not to bring her candidate against the acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who was vying for the Presidency. She too gave her assent to keep continued Sahebzada Yaqoob Khan as the Foreign Minister and would not halt policy regarding Afghanistan Issue. It is worth mentioning that Sahebzada Yaqoob Khan belonged to the ML-led IJI (1988, p. 2611).

Despite other problems faced to Benazir Bhutto, Asif Zardari, her husband became an additional liability for her, who sought to have prominence in the political affairs of the state and wanted his presence to be recognized in the politics. His presence in the meetings or on foreign tours the civil-military bureaucracy disliked. They thought his presence to be unnecessary and uncanny. In the same way, the public was also apprehensive about Asif Zardari's that type of presentation. He was a constant source of embarrassment for Benazir Bhutto as the officials used to resent his presence particularly at the official briefings (Kamran, 2008, p. 145). This shows that how elites use the public office.

Zardari earned the name of swindle within no time. He used the office of the Prime Minister making shady deals, sell permits and licenses of industries and blessing his friends with favours. This earned him the little of Mr. Ten percent. It distorted the image of Benazir Bhutto in the public. This not only made the way for her dismissal but also tarnished the PPP's image as the political party (Kamran, 2008, pp. 145-46).

The political leadership of Benazir Bhutto proved to be weak if analyzed her political inadequacies. She ill planned the movements for democracy and played down her majority as the PM when she first assumed the office. She followed the footsteps which Gen. Zia ul Haq wanted the politician to follow. She outclassed many while bring the elected representatives to have their support in the National Assembly as she gave free hand to her husband of what to do in the PM secretariat (Khan A. A., 1997)".

The PML had close relations with Gen. Ayub Khan, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, and Gen. Pervez Musharraf. This shows the relations between the PML and non-political forces. Similarly, the PPP, in the opinion of Jamaat, had direct relations with the military regimes of Gen. Ayub Khan and Gen. Yahya Khan. It was the PPP who brought Gen. Zia-ul-Haq to the coveted post of the COAS but he struck back on it, and confrontation started between him and the PPP. Moreover, after Gen. Zia-ul-Haq death in 1988, it was Gen. Aslam Baig and Lt. Gen Asad Durrani who played an important role in bringing her to the power in 1988 elections.

Benazir Bhutto too awarded them with public appreciation for their role in the so-called restoration of democracy and awarded Tamgha-e-Jamhooriyat to Aslam Baig (the COAS). In addition to, it was the political parties that started clan based (biradari based) politics for their own purpose. Before independence, the PML was a group of some wealthy family, and it even remained under their influences after independence. Thus biradari based politics provided not only strength to the political parties but it also provided leadership to the political parties. Bhuttos, Paghars, Lagharis, Mangales, Khan and Sherpoas are worth mentioning (Ahmed, 2009, pp. 111-113).

During her first term in office, two things distracted Benazir Bhutto. First and foremost, she sought to govern all the opposition parties. Secondly, she allowed her husband Asif Zardari to use her political powers, who used those powers for personal gains. Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed her government in the light of the prevailed circumstances. Despite the fact, he was elected for the next five years by the PPP. However, Benazir Bhutto, later on, realized that his election as the president by her political party was her political blunder (Khan Faqir, Fakhru'l Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).

Favoritism was the order of the day. This was used arbitrarily for personal purpose and flounder the law. The MNAs and MPAs were hardly arrested if found guilty. The corruption was rampant. The affluent people got monetary benefit in land scam as well as in banks or financial scams without any check from the government to patch the rent. The government made Commission to probe Cooperative Financial Companies scams. But however, no fruitful results were met. Moreover, to show case the public favor, the government representatives used to distributed cheques among the effectees on TV to show that government constituted commission were doing enough. However, both the government and the opposition accused each other of these scams and held responsible for them one another. Such blame game did nothing fulfilling the loss been incurred on the masses (Khan Faqir, Fakhru'l Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).

Benazir Bhutto becomes involved in controversy and conformation with the president and the military, over the retirement of admiral Sirohey. Admiral Sirohey was appointed as Chief of staff Committee in 1986. He was appointed as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee in 1988. When his three years term as Chief of Staff Committee ended in 1989, the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto sought to retire him on the following grounds. First and foremost, the president is the appointing authority under the constitution to such post whereas the prime minister is the retiring authority. Secondly, his retirement was due after his appointment as admiral in 1989. However, the president and the army had of the view that his retirement was due not after three years as the admiral but, as the chairman JCSC that is 1991. Moreover, the president was both appointing and the retiring authority. This becomes a thorn in the relations between the president and the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. At last, Benazir Bhutto let Sirohey continue in his office (The Dynamics of Power: Military, p. 11).

Benazir Bhutto's although campaigned against military dictator but she made pledged with the military establishment that she would not commit anything that could minimize its privileges (S. Venkatanarayanan, 1989). It shows that it is the politicians or political leadership that compromise with the army for their personal advantages. Although before power, they vehemently speak against the military and its political involvement. However, coming into power, they compromise for personal interest.

Such kind of behaviors on the part of political leaders has produced distrust about democracy. This disappointment does not mean that democracy is the bad form of government. But it is related with the undemocratic behavior of the power elites who had been hoped to make democracy work in the polity. Like a number of democracies, where aspiration for democracy is strong, however, pro-democratic groups are less. The same is the case of Pakistan (Shafiqat, 1999, pp. 283-284).

#### 4. CONCLUSION

In short, mutual rivalries among the power elites (political elites) put the democratic transition in the state on stake and floundered democracy for personal gains. In this struggle for power, they even do not hesitate to join hands with the army in order to bring down their rival. It was this rivalry for power that none of the governments was able to complete its span of time according to the constitution. Each government had to leave the office ungracefully. For this state of affairs, political elites are held responsible keeping in view their role that provided an opportunity to the group of elites both democratic and undemocratic to take advantage of the situation between the main political elites. Benazir's first term in office was characteristics of such type of politics that consisted of confrontation, authoritarianism, and of what not. Both the ruling party and the opposition had been engaged in the so-called politics which was only to promote their personal interests at the cost of democracy. In addition to this, the role of the opposition was not according to democratic norms and principles. It made alliances against the ruling party in order to bring it down, and welcomed frequently the undemocratic decisions of the President. The role of Nawaz Sharif and of other opposition during their respective periods in opposition speaks volume about their political behavior. Moreover, the hung parliaments were also a factor in deepening the crisis of democracy during Benazir's first term in office. If the coalition partners failed to compromise on mutual interests, the dissident threatened the government to go out of the coalition. As a result, the ruling party had to suffer from crisis. There was unprecedented rigging of elections in which the government comprised of the President, the interim set up, and the intelligence agencies performed their active role. In short power elites did not allow democracy out of their personal interests in the period.

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